DSDiptangshu Sen

Diptangshu Sen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Diptangshu Sen has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Data Sharing with Endogenous Choices over Differential Privacy Levels

    by Raef Bassily, Kate Donahue, Diptangshu Sen, Annuo Zhao, Juba Ziani

    We study coalition formation for data sharing under differential privacy when agents have heterogeneous privacy costs. Each agent holds a sensitive data point and decides whether to participate in a data-sharing coalition and how much noise to add to their data. Privacy choices induce a fundamental trade-off: higher privacy reduces individual data-sharing costs but degrades data utility and statistical accuracy for the coalition. These choices generate externalities across agents, making both participation and privacy levels strategic. Our goal is to understand which coalitions are stable, how privacy choices shape equilibrium outcomes, and how decentralized data sharing compares to a centralized, socially optimal benchmark. We provide a comprehensive equilibrium analysis across a broad range of privacy-cost regimes, from decreasing costs (e.g., privacy amplification from pooling data) to increasing costs (e.g., greater exposure to privacy attacks in larger coalitions). We first characterize Nash equilibrium coalitions with endogenous privacy levels and show that equilibria may fail to exist and can be non-monotonic in problem parameters. We also introduce a weaker equilibrium notion called robust equilibrium (that allows more widespread equilibrium existence by equipping existing players in the coalition with the power to prevent or veto external players from joining) and fully characterize such equilibria. Finally, we analyze, for both Nash and robust equilibria, the efficiency relative to the social optimum in terms of social welfare and estimator accuracy. We derive bounds that depend sharply on the number of players, properties of the cost profile and how privacy costs scale with coalition size.

  • Open Access

    Fixed Points and Stochastic Meritocracies: A Long-Term Perspective

    by Gaurab Pokharel, Diptangshu Sen, Sanmay Das, Juba Ziani

    We study group fairness in the context of feedback loops induced by meritocratic selection into programs that themselves confer additional advantage, like college admissions. We introduce a novel stylized inter-generational model for the setting and analyze it in situations where there are no underlying differences between two populations. We show that, when the benefit of the program (or the harm of not getting into it) is completely symmetric, disparities between the two populations will eventually dissipate. However, the time an accumulated advantage takes to dissipate could be significant, and increases substantially as a function of the relative importance of the program in conveying benefits. We also find that significant disparities can arise due to chance even from completely symmetric initial conditions, especially when populations are small. The introduction of even a slight asymmetry, where the group that has accumulated an advantage becomes slightly preferred, leads to a completely different outcome. In these instances, starting from completely symmetric initial conditions, disparities between groups arise stochastically and then persist over time, yielding a permanent advantage for one group. Our analysis precisely characterizes conditions under which disparities persist or diminish, with a particular focus on the role of the scarcity of available spots in the program and its effectiveness. We also present extensive simulations in a richer model that further support our theoretical results in the simpler, stylized model. Our findings are relevant for the design and implementation of algorithmic fairness interventions in similar selection processes.

  • Open Access

    Incentivizing Desirable Effort Profiles in Strategic Classification: The Role of Causality and Uncertainty

    by Valia Efthymiou, Chara Podimata, Diptangshu Sen, Juba Ziani

    We study strategic classification in binary decision-making settings where agents can modify their features in order to improve their classification outcomes. Importantly, our work considers the causal structure across different features, acknowledging that effort in a given feature may affect other features. The main goal of our work is to understand \emph{when and how much agent effort is invested towards desirable features}, and how this is influenced by the deployed classifier, the causal structure of the agent's features, their ability to modify them, and the information available to the agent about the classifier and the feature causal graph. In the complete information case, when agents know the classifier and the causal structure of the problem, we derive conditions ensuring that rational agents focus on features favored by the principal. We show that designing classifiers to induce desirable behavior is generally non-convex, though tractable in special cases. We also extend our analysis to settings where agents have incomplete information about the classifier or the causal graph. While optimal effort selection is again a non-convex problem under general uncertainty, we highlight special cases of partial uncertainty where this selection problem becomes tractable. Our results indicate that uncertainty drives agents to favor features with higher expected importance and lower variance, potentially misaligning with principal preferences. Finally, numerical experiments based on a cardiovascular disease risk study illustrate how to incentivize desirable modifications under uncertainty.

  • Open Access

    Differentially Private Data Release on Graphs: Inefficiencies and Unfairness

    by Ferdinando Fioretto, Diptangshu Sen, Juba Ziani

    Networks are crucial components of many sectors, including telecommunications, healthcare, finance, energy, and transportation.The information carried in such networks often contains sensitive user data, like location data for commuters and packet data for online users. Therefore, when considering data release for networks, one must ensure that data release mechanisms do not leak information about individuals, quantified in a precise mathematical sense. Differential Privacy (DP) is the widely accepted, formal, state-of-the-art technique, which has found use in a variety of real-life settings including the 2020 U.S. Census, Apple users' device data, or Google's location data. Yet, the use of DP comes with new challenges, as the noise added for privacy introduces inaccuracies or biases and further, DP techniques can also distribute these biases disproportionately across different populations, inducing fairness issues. The goal of this paper is to characterize the impact of DP on bias and unfairness in the context of releasing information about networks, taking a departure from previous work which has studied these effects in the context of private population counts release (such as in the U.S. Census). To this end, we consider a network release problem where the network structure is known to all, but the weights on edges must be released privately. We consider the impact of this private release on a simple downstream decision-making task run by a third-party, which is to find the shortest path between any two pairs of nodes and recommend the best route to users. This setting is of highly practical relevance, mirroring scenarios in transportation networks, where preserving privacy while providing accurate routing information is crucial. Our work provides theoretical foundations and empirical evidence into the bias and unfairness arising due to privacy in these networked decision problems.

  • Open Access

    On Rider Strategic Behavior in Ride-Sharing Platforms

    by Jay Mulay, Diptangshu Sen, Juba Ziani

    Over the past decade, ride-sharing services have become increasingly important, with U.S. market leaders such as Uber and Lyft expanding to over 900 cities worldwide and facilitating billions of rides annually. This rise reflects their ability to meet users' convenience, efficiency, and affordability needs. However, in busy areas and surge zones, the benefits of these platforms can diminish, prompting riders to relocate to cheaper, more convenient locations or seek alternative transportation. While much research has focused on the strategic behavior of drivers, the strategic actions of riders, especially when it comes to riders walking outside of surge zones, remain under-explored. This paper examines the impact of rider-side strategic behavior on surge dynamics. We investigate how riders' actions influence market dynamics, including supply, demand, and pricing. We show significant impacts, such as spillover effects where demand increases in areas adjacent to surge zones and prices surge in nearby areas. Our theoretical insights and experimental results highlight that rider strategic behavior helps redistribute demand, reduce surge prices, and clear demand in a more balanced way across zones.

  • Open Access

    Equilibria of Data Marketplaces with Privacy-Aware Sellers under Endogenous Privacy Costs

    by Diptangshu Sen, Jingyan Wang, Juba Ziani

    We study a two-sided online data ecosystem comprised of an online platform, users on the platform, and downstream learners or data buyers. The learners can buy user data on the platform (to run a statistic or machine learning task). Potential users decide whether to join by looking at the trade-off between i) their benefit from joining the platform and interacting with other users and ii) the privacy costs they incur from sharing their data. First, we introduce a novel modeling element for two-sided data platforms: the privacy costs of the users are endogenous and depend on how much of their data is purchased by the downstream learners. Then, we characterize marketplace equilibria in certain simple settings. In particular, we provide a full characterization in two variants of our model that correspond to different utility functions for the users: i) when each user gets a constant benefit for participating in the platform and ii) when each user's benefit is linearly increasing in the number of other users that participate. In both variants, equilibria in our setting are significantly different from equilibria when privacy costs are exogenous and fixed, highlighting the importance of taking endogeneity in the privacy costs into account. Finally, we provide simulations and semi-synthetic experiments to extend our results to more general assumptions. We experiment with different distributions of users' privacy costs and different functional forms of the users' utilities for joining the platform.

  • Open Access

    Pricing in Ride-sharing Markets : Effects of network competition and autonomous vehicles

    by Diptangshu Sen, Arnob Ghosh

    Autonomous vehicles will be an integral part of ride-sharing services in the future. This setting differs from traditional ride-sharing marketplaces because of the absence of the supply side (drivers). However, it has far-reaching consequences because in addition to pricing, players now have to make decisions on how to distribute fleets across network locations and re-balance vehicles in order to serve future demand. In this paper, we explore a duopoly setting in the ride-sharing marketplace where the players have fully autonomous fleets. Each ride-service provider (RSP)'s prices depend on the prices and the supply of the other player. We formulate their decision-making problems using a game-theoretic setup where each player seeks to find the optimal prices and supplies at each node while considering the decisions of the other player. This leads to a scenario where the players' optimization problems are coupled and it is challenging to find the equilibrium. We characterize the types of demand functions (e.g.: linear) for which this game admits an exact potential function and can be solved efficiently. For other types of demand functions, we propose an iterative algorithm to compute the equilibrium. We conclude by providing numerical insights into how different kinds of equilibria would play out in the market when the players are asymmetric. Our numerical evaluations also provide insights into how the regulator needs to consider network effects while deciding regulation in order to avoid unfavorable outcomes.