IAIoannis Anagnostides

Ioannis Anagnostides

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Ioannis Anagnostides has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Chaos in Autobidding Auctions

    by Ioannis Anagnostides, Ian Gemp, Georgios Piliouras, Kelly Spendlove

    As autobidding systems increasingly dominate online advertising auctions, characterizing their long-term dynamical behavior is brought to the fore. In this paper, we examine the dynamics of autobidders who optimize value subject to a return-on-spend (RoS) constraint under uniform bid scaling. Our main set of results show that simple autobidding dynamics can exhibit formally chaotic behavior. This significantly strengthens the recent results of Leme, Piliouras, Schneider, Spendlove, and Zuo (EC '24) that went as far as quasiperiodicity. Our proof proceeds by establishing that autobidding dynamics can simulate -- up to an arbitrarily small error -- a broad class of continuous-time nonlinear dynamical systems. This class contains as a special case Chua's circuit, a classic chaotic system renowned for its iconic double scroll attractor. Our reduction develops several modular gadgets, which we anticipate will find other applications going forward. Moreover, in discrete time, we show that different incarnations of mirror descent can exhibit Li-Yorke chaos, topological transitivity, and sensitivity to initial conditions, connecting along the way those dynamics to classic dynamical systems such as the logistic map and the Ricker population model. Taken together, our results reveal that the long-term behavior of ostensibly simple second-price autobidding auctions can be inherently unpredictable and complex.

  • Open Access

    Tight Inapproximability for Welfare-Maximizing Autobidding Equilibria

    by Ioannis Anagnostides, Ian Gemp, Georgios Piliouras, Kelly Spendlove

    We examine the complexity of computing welfare- and revenue-maximizing equilibria in autobidding second-price auctions subject to return-on-spend (RoS) constraints. We show that computing an autobidding equilibrium that approximates the welfare-optimal one within a factor of $2 - ε$ is NP-hard for any constant $ε> 0$. Moreover, deciding whether there exists an autobidding equilibrium that attains a $1/2 + ε$ fraction of the optimal welfare -- unfettered by equilibrium constraints -- is NP-hard for any constant $ε> 0$. This hardness result is tight in view of the fact that the price of anarchy (PoA) is at most $2$, and shows that deciding whether a non-trivial autobidding equilibrium exists -- one that is even marginally better than the worst-case guarantee -- is intractable. For revenue, we establish a stronger logarithmic inapproximability, while under the projection games conjecture, our reduction rules out even a polynomial approximation factor. These results significantly strengthen the APX-hardness of Li and Tang (AAAI '24). Furthermore, we refine our reduction in the presence of ML advice concerning the buyers' valuations, revealing again a close connection between the inapproximability threshold and PoA bounds. Finally, we examine relaxed notions of equilibrium attained by simple learning algorithms, establishing constant inapproximability for both revenue and welfare.

  • Open Access

    (Doubly) Exponential Lower Bounds for Follow the Regularized Leader in Potential Games

    by Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Nikolas Patris, Tuomas Sandholm

    Follow the regularized leader FTRL is the premier algorithm for online optimization. However, despite decades of research on its convergence in constrained optimization -- and potential games in particular -- its behavior remained hitherto poorly understood. In this paper, we establish that FTRL can take exponential time to converge to a Nash equilibrium in two-player potential games for any (permutation-invariant) regularizer and potentially vanishing learning rate. By known equivalences, this translates to an exponential lower bound for certain mirror descent counterparts, most notably multiplicative weights update. On the positive side, we establish the potential property for FTRL and obtain an exponential upper bound $\exp(O_ε(1/ε^2))$ for any no-regret dynamics executed in a lazy, alternating fashion, matching our lower bound up to factors in the exponent. Finally, in multi-player potential games, we show that fictitious play -- the extreme version of FTRL -- can take doubly exponential time to reach a Nash equilibrium. This constitutes an exponentially stronger lower bound for the foundational learning algorithm in games.

  • Open Access

    On the Computational Complexity of Performative Prediction

    by Ioannis Anagnostides, Rohan Chauhan, Ioannis Panageas, Tuomas Sandholm, Jingming Yan

    Performative prediction captures the phenomenon where deploying a predictive model shifts the underlying data distribution. While simple retraining dynamics are known to converge linearly when the performative effects are weak ($ρ< 1$), the complexity in the regime $ρ> 1$ was hitherto open. In this paper, we establish a sharp phase transition: computing an $ε$-performatively stable point is PPAD-complete -- and thus polynomial-time equivalent to Nash equilibria in general-sum games -- even when $ρ= 1 + O(ε)$. This intractability persists even in the ostensibly simple setting with a quadratic loss function and linear distribution shifts. One of our key technical contributions is to extend this PPAD-hardness result to general convex domains, which is of broader interest in the complexity of variational inequalities. Finally, we address the special case of strategic classification, showing that computing a strategic local optimum is PLS-hard.

  • Algorithms and complexity for computing Nash equilibria in adversarial team games

    by Ioannis Anagnostides, Fivos Kalogiannis, Ioannis Panageas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Stephen Mcaleer


  • Open Access

    Learning and Computation of Φ-Equilibria at the Frontier of Tractability

    by Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde, Ratip Emin Berker, Gabriele Farina, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm


  • Open Access

    Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium

    by Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen McAleer, Andreas Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm


  • Open Access

    Optimistic Policy Gradient in Multi-Player Markov Games with a Single Controller: Convergence beyond the Minty Property

    by Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm

    Policy gradient methods enjoy strong practical performance in numerous tasks in reinforcement learning. Their theoretical understanding in multiagent settings, however, remains limited, especially beyond two-player competitive and potential Markov games. In this paper, we develop a new framework to characterize optimistic policy gradient methods in multi-player Markov games with a single controller. Specifically, under the further assumption that the game exhibits an equilibrium collapse, in that the marginals of coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) induce Nash equilibria (NE), we show convergence to stationary epsilon-NE in O(1/epsilon^2) iterations, where O suppresses polynomial factors in the natural parameters of the game. Such an equilibrium collapse is well-known to manifest itself in two-player zero-sum Markov games, but also occurs even in a class of multi-player Markov games with separable interactions, as established by recent work. As a result, we bypass known complexity barriers for computing stationary NE when either of our assumptions fails. Our approach relies on a natural generalization of the classical Minty property that we introduce, which we anticipate to have further applications beyond Markov games.


  • Open Access

    Optimistic Policy Gradient in Multi-Player Markov Games with a Single Controller: Convergence Beyond the Minty Property

    by Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm

    Policy gradient methods enjoy strong practical performance in numerous tasks in reinforcement learning. Their theoretical understanding in multiagent settings, however, remains limited, especially beyond two-player competitive and potential Markov games. In this paper, we develop a new framework to characterize optimistic policy gradient methods in multi-player Markov games with a single controller. Specifically, under the further assumption that the game exhibits an equilibrium collapse, in that the marginals of coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) induce Nash equilibria (NE), we show convergence to stationary $ε$-NE in $O(1/ε^2)$ iterations, where $O(\cdot)$ suppresses polynomial factors in the natural parameters of the game. Such an equilibrium collapse is well-known to manifest itself in two-player zero-sum Markov games, but also occurs even in a class of multi-player Markov games with separable interactions, as established by recent work. As a result, we bypass known complexity barriers for computing stationary NE when either of our assumptions fails. Our approach relies on a natural generalization of the classical Minty property that we introduce, which we anticipate to have further applications beyond Markov games.