Yubiao Huang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yubiao Huang has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dan Meng
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China
3 shared publications - Peinan Li
State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Beijing, China
3 shared publications - Rui Hou
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China
3 shared publications - Shiwen Wang
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Xingbin Wang
School of Cybersecurity, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300350, China
2 shared publications - Yunkai Bai
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, Beijing, China
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-7
Janus: Compiler-Based Defense Against Transient Execution Attacks Using ARM Hardware Primitives
- 26 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-7
Open AccessJanus: Compiler-Based Defense Against Transient Execution Attacks Using ARM Hardware Primitives
- Open Access
- 23 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
SecPaging: Secure Enclave Paging with Hardware-Enforced Protection against Controlled-Channel Attacks
As a prevalent privacy-preserving technology, Trusted Execution Environment has become widely adopted in numerous commercial processors. Nonetheless, they remain susceptible to various controlled-channel attacks. Untrusted operating systems can deduce enclave secrets by manipulating page tables or observing allocation- or swap-based page faults. In this paper, we propose SecPaging, a novel secure enclave paging mechanism based on hardware-enforced and microcode-supported protection to prevent these attacks. First, enclave PTEs are protected through hardware isolation, preventing privileged attackers from malicious tampering or observations. Second, an Eager-Allocation mechanism is employed to prevent allocation-based controlled-channel attacks. Besides, a Record-Reload mechanism is proposed to prevent swap-based controlled-channel attacks. We simulate SecPaging on real SGX. Experiments demonstrate that controlled channel attacks can be defended with minimal performance overhead.
- 23 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Open AccessSecPaging: Secure Enclave Paging with Hardware-Enforced Protection against Controlled-Channel Attacks
As a prevalent privacy-preserving technology, Trusted Execution Environment has become widely adopted in numerous commercial processors. Nonetheless, they remain susceptible to various controlled-channel attacks. Untrusted operating systems can deduce enclave secrets by manipulating page tables or observing allocation- or swap-based page faults. In this paper, we propose SecPaging, a novel secure enclave paging mechanism based on hardware-enforced and microcode-supported protection to prevent these attacks. First, enclave PTEs are protected through hardware isolation, preventing privileged attackers from malicious tampering or observations. Second, an Eager-Allocation mechanism is employed to prevent allocation-based controlled-channel attacks. Besides, a Record-Reload mechanism is proposed to prevent swap-based controlled-channel attacks. We simulate SecPaging on real SGX. Experiments demonstrate that controlled channel attacks can be defended with minimal performance overhead.
- Open Access
- 23 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
EnTurbo: Accelerate Confidential Serverless Computing via Parallelizing Enclave Startup Procedure
Serverless computing has gained widespread attention, and Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are well-suited for safeguarding user privacy. However, the additional startup procedure introduced by TEEs imposes considerable performance overhead on confidential serverless workloads. This paper introduces a novel parallelized enclave startup design, EnTurbo, which eliminates the integrity dependence of the enclave startup procedure, accelerating it while ensuring its security. Additionally, EnTurbo parallelizes the measurement procedure, enabling multi-thread measurement for acceleration with provable security. We evaluate EnTurbo by running confidential serverless workloads on SGX simulation mode. Results show that EnTurbo effectively speeds up enclave serverless by 1.42x-6.48x (SGXv1) and 1.33x-3.76x (SGXv2).
- 23 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Open AccessEnTurbo: Accelerate Confidential Serverless Computing via Parallelizing Enclave Startup Procedure
Serverless computing has gained widespread attention, and Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are well-suited for safeguarding user privacy. However, the additional startup procedure introduced by TEEs imposes considerable performance overhead on confidential serverless workloads. This paper introduces a novel parallelized enclave startup design, EnTurbo, which eliminates the integrity dependence of the enclave startup procedure, accelerating it while ensuring its security. Additionally, EnTurbo parallelizes the measurement procedure, enabling multi-thread measurement for acceleration with provable security. We evaluate EnTurbo by running confidential serverless workloads on SGX simulation mode. Results show that EnTurbo effectively speeds up enclave serverless by 1.42x-6.48x (SGXv1) and 1.33x-3.76x (SGXv2).