AHAshish Hooda

Ashish Hooda

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Ashish Hooda has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    D4: Detection of Adversarial Diffusion Deepfakes Using Disjoint Ensembles

    by Ashish Hooda, Neal Mangaokar, Ryan Feng, Kassem Fawaz, Somesh Jha, Atul Prakash

    Detecting diffusion-generated deepfake images remains an open problem. Current detection methods fail against an adversary who adds imperceptible adversarial perturbations to the deepfake to evade detection. In this work, we propose Disjoint Diffusion Deepfake Detection (D4), a deepfake detector designed to improve black-box adversarial robustness beyond de facto solutions such as adversarial training. D4 uses an ensemble of models over disjoint subsets of the frequency spectrum to significantly improve adversarial robustness. Our key insight is to leverage a redundancy in the frequency domain and apply a saliency partitioning technique to disjointly distribute frequency components across multiple models. We formally prove that these disjoint ensembles lead to a reduction in the dimensionality of the input subspace where adversarial deepfakes lie, thereby making adversarial deepfakes harder to find for black-box attacks. We then empirically validate the D4 method against several black-box attacks and find that D4 significantly outperforms existing state-of-the-art defenses applied to diffusion-generated deepfake detection. We also demonstrate that D4 provides robustness against adversarial deepfakes from unseen data distributions as well as unseen generative techniques.


  • Open Access

    Theoretically Principled Trade-off for Stateful Defenses against Query-Based Black-Box Attacks

    by Ashish Hooda, Neal Mangaokar, Ryan Feng, Kassem Fawaz, Somesh Jha, Atul Prakash

    Adversarial examples threaten the integrity of machine learning systems with alarming success rates even under constrained black-box conditions. Stateful defenses have emerged as an effective countermeasure, detecting potential attacks by maintaining a buffer of recent queries and detecting new queries that are too similar. However, these defenses fundamentally pose a trade-off between attack detection and false positive rates, and this trade-off is typically optimized by hand-picking feature extractors and similarity thresholds that empirically work well. There is little current understanding as to the formal limits of this trade-off and the exact properties of the feature extractors/underlying problem domain that influence it. This work aims to address this gap by offering a theoretical characterization of the trade-off between detection and false positive rates for stateful defenses. We provide upper bounds for detection rates of a general class of feature extractors and analyze the impact of this trade-off on the convergence of black-box attacks. We then support our theoretical findings with empirical evaluations across multiple datasets and stateful defenses.

  • Open Access

    Re-purposing Perceptual Hashing based Client Side Scanning for Physical Surveillance

    by Ashish Hooda, Andrey Labunets, Tadayoshi Kohno, Earlence Fernandes

    Content scanning systems employ perceptual hashing algorithms to scan user content for illegal material, such as child pornography or terrorist recruitment flyers. Perceptual hashing algorithms help determine whether two images are visually similar while preserving the privacy of the input images. Several efforts from industry and academia propose to conduct content scanning on client devices such as smartphones due to the impending roll out of end-to-end encryption that will make server-side content scanning difficult. However, these proposals have met with strong criticism because of the potential for the technology to be misused and re-purposed. Our work informs this conversation by experimentally characterizing the potential for one type of misuse -- attackers manipulating the content scanning system to perform physical surveillance on target locations. Our contributions are threefold: (1) we offer a definition of physical surveillance in the context of client-side image scanning systems; (2) we experimentally characterize this risk and create a surveillance algorithm that achieves physical surveillance rates of >40% by poisoning 5% of the perceptual hash database; (3) we experimentally study the trade-off between the robustness of client-side image scanning systems and surveillance, showing that more robust detection of illegal material leads to increased potential for physical surveillance.