Panageas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Panageas has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gabriele Farina
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
4 shared publications - Ioannis Anagnostides
Carnegie Mellon University
4 shared publications - Tuomas Sandholm
Carnegie Mellon University
4 shared publications Fivos Kalogiannis
University of California, Irvine Archimedes Research Unit
2 shared publications- Rose Zhang
University of California, Irvine
2 shared publications Stelios Stavroulakis
University of California, Irvine
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 513-529
Convergence to Equilibrium of No-Regret Dynamics in Congestion Games
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 513-529
Convergence to Equilibrium of No-Regret Dynamics in Congestion Games
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 119-136
Time-Efficient Algorithms for Nash-Bargaining-Based Matching Market Models
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 119-136
Time-Efficient Algorithms for Nash-Bargaining-Based Matching Market Models
- Open Access
Learning Equilibria in Adversarial Team Markov Games: A Nonconvex-Hidden-Concave Min-Max Optimization Problem
We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in Markov games which is a cornerstone in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). In particular, we focus on infinite-horizon adversarial team Markov games (ATMGs) in which agents that share a common reward function compete against a single opponent, the adversary. These games unify two-player zero-sum Markov games and Markov potential games, resulting in a setting that encompasses both collaboration and competition. Kalogiannis et al. (2023a) provided an efficient equilibrium computation algorithm for ATMGs which presumes knowledge of the reward and transition functions and has no sample complexity guarantees. We contribute a learning algorithm that utilizes MARL policy gradient methods with iteration and sample complexity that is polynomial in the approximation error $ε$ and the natural parameters of the ATMG, resolving the main caveats of the solution by (Kalogiannis et al., 2023a). It is worth noting that previously, the existence of learning algorithms for NE was known for Markov two-player zero-sum and potential games but not for ATMGs. Seen through the lens of min-max optimization, computing a NE in these games consists a nonconvex-nonconcave saddle-point problem. Min-max optimization has received extensive study. Nevertheless, the case of nonconvex-nonconcave landscapes remains elusive: in full generality, finding saddle-points is computationally intractable (Daskalakis et al., 2021). We circumvent the aforementioned intractability by developing techniques that exploit the hidden structure of the objective function via a nonconvex-concave reformulation. However, this introduces the challenge of a feasibility set with coupled constraints. We tackle these challenges by establishing novel techniques for optimizing weakly-smooth nonconvex functions, extending the framework of (Devolder et al., 2014).Open AccessLearning Equilibria in Adversarial Team Markov Games: A Nonconvex-Hidden-Concave Min-Max Optimization Problem
We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in Markov games which is a cornerstone in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). In particular, we focus on infinite-horizon adversarial team Markov games (ATMGs) in which agents that share a common reward function compete against a single opponent, the adversary. These games unify two-player zero-sum Markov games and Markov potential games, resulting in a setting that encompasses both collaboration and competition. Kalogiannis et al. (2023a) provided an efficient equilibrium computation algorithm for ATMGs which presumes knowledge of the reward and transition functions and has no sample complexity guarantees. We contribute a learning algorithm that utilizes MARL policy gradient methods with iteration and sample complexity that is polynomial in the approximation error $ε$ and the natural parameters of the ATMG, resolving the main caveats of the solution by (Kalogiannis et al., 2023a). It is worth noting that previously, the existence of learning algorithms for NE was known for Markov two-player zero-sum and potential games but not for ATMGs. Seen through the lens of min-max optimization, computing a NE in these games consists a nonconvex-nonconcave saddle-point problem. Min-max optimization has received extensive study. Nevertheless, the case of nonconvex-nonconcave landscapes remains elusive: in full generality, finding saddle-points is computationally intractable (Daskalakis et al., 2021). We circumvent the aforementioned intractability by developing techniques that exploit the hidden structure of the objective function via a nonconvex-concave reformulation. However, this introduces the challenge of a feasibility set with coupled constraints. We tackle these challenges by establishing novel techniques for optimizing weakly-smooth nonconvex functions, extending the framework of (Devolder et al., 2014). - Open Access
- 24 March 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 38 (9) , 9874-9882
Computing Nash Equilibria in Potential Games with Private Uncoupled Constraints
We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network congestion games where individual drivers adhere to personal budget and fuel limitations. Despite the plethora of algorithms that efficiently compute Nash equilibria (NE) in potential games, the domain of constrained potential games remains largely unexplored. We introduce an algorithm that leverages the Lagrangian formulation of NE. The algorithm is implemented independently by each player and runs in polynomial time with respect to the approximation error, the sum of the size of the action-spaces, and the game's inherit parameters.
- 24 March 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 38 (9) , 9874-9882
Open AccessComputing Nash Equilibria in Potential Games with Private Uncoupled Constraints
We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network congestion games where individual drivers adhere to personal budget and fuel limitations. Despite the plethora of algorithms that efficiently compute Nash equilibria (NE) in potential games, the domain of constrained potential games remains largely unexplored. We introduce an algorithm that leverages the Lagrangian formulation of NE. The algorithm is implemented independently by each player and runs in polynomial time with respect to the approximation error, the sum of the size of the action-spaces, and the game's inherit parameters.
- Open Access
- 24 March 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 38 (9) , 9451-9459
Optimistic Policy Gradient in Multi-Player Markov Games with a Single Controller: Convergence beyond the Minty Property
Policy gradient methods enjoy strong practical performance in numerous tasks in reinforcement learning. Their theoretical understanding in multiagent settings, however, remains limited, especially beyond two-player competitive and potential Markov games. In this paper, we develop a new framework to characterize optimistic policy gradient methods in multi-player Markov games with a single controller. Specifically, under the further assumption that the game exhibits an equilibrium collapse, in that the marginals of coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) induce Nash equilibria (NE), we show convergence to stationary epsilon-NE in O(1/epsilon^2) iterations, where O suppresses polynomial factors in the natural parameters of the game. Such an equilibrium collapse is well-known to manifest itself in two-player zero-sum Markov games, but also occurs even in a class of multi-player Markov games with separable interactions, as established by recent work. As a result, we bypass known complexity barriers for computing stationary NE when either of our assumptions fails. Our approach relies on a natural generalization of the classical Minty property that we introduce, which we anticipate to have further applications beyond Markov games.
- 24 March 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 38 (9) , 9451-9459
Open AccessOptimistic Policy Gradient in Multi-Player Markov Games with a Single Controller: Convergence beyond the Minty Property
Policy gradient methods enjoy strong practical performance in numerous tasks in reinforcement learning. Their theoretical understanding in multiagent settings, however, remains limited, especially beyond two-player competitive and potential Markov games. In this paper, we develop a new framework to characterize optimistic policy gradient methods in multi-player Markov games with a single controller. Specifically, under the further assumption that the game exhibits an equilibrium collapse, in that the marginals of coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) induce Nash equilibria (NE), we show convergence to stationary epsilon-NE in O(1/epsilon^2) iterations, where O suppresses polynomial factors in the natural parameters of the game. Such an equilibrium collapse is well-known to manifest itself in two-player zero-sum Markov games, but also occurs even in a class of multi-player Markov games with separable interactions, as established by recent work. As a result, we bypass known complexity barriers for computing stationary NE when either of our assumptions fails. Our approach relies on a natural generalization of the classical Minty property that we introduce, which we anticipate to have further applications beyond Markov games.
- Open Access
Computing Nash Equilibria in Potential Games with Private Uncoupled Constraints
We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network congestion games where individual drivers adhere to personal budget and fuel limitations. Despite the plethora of algorithms that efficiently compute Nash equilibria (NE) in potential games, the domain of constrained potential games remains largely unexplored. We introduce an algorithm that leverages the Lagrangian formulation of NE. The algorithm is implemented independently by each player and runs in polynomial time with respect to the approximation error, the sum of the size of the action-spaces, and the game's inherent parameters.
Open AccessComputing Nash Equilibria in Potential Games with Private Uncoupled Constraints
We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network congestion games where individual drivers adhere to personal budget and fuel limitations. Despite the plethora of algorithms that efficiently compute Nash equilibria (NE) in potential games, the domain of constrained potential games remains largely unexplored. We introduce an algorithm that leverages the Lagrangian formulation of NE. The algorithm is implemented independently by each player and runs in polynomial time with respect to the approximation error, the sum of the size of the action-spaces, and the game's inherent parameters.
- Open Access
Optimistic Policy Gradient in Multi-Player Markov Games with a Single Controller: Convergence Beyond the Minty Property
Policy gradient methods enjoy strong practical performance in numerous tasks in reinforcement learning. Their theoretical understanding in multiagent settings, however, remains limited, especially beyond two-player competitive and potential Markov games. In this paper, we develop a new framework to characterize optimistic policy gradient methods in multi-player Markov games with a single controller. Specifically, under the further assumption that the game exhibits an equilibrium collapse, in that the marginals of coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) induce Nash equilibria (NE), we show convergence to stationary $ε$-NE in $O(1/ε^2)$ iterations, where $O(\cdot)$ suppresses polynomial factors in the natural parameters of the game. Such an equilibrium collapse is well-known to manifest itself in two-player zero-sum Markov games, but also occurs even in a class of multi-player Markov games with separable interactions, as established by recent work. As a result, we bypass known complexity barriers for computing stationary NE when either of our assumptions fails. Our approach relies on a natural generalization of the classical Minty property that we introduce, which we anticipate to have further applications beyond Markov games.Open AccessOptimistic Policy Gradient in Multi-Player Markov Games with a Single Controller: Convergence Beyond the Minty Property
Policy gradient methods enjoy strong practical performance in numerous tasks in reinforcement learning. Their theoretical understanding in multiagent settings, however, remains limited, especially beyond two-player competitive and potential Markov games. In this paper, we develop a new framework to characterize optimistic policy gradient methods in multi-player Markov games with a single controller. Specifically, under the further assumption that the game exhibits an equilibrium collapse, in that the marginals of coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) induce Nash equilibria (NE), we show convergence to stationary $ε$-NE in $O(1/ε^2)$ iterations, where $O(\cdot)$ suppresses polynomial factors in the natural parameters of the game. Such an equilibrium collapse is well-known to manifest itself in two-player zero-sum Markov games, but also occurs even in a class of multi-player Markov games with separable interactions, as established by recent work. As a result, we bypass known complexity barriers for computing stationary NE when either of our assumptions fails. Our approach relies on a natural generalization of the classical Minty property that we introduce, which we anticipate to have further applications beyond Markov games. - Open Access
On the Convergence of No-Regret Learning Dynamics in Time-Varying Games
Most of the literature on learning in games has focused on the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Much less is known about the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in dynamic multiagent settings. In this paper, we characterize the convergence of optimistic gradient descent (OGD) in time-varying games. Our framework yields sharp convergence bounds for the equilibrium gap of OGD in zero-sum games parameterized on natural variation measures of the sequence of games, subsuming known results for static games. Furthermore, we establish improved second-order variation bounds under strong convexity-concavity, as long as each game is repeated multiple times. Our results also apply to time-varying general-sum multi-player games via a bilinear formulation of correlated equilibria, which has novel implications for meta-learning and for obtaining refined variation-dependent regret bounds, addressing questions left open in prior papers. Finally, we leverage our framework to also provide new insights on dynamic regret guarantees in static games.
Open AccessOn the Convergence of No-Regret Learning Dynamics in Time-Varying Games
Most of the literature on learning in games has focused on the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Much less is known about the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in dynamic multiagent settings. In this paper, we characterize the convergence of optimistic gradient descent (OGD) in time-varying games. Our framework yields sharp convergence bounds for the equilibrium gap of OGD in zero-sum games parameterized on natural variation measures of the sequence of games, subsuming known results for static games. Furthermore, we establish improved second-order variation bounds under strong convexity-concavity, as long as each game is repeated multiple times. Our results also apply to time-varying general-sum multi-player games via a bilinear formulation of correlated equilibria, which has novel implications for meta-learning and for obtaining refined variation-dependent regret bounds, addressing questions left open in prior papers. Finally, we leverage our framework to also provide new insights on dynamic regret guarantees in static games.
- Open Access
On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Zero-sum Games: Extra Gradient Succeeds where Optimism Fails
Last-iterate convergence has received extensive study in two player zero-sum games starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical methods that exhibit last-iterate convergence for the aforementioned games include extra-gradient (EG) and optimistic gradient descent ascent (OGDA). However, all the established last-iterate convergence results hold for the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Recently, a line of research has focused on regret analysis of OGDA in time-varying games, i.e., games where payoffs evolve with time; the last-iterate behavior of OGDA and EG in time-varying environments remains unclear though. In this paper, we study the last-iterate behavior of various algorithms in two types of unconstrained, time-varying, bilinear zero-sum games: periodic and convergent perturbed games. These models expand upon the usual repeated game formulation and incorporate external environmental factors, such as the seasonal effects on species competition and vanishing external noise. In periodic games, we prove that EG will converge while OGDA and momentum method will diverge. This is quite surprising, as to the best of our knowledge, it is the first result that indicates EG and OGDA have qualitatively different last-iterate behaviors and do not exhibit similar behavior. In convergent perturbed games, we prove all these algorithms converge as long as the game itself stabilizes with a faster rate than $1/t$.Open AccessOn the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Zero-sum Games: Extra Gradient Succeeds where Optimism Fails
Last-iterate convergence has received extensive study in two player zero-sum games starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical methods that exhibit last-iterate convergence for the aforementioned games include extra-gradient (EG) and optimistic gradient descent ascent (OGDA). However, all the established last-iterate convergence results hold for the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Recently, a line of research has focused on regret analysis of OGDA in time-varying games, i.e., games where payoffs evolve with time; the last-iterate behavior of OGDA and EG in time-varying environments remains unclear though. In this paper, we study the last-iterate behavior of various algorithms in two types of unconstrained, time-varying, bilinear zero-sum games: periodic and convergent perturbed games. These models expand upon the usual repeated game formulation and incorporate external environmental factors, such as the seasonal effects on species competition and vanishing external noise. In periodic games, we prove that EG will converge while OGDA and momentum method will diverge. This is quite surprising, as to the best of our knowledge, it is the first result that indicates EG and OGDA have qualitatively different last-iterate behaviors and do not exhibit similar behavior. In convergent perturbed games, we prove all these algorithms converge as long as the game itself stabilizes with a faster rate than $1/t$. - Open Access
Zero-sum Polymatrix Markov Games: Equilibrium Collapse and Efficient Computation of Nash Equilibria
The works of (Daskalakis et al., 2009, 2022; Jin et al., 2022; Deng et al., 2023) indicate that computing Nash equilibria in multi-player Markov games is a computationally hard task. This fact raises the question of whether or not computational intractability can be circumvented if one focuses on specific classes of Markov games. One such example is two-player zero-sum Markov games, in which efficient ways to compute a Nash equilibrium are known. Inspired by zero-sum polymatrix normal-form games (Cai et al., 2016), we define a class of zero-sum multi-agent Markov games in which there are only pairwise interactions described by a graph that changes per state. For this class of Markov games, we show that an $ε$-approximate Nash equilibrium can be found efficiently. To do so, we generalize the techniques of (Cai et al., 2016), by showing that the set of coarse-correlated equilibria collapses to the set of Nash equilibria. Afterwards, it is possible to use any algorithm in the literature that computes approximate coarse-correlated equilibria Markovian policies to get an approximate Nash equilibrium.
Open AccessZero-sum Polymatrix Markov Games: Equilibrium Collapse and Efficient Computation of Nash Equilibria
The works of (Daskalakis et al., 2009, 2022; Jin et al., 2022; Deng et al., 2023) indicate that computing Nash equilibria in multi-player Markov games is a computationally hard task. This fact raises the question of whether or not computational intractability can be circumvented if one focuses on specific classes of Markov games. One such example is two-player zero-sum Markov games, in which efficient ways to compute a Nash equilibrium are known. Inspired by zero-sum polymatrix normal-form games (Cai et al., 2016), we define a class of zero-sum multi-agent Markov games in which there are only pairwise interactions described by a graph that changes per state. For this class of Markov games, we show that an $ε$-approximate Nash equilibrium can be found efficiently. To do so, we generalize the techniques of (Cai et al., 2016), by showing that the set of coarse-correlated equilibria collapses to the set of Nash equilibria. Afterwards, it is possible to use any algorithm in the literature that computes approximate coarse-correlated equilibria Markovian policies to get an approximate Nash equilibrium.