Chengrui Fang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Chengrui Fang has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aditya Asgaonkar
Ethereum Foundation, Sunnyvale, CA, USA
1 shared publication - Fan Zhang
Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
1 shared publication - Francesco D'Amato
Ethereum Foundation, Berlin, Germany
1 shared publication - Kartik Nayak
Duke University
1 shared publication - Luca Zanolini
Ethereum Foundation, London, United Kingdom
1 shared publication - Sarisht Wadhwa
Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 378-392
Data Independent Order Policy Enforcement: Limitations and Solutions
Order manipulation attacks such as frontrunning and sandwiching have become an increasing concern in blockchain applications such as DeFi. To protect from such attacks, several recent works have designed order policy enforcement (OPE) protocols to order transactions fairly in a data-independent fashion. However, while the manipulation attacks are motivated by monetary profits, the defenses assume honesty among a significantly large set of participants. In existing protocols, if all participants are rational, they may be incentivized to collude and circumvent the order policy without incurring any penalty. This work makes two key contributions. First, we explore whether the need for the honesty assumption is fundamental. Indeed, we show that it is impossible to design OPE protocols under some requirements when all parties are rational. Second, we explore the tradeoffs needed to circumvent the impossibility result. In the process, we propose a novel concept of rationally binding transactions that allows us to construct AnimaguSwap, the first content-oblivious Automated Market Makers (AMM) interface that is secure under rationality. We report on a prototype implementation of AnimaguSwap and performance evaluation results demonstrating its practicality.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 378-392
Open AccessData Independent Order Policy Enforcement: Limitations and Solutions
Order manipulation attacks such as frontrunning and sandwiching have become an increasing concern in blockchain applications such as DeFi. To protect from such attacks, several recent works have designed order policy enforcement (OPE) protocols to order transactions fairly in a data-independent fashion. However, while the manipulation attacks are motivated by monetary profits, the defenses assume honesty among a significantly large set of participants. In existing protocols, if all participants are rational, they may be incentivized to collude and circumvent the order policy without incurring any penalty. This work makes two key contributions. First, we explore whether the need for the honesty assumption is fundamental. Indeed, we show that it is impossible to design OPE protocols under some requirements when all parties are rational. Second, we explore the tradeoffs needed to circumvent the impossibility result. In the process, we propose a novel concept of rationally binding transactions that allows us to construct AnimaguSwap, the first content-oblivious Automated Market Makers (AMM) interface that is secure under rationality. We report on a prototype implementation of AnimaguSwap and performance evaluation results demonstrating its practicality.