JTJohn Laurence Thorogood

John Laurence Thorogood

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

John Laurence Thorogood has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • An Assessment of the Kick Tolerance Calculation, its Uncertainty and Sensitivity

    by John Thorogood, Ewen Robertson, David Castillo, Steve Sawaryn

    Much of the contemporary literature on kick tolerance relates to the practical aspects of the calculation and the effects of the underlying assumptions and necessary simplifications. It tends to a formulaic approach involving unconstrained uncertainties about pore pressure, kick intensity, drilling fluid density safety factors which tend to overlook the inherent complexities of the subsurface environment and the reality of model limitations. The literature on kick tolerance highlighting the strengths, weaknesses and limitations of the classic calculation is reviewed before describing a first-principles approach to determining the consequences which casing seat strength limitations and strength variations in the overall open-hole section imposes on safe well designs as a result of uncertainties in the input variables and basic model assumptions. The classic kick tolerance calculation, together with its associated assumptions, yields only a single value for a given set of inputs. The uncertainties and sensitivities are those introduced by the variables and the choice of operational procedures. The Monte Carlo method is employed to explore the effect of uncertainties in the input parameters and associated assumptions. The analysis is based on the Driller’s Method for kick circulation, with a single bubble insoluble gas with optional allowances for gas gravity and thermal regimes. To examine the various factors influencing kick tolerance, the problem is framed graphically in terms of an allowable influx volume, the dependent variable, against bottom hole pressure, the independent variable, on which pore pressure, its uncertainty, possible variations in shoe strength, strength in the open-hole section, drilling fluid density with associated equivalent circulating density and swab effects can be examined. Application of the new approach demands significant prior work to determine the uncertainties inherent in the problem. Some of these uncertainties, such as drilling fluid density variations, swabbing and equivalent circulating density must be evaluated by the engineer as part of the normal well design. Other factors, such as shoe strength, pore pressure variability and formation depth error bars must be developed as part of a multi-disciplinary effort within the planning team. Often ignored due to the spatial uncertainties, natural fractures intersecting the borehole could be inherently unstable and prone to hydraulic communication between borehole and formation. Synthesising some of these considerations into a simple calculation framework allows the effect of these parameters either individually or collectively to be quantified and provides a view of the potential geological uncertainties inherent in a well design. The approach offers a starting point for thinking about the nature of geological uncertainties and carrying them into drilling programmes


  • Real-Time Operations Support for Geographically Dispersed Operations

    by Richard Kucs, Wolfgang Lehnert, John Thorogood, Hermann Spoerker, Neal Whatson

    Presentations on real-time drilling support activities have been focused on large-scale operators or service companies that have full-time dedicated centers serving multiple rigs. These are staffed on a full-time basis with specialist monitoring teams and are supported by an extensive integrated communications infrastructure.This paper addresses the problem faced by an operator working on a much smaller scale needing to provide a few geographically dispersed rigs with the benefits of real-time support technologies through high quality communications and a clearly defined workflow involving collaborative working between the rig, operations office and the head office in Europe. We describe how the real-time systems were implemented for a number of global drilling operations without installing a real time operation center. A case study of implementation in one area is presented.This approach enabled the decision makers in the field to access the experience of and support from the rest of the organization. The global real time collaboration environment allowed the specialists to direct their attention, as required, to operations most in need of support at any particular time. By not installing a real-time operations center, the organization saved resources and encouraged the local teams to use the analysis tools themselves to manage their operational performance.The head office organization provided technical and administrative support. It facilitated the design of the workflows and set common standards for the IT and communications architecture. The workflows were essential in order to create a structure for using the software tools within a local drilling team and to make sure that problems were detected as early as possible. The workflows aimed to strike a balance between not allowing early warning signals to be overlooked while giving the operations team the freedom to responsibly manage the operation on the rig. Through the way that the system and the workflows were used on a daily basis, the rig personnel gained confidence that the system was set up purely to support them and for their benefit. The design and the implementation of these workflows utilized industry-leading real time drilling data analysis and drilling support tools.When difficult operational problems were encountered, by acting as a knowledge broker, the central organization drew from its world-wide skill pool to organize problem-specific multi-disciplinary support for problem-solving, peer review and functional sign-off for program changes. These "on-call" teams ensured that the knowledge of the organization was leveraged and experience shared. It enabled the head office organization to provide resources to assist in following up the analysis of positive and negative events will be done properly and result in lessons learnt and updated best practice.


  • Threat and Error Management: The Connection Between Process Safety and Practical Action at the Worksite

    by J. L. Thorogood, M. T. Crichton

    High Reliability Organisations have five important characteristics: a preoccupation with failure, a reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, resilience, and a respect for expertise. Experience from recent incidents suggests that these qualities may generally be lacking in organisations that manage drilling operations today. Research sponsored by OGP and others has suggested that creating a sense of ‘chronic unease’ in relation to barrier integrity and operation of safety-critical systems, combined with understanding of the psychological issues that create error-producing conditions, will strengthen defences against major accidents occurring. The question remains as to the best way to embed the necessary skills through teaching, coaching, and assessment and their integration into routine working practices. Experience from aviation suggests that successful implementation of non-technical skills needs to be combined with a clearly defined operational framework. Such an operational framework, however, is not widely observed in the drilling community at present. A standardised approach that defines how drilling operations are to be executed, activities monitored, decisions made or changes managed in a time-constrained environment provides the context in which the necessary individual and organisational skills can be taught. Training needs to address the underlying psychological theory, in particular cognitive biases, of non-technical skills to counter threats and errors in the workplace. The paper summarises the principles of high reliability organisations and their contribution to process safety in the context of drilling operations. Next, we describe Threat and Error Management, which evolved from aviation-based Crew Resource Management to produce the levels of safety that today we accept as normal. We introduce operational risk management in drilling as the analogous link with aviation. The paper concludes by illustrating how these concepts can be used in drilling operations to enhance routine risk management activities, and will describe the tools and techniques involved. The advantage of this approach is that effective non-technical skills can be observed, coached and assessed on a routine basis in the workplace. Active use of these methods in every-day drilling operations promotes the essential characteristics of a high reliability organisation by instilling the sense of chronic unease and concern for barrier integrity, thereby reducing the chance of minor anomalies cascading into major accidental events.


  • Case Study of Weak Signals and Confirmation Bias in Drilling Operations

    by J. L. Thorogood, M. T. Crichton, A. Bahamondes

    The paper presents a case study of the circumstances leading up to a situation where a supposedly vertical well ended up at 14° before the deviation was detected and a correction could be made. This case study illustrates how a relatively routine activity could end up off the plan, and also highlights the impact of weak signals and confirmation bias on the situation. Process safety has become a focus of attention, with much work done to ensure that organisations are educated and trained in the techniques necessary to avoid catastrophic incidents. Human error has come under the spotlight and "human factors", including non-technical skills, are being included into training programmes, such as well control. However, the language around human factors, and the psychological terms used, such as "cognitive bias", "chronic unease" and "weak signals" are abstract and unfamiliar to the drilling community. Furthermore, limiting human factors training to well control suggests that non-technical skills are only required during abnormal events. Yet, as this case study will show, developing these skills in general brings benefits in avoiding what might be regarded as "normal" non-productive time incidents. By describing a real and very recent wells incident, the paper shows how the same set of circumstances can be investigated from several different perspectives and how different conclusions about root cause can be drawn depending on the agenda of the investigator. There is no doubt that no single perspective fully explains what happened in this incident, and why, but traditionally there is little evidence of a human factors perspective being adopted during incident investigations beyond the use of the label of ‘human error’. The paper will show how, without the benefit of hindsight, the rig team made a perfectly reasonable set of decisions under the circumstances with which they thought they were being confronted. There was evidence in some of the data to suggest that the well was deviating from the vertical, but there were competing pressures on the team for them to disregard the warnings. While there are certain obvious procedural and technical lessons to be drawn from the event, deeper lessons relate to the difficulties associated with overcoming the tendency to see what is expected and the central role played by leaders to support and commit to the time and cost of precautionary actions. It is hoped that the paper will encourage the drilling community to look beyond the apparent interpretations of an event to consider why it was that otherwise sensible people did what they did. There are many incidents of this type from which the community can learn at relatively low cost, particularly focusing on the human factors aspects. Yet, the learning from these incidents, and the training to avoid them will, ultimately, develop the skills that will be instrumental in helping teams identify and react to conditions that might otherwise develop into a catastrophe.


  • Drilling Automation: Potential for Human Error

    by Fionn Iversen, Leif Jarle Gressgård, John L. Thorogood, Mohsen Karimi Balov, Vidar Hepsø

    Summary: Mode confusion is an automated system behaving differently than expected and the operator not being aware of (or not properly understanding) what the system is doing. Mode confusion is well-recognized in the aviation community and has been indicated in a number of high-profile aviation accidents. As an example, a JAS Gripen fighter jet crashed during a test flight in the 1980s because the pilot tried to manually correct instability while the plane's computer was automatically trying to do the same. The potential for the same type of problems, and associated safety hazards, arises in drilling-rig operations as a result of the increasing trend for automation and advisory systems. A simple example could be formation fracturing with an automated downhole pressure-control system when displacing to higher mud weight caused by the driller relying on the automated system to maintain sufficiently low flow rate without having reconfigured the system with the new mud properties. This paper describes how the use of a drilling support system in different modes and levels of automation may influence the system operator's performance and risk of human error. The development of a systematic method for detecting mode-confusion problems by model checking is central in this respect. The test cases have been simulated in a virtual test environment created at IRIS specifically for such purposes. The test environment and test cases are described, and results are reported and discussed.


  • Is There a Place for High Reliability Organisations in Drilling?

    by John Laurence Thorogood

    High reliability organisations research was originally carried out with aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. Essentially, they were relatively closed communities, with a high operational tempo where mistakes could have extremely serious and direct consequences. In these cases, rapid learning was a by-product of personnel rotation and the need to train successors. Recent research suggests that high reliability organisations have five important characteristics: a preoccupation with failure, a reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, resilience and a respect for expertise. It is not immediately obvious that these qualities are an inherent part of the culture of the organisations that manage drilling operations today. The thesis of this paper is that these five traits taken together can prevent drilling operations from drifting into failures caused by the complexity of the organisations involved in conceptualising, planning and executing drilling operations, including the management environment in which they are set. This paper considers how apparently successful organisations can ‘drift into failure’ in part as a result of the consequences of organisational complexity. These ideas set the scene for a review of high reliability organisation theory and suggest ways in which the principles might be applied to the management of drilling operations.


  • Automation in Drilling: Future Evolution and Lessons from Aviation

    by John Laurence Thorogood

    Automation of the drilling process has been gathering pace over the last 10 years, with progress being made on many fronts, from choke control in managed pressure drilling (MPD) operations, through a new generation of auto drillers to intelligent systems that prevent the driller from exceeding parameters that might cause downhole problems. Observing the current state of automation in drilling, it is clear that in the case of MPD, automation has resulted in closer and more stable control of a process that can be achieved by a manual system. Auto-drillers combined with downhole rotary steerable systems have resulted in improved progress rates compared to manual systems. By contrast, modern rigs with highly mechanised pipe handling systems are still controlled manually with a crewing arrangement that has changed little while the technology has evolved dramatically. These developments pose a number of questions, for example: In what direction is automation likely to evolve in the future, and why? Can the drilling community avoid the mistakes of other industries and how might this be prevented? The paper reviews developments of automation in aviation and describes some of the problems that have arisen. It then outlines the analogous efforts in drilling and identifies lessons that could be learned. The paper presents a rationale on which further automation initiatives might be based and some of the related changes that might be necessary as a result.


  • Drilling Automation: Potential for Human Error

    by Fionn Petter Iversen, Leif Jarle Gressgaard, John Laurence Thorogood, Mohsen Karimi Balov, Vidar Hepsoe

    Mode confusion is when an automated system behaves differently than expected; in such a way that the operator is not aware of or does not properly understand what the system is doing. Mode confusion is well recognized in the aviation community and has been indicated in a number of high profile aviation accidents. As an example, a Jas Gripen fighter jet crashed during a test flight in the 1980s due to the pilot trying to manually correct instability while the plane's computer was automatically trying to do the same. The potential for the same type of problems, and associated safety hazards, arises in drilling rig operations as a result of the increasing trend for automation and advisory systems. A simple example could be formation fracturing with an automated ECD control system when displacing to higher mudweight caused by the driller relying on the automated system to maintain sufficiently low flowrate without having reconfigured the system with the new mud properties. Through the reported study the authors wish to analyse how use of a drilling support system in different modes and levels of automation may influence the system operator's performance and risk of human error. Development of a systematic method for detecting mode confusion problems by model checking is central in this respect. The test cases have been simulated in a synthetic test environment created at IRIS specifically for such purposes. The test environment and test cases are described, and results are reported and discussed.


  • Human-Factors Implications of Remote Drilling Operations: A Case Study From the North Sea

    by Kristina Lauche, Steven J. Sawaryn, John L. Thorogood

    Summary: Improved capabilities for real-time data transfer have given rise to remote monitoring and support for drilling operations, providing faster access to information onshore and reducing personnel on board (POB) and cost. The challenge lies not so much with the technical feasibility but with the impact on work processes, which is still poorly understood. This paper presents a case study of the human-factors implications of onshore operation centers (OOCs) in the North Sea. The authors first investigated work conducted in the Norwegian sector and then followed the implementation of a pilot OOC for the Andrew low-cost-drilling project in Aberdeen. All delivered wells successfully but addressed different strategic aims.For the case study of the Andrew project, the sample comprised 13 semistructured interviews conducted over 3 months and a longitudinal-attitude study with 33 participants from the onshore drilling team, OOC staff, and drilling representatives from offshore. Results were content analyzed by a team of industrial psychologists. The findings show that remote operations in drilling produce effects similar to those of virtual teams and computer-mediated process control in other industries; the monitoring work in the OOC was deprived of some of the physical activity, sensory information, and informal interaction. Potentially, some of these tasks could be automated further, while more cross-trained staff would be required offshore. Different user groups responded differently to the OOC implementation. Onshore teams generally approved of the concept because the OOC helped to create more situation awareness and presented an ideal environment for collaborative decision making and learning. The offshore response was mixed, with strong support for its innovative potential, but also critical voices about system reliability, contractual concerns, and the impact on work/life balance.OOCs can add value to drilling operations by enabling better-informed decisions, but the findings show that success depends on how well the introduction of organizational change is managed. The study provides evidence on how prospective users can be involved in the change process in this dispersed and fluctuating industry and which social and cognitive skills are important for effective collaboration in e-operations.


  • The Traveling-Cylinder Diagram: A Practical Tool for Collision Avoidance

    by J. L. Thorogood, S. J. Sawaryn

    Summary: The "traveling-cylinder" diagram aids collision risk assessment during planning and collision avoidance during direc tional drilling at multiwell locations. Survey results can be plotted directly on the diagram, enabling an immediate visual risk assess ment. This paper describes the conceptual basis of the diagram, how the diagram is used during planning and drilling, and how the information on the diagram can be interpreted.