Cem Topcuoglu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Cem Topcuoglu has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aanjhan Ranganathan
Northeastern University, Boston, USA
3 shared publications - Narmeen Shafqat
Northeastern University Northeastern University Northeastern University Northeastern University
3 shared publications - Engin Kirda
Northeastern University,Boston,MA,USA
2 shared publications - Engin Kirda
Northeastern University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by HICSS Conference Office
Assessing the Feasibility of the Virtual Smartphone Paradigm in Countering Zero-Click Attacks
Zero-click attacks exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in chat apps, such as WhatsApp and iMessage, enabling root access to the user's device without their interaction, thereby posing a significant privacy risk. While Apple's Lockdown mode and Samsung's Message Guard implement virtual sandboxes, it is crucial to recognize that sophisticated zero-click exploits can potentially bypass the sandbox and compromise the device. This paper explores the feasibility of countering such attacks by shifting the attack surface to a virtual smartphone ecosystem, developed using readily available off-the-shelf components. Considering that zero-click attacks are inevitable, our cross-platform security system is strategically designed to substantially reduce the impact and duration of any potential successful attack. Our evaluation highlighted several trade-offs between security and usability. Moreover, we share insights to inspire further research on mitigating zero-click attacks on smartphones.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by HICSS Conference Office
Open AccessAssessing the Feasibility of the Virtual Smartphone Paradigm in Countering Zero-Click Attacks
Zero-click attacks exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in chat apps, such as WhatsApp and iMessage, enabling root access to the user's device without their interaction, thereby posing a significant privacy risk. While Apple's Lockdown mode and Samsung's Message Guard implement virtual sandboxes, it is crucial to recognize that sophisticated zero-click exploits can potentially bypass the sandbox and compromise the device. This paper explores the feasibility of countering such attacks by shifting the attack surface to a virtual smartphone ecosystem, developed using readily available off-the-shelf components. Considering that zero-click attacks are inevitable, our cross-platform security system is strategically designed to substantially reduce the impact and duration of any potential successful attack. Our evaluation highlighted several trade-offs between security and usability. Moreover, we share insights to inspire further research on mitigating zero-click attacks on smartphones.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by HICSS Conference Office
Assessing the Feasibility of the Virtual Smartphone Paradigm in Countering Zero-Click Attacks
Zero-click attacks exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in chat apps, such as WhatsApp and iMessage, enabling root access to the user's device without their interaction, thereby posing a significant privacy risk. While Apple's Lockdown mode and Samsung's Message Guard implement virtual sandboxes, it is crucial to recognize that sophisticated zero-click exploits can potentially bypass the sandbox and compromise the device. This paper explores the feasibility of countering such attacks by shifting the attack surface to a virtual smartphone ecosystem, developed using readily available off-the-shelf components. Considering that zero-click attacks are inevitable, our cross-platform security system is strategically designed to substantially reduce the impact and duration of any potential successful attack. Our evaluation highlighted several trade-offs between security and usability. Moreover, we share insights to inspire further research on mitigating zero-click attacks on smartphones.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by HICSS Conference Office
Open AccessAssessing the Feasibility of the Virtual Smartphone Paradigm in Countering Zero-Click Attacks
Zero-click attacks exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in chat apps, such as WhatsApp and iMessage, enabling root access to the user's device without their interaction, thereby posing a significant privacy risk. While Apple's Lockdown mode and Samsung's Message Guard implement virtual sandboxes, it is crucial to recognize that sophisticated zero-click exploits can potentially bypass the sandbox and compromise the device. This paper explores the feasibility of countering such attacks by shifting the attack surface to a virtual smartphone ecosystem, developed using readily available off-the-shelf components. Considering that zero-click attacks are inevitable, our cross-platform security system is strategically designed to substantially reduce the impact and duration of any potential successful attack. Our evaluation highlighted several trade-offs between security and usability. Moreover, we share insights to inspire further research on mitigating zero-click attacks on smartphones.
- Open Access
Experience Report on the Challenges and Opportunities in Securing Smartphones Against Zero-Click Attacks
Zero-click attacks require no user interaction and typically exploit zero-day (i.e., unpatched) vulnerabilities in instant chat applications (such as WhatsApp and iMessage) to gain root access to the victim's smartphone and exfiltrate sensitive data. In this paper, we report our experiences in attempting to secure smartphones against zero-click attacks. We approached the problem by first enumerating several properties we believed were necessary to prevent zero-click attacks against smartphones. Then, we created a security design that satisfies all the identified properties, and attempted to build it using off-the-shelf components. Our key idea was to shift the attack surface from the user's smartphone to a sandboxed virtual smartphone ecosystem where each chat application runs in isolation. Our performance and usability evaluations of the system we built highlighted several shortcomings and the fundamental challenges in securing modern smartphones against zero-click attacks. In this experience report, we discuss the lessons we learned, and share insights on the missing components necessary to achieve foolproof security against zero-click attacks for modern mobile devices.
Open AccessExperience Report on the Challenges and Opportunities in Securing Smartphones Against Zero-Click Attacks
Zero-click attacks require no user interaction and typically exploit zero-day (i.e., unpatched) vulnerabilities in instant chat applications (such as WhatsApp and iMessage) to gain root access to the victim's smartphone and exfiltrate sensitive data. In this paper, we report our experiences in attempting to secure smartphones against zero-click attacks. We approached the problem by first enumerating several properties we believed were necessary to prevent zero-click attacks against smartphones. Then, we created a security design that satisfies all the identified properties, and attempted to build it using off-the-shelf components. Our key idea was to shift the attack surface from the user's smartphone to a sandboxed virtual smartphone ecosystem where each chat application runs in isolation. Our performance and usability evaluations of the system we built highlighted several shortcomings and the fundamental challenges in securing modern smartphones against zero-click attacks. In this experience report, we discuss the lessons we learned, and share insights on the missing components necessary to achieve foolproof security against zero-click attacks for modern mobile devices.