Brian Hu Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Brian Hu Zhang has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gabriele Farina
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
4 shared publications - Tuomas Sandholm
Carnegie Mellon University
4 shared publications - Nicola Gatti
Politecnico di Milano Politecnico di Milano Politecnico di Milano Politecnico di Milano Politecnico di Milano
3 shared publications - Andrea Celli
Bocconi University
2 shared publications - Federico Cacciamani
Carnegie Mellon University MIT Carnegie Mellon University Politecnico di Milano Carnegie Mellon University MIT Bocconi University Politecnico di Milano Carnegie Mellon University Carnegie Mellon University Strategic Machine, Inc. Strategy Robot, Inc
2 shared publications - Ioannis Anagnostides
Carnegie Mellon University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 3 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 356
Efficient representations for team and imperfect-recall equilibrium computation
- 3 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 356
Efficient representations for team and imperfect-recall equilibrium computation
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 51 (1) , 60-91
Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-Generation
We study the problem of finding optimal correlated equilibria of various sorts in extensive-form games: normal-form coarse correlated equilibrium (NFCCE), extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE), and extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE). We make two primary contributions. First, we introduce a new algorithm for computing optimal equilibria in all three notions. Its runtime depends exponentially only on a parameter related to the information structure of the game. We also prove a fundamental complexity gap between NFCCE and the other two concepts. Second, we propose a two-sided column generation approach for use when the runtime or memory usage of the previous algorithm is prohibitive. Our algorithm improves upon an earlier one-sided approach by means of a new decomposition of correlated strategies which allows players to reoptimize their sequence-form strategies with respect to correlation plans which were previously added to the support. Experiments show that our techniques outperform the prior state of the art for computing optimal general-sum correlated equilibria. Funding: This work was supported by National Institutes of Health [Grant A240108S001]; Vannevar Bush Faculty Fellowship [Grant ONR N00014-23-1-2876]; National Science Foundation [Grants CCF-173355, IIS-190140, RI-1901403, RI-2312342]; and Army Research Office [Grants W911NF2010081, W911NF2210266].
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 51 (1) , 60-91
Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-Generation
We study the problem of finding optimal correlated equilibria of various sorts in extensive-form games: normal-form coarse correlated equilibrium (NFCCE), extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE), and extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE). We make two primary contributions. First, we introduce a new algorithm for computing optimal equilibria in all three notions. Its runtime depends exponentially only on a parameter related to the information structure of the game. We also prove a fundamental complexity gap between NFCCE and the other two concepts. Second, we propose a two-sided column generation approach for use when the runtime or memory usage of the previous algorithm is prohibitive. Our algorithm improves upon an earlier one-sided approach by means of a new decomposition of correlated strategies which allows players to reoptimize their sequence-form strategies with respect to correlation plans which were previously added to the support. Experiments show that our techniques outperform the prior state of the art for computing optimal general-sum correlated equilibria. Funding: This work was supported by National Institutes of Health [Grant A240108S001]; Vannevar Bush Faculty Fellowship [Grant ONR N00014-23-1-2876]; National Science Foundation [Grants CCF-173355, IIS-190140, RI-1901403, RI-2312342]; and Army Research Office [Grants W911NF2010081, W911NF2210266].
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1105
Learning and Computation of Φ-Equilibria at the Frontier of Tractability
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1105
Open AccessLearning and Computation of Φ-Equilibria at the Frontier of Tractability
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 106-107
Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 106-107
Open AccessHidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 73-74
Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 73-74
Open AccessSteering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium