Paul Flammarion
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Paul Flammarion has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Frank Sill Torres
German Aerospace Center, Institute for the Protection of Maritime Infrastructures Bremerhaven Germany
2 shared publications - Rolf Drechsler
Faculty 03 Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Bremen
2 shared publications - Sajjad Parvin
Institute of Computer Science, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
2 shared publications - Chandan Kumar Jha
Faculty 03 Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Bremen
1 shared publication - Sallar Ahmadi-Pour
Institute of Computer Science, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
The Deception of Sight: Camouflaging Chips Information Against Optical Probing Attacks By Selective Increase of Local Density
In recent years, a novel non-invasive laser-assisted attack known as Optical Probing (OP) has been demonstrated to effectively probe the internal state of integrated circuits. This attack exploits the relative transparency of the silicon substrate to Near-InfraRed (NIR) light, enabling optical access through the backside of the chip. Consequently, OP poses a significant threat to information processed or stored on the chip and may facilitate Intellectual Property (IP) theft or reverse engineering. Existing mitigation techniques can be broadly classified into three categories: (1) fabrication-level modifications, (2) sensor-based countermeasures, and (3) circuit-level design techniques. Fabrication-based countermeasures are costly and often incompatible with standard industrial manufacturing processes, limiting their practicality for OP-resilient chip design. Sensor-based countermeasures may be circumvented by adaptive attackers, whereas circuit-level techniques typically require modifications to the layout of standard-cell libraries. Such modifications are time-consuming and can introduce considerable PPA overheads relative to conventional standard-cell designs. Therefore, this study investigates whether increasing the local layout density around a target logic cell can enhance resilience against OP attacks without requiring modifications beyond the layout level. In this context, local density refers to the fraction of a predefined region surrounding the target cell that is occupied by neighboring logic cells and associated layout structures. Our methodology employs standard logic cells to protect the chip’s sensitive information from an adversary equipped with OP capabilities. We found that increasing the local density of surrounding logic cells near a target logic cell enhances overall reflection, effectively masking the reflection from the target logic cell. This can significantly improve the concealment of the secure cell’s information from the OP attack since the reflections from the neighboring logic cells overlap with the target logic cells that need to be secured. Hence, an adversary cannot distinguish the exact location of the source of reflection. We demonstrate that this methodology can effectively countermeasure against OP attacks by conducting detailed experiments on the relationship between density and reflection, using NAND, INVERTER, NOR, and Flip-Flop cells. We exhaustively evaluated thousands of placement strategies with varying densities to show the efficacy of our technique against OP attacks. Moreover, we demonstrate the integration of our OP attack mitigation technique into the ASIC flow for designing an AES-128 core. We demonstrate that our technique in the worst-case comes with a 1% increase in power consumption, a 1% increase in area, and no change in the operating frequency compared to the unprotected AES-128 core against OP attack.
- 21 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
Open AccessThe Deception of Sight: Camouflaging Chips Information Against Optical Probing Attacks By Selective Increase of Local Density
In recent years, a novel non-invasive laser-assisted attack known as Optical Probing (OP) has been demonstrated to effectively probe the internal state of integrated circuits. This attack exploits the relative transparency of the silicon substrate to Near-InfraRed (NIR) light, enabling optical access through the backside of the chip. Consequently, OP poses a significant threat to information processed or stored on the chip and may facilitate Intellectual Property (IP) theft or reverse engineering. Existing mitigation techniques can be broadly classified into three categories: (1) fabrication-level modifications, (2) sensor-based countermeasures, and (3) circuit-level design techniques. Fabrication-based countermeasures are costly and often incompatible with standard industrial manufacturing processes, limiting their practicality for OP-resilient chip design. Sensor-based countermeasures may be circumvented by adaptive attackers, whereas circuit-level techniques typically require modifications to the layout of standard-cell libraries. Such modifications are time-consuming and can introduce considerable PPA overheads relative to conventional standard-cell designs. Therefore, this study investigates whether increasing the local layout density around a target logic cell can enhance resilience against OP attacks without requiring modifications beyond the layout level. In this context, local density refers to the fraction of a predefined region surrounding the target cell that is occupied by neighboring logic cells and associated layout structures. Our methodology employs standard logic cells to protect the chip’s sensitive information from an adversary equipped with OP capabilities. We found that increasing the local density of surrounding logic cells near a target logic cell enhances overall reflection, effectively masking the reflection from the target logic cell. This can significantly improve the concealment of the secure cell’s information from the OP attack since the reflections from the neighboring logic cells overlap with the target logic cells that need to be secured. Hence, an adversary cannot distinguish the exact location of the source of reflection. We demonstrate that this methodology can effectively countermeasure against OP attacks by conducting detailed experiments on the relationship between density and reflection, using NAND, INVERTER, NOR, and Flip-Flop cells. We exhaustively evaluated thousands of placement strategies with varying densities to show the efficacy of our technique against OP attacks. Moreover, we demonstrate the integration of our OP attack mitigation technique into the ASIC flow for designing an AES-128 core. We demonstrate that our technique in the worst-case comes with a 1% increase in power consumption, a 1% increase in area, and no change in the operating frequency compared to the unprotected AES-128 core against OP attack.
- 11 December 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Embedded Systems Letters
- Vol. 17 (3) , 147-150
Auto-OPS: A Framework for Automated Optical Probing Simulation on GDS-II
In this work, for the first time, we propose a security evaluation framework, namely Auto-OPS, that automates performing the Optical Probing (OP) attack in simulation on a full GDS-II design file. Auto-OPS empowers designers by automatically extracting the active regions geometry model of each logic cell in the standard cell library or custom-designed logic cells to evaluate the security robustness of a design. Auto-OPS enables scaling up of the current OP evaluation environments which rely on manual extraction of active regions which is an error-prone and cumbersome procedure. Additionally, we evaluated and demonstrated the performance of our framework on several benchmark circuits GDS-II files designed using an open-source 45nm standard cell library.
- 11 December 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Embedded Systems Letters
- Vol. 17 (3) , 147-150
Auto-OPS: A Framework for Automated Optical Probing Simulation on GDS-II
In this work, for the first time, we propose a security evaluation framework, namely Auto-OPS, that automates performing the Optical Probing (OP) attack in simulation on a full GDS-II design file. Auto-OPS empowers designers by automatically extracting the active regions geometry model of each logic cell in the standard cell library or custom-designed logic cells to evaluate the security robustness of a design. Auto-OPS enables scaling up of the current OP evaluation environments which rely on manual extraction of active regions which is an error-prone and cumbersome procedure. Additionally, we evaluated and demonstrated the performance of our framework on several benchmark circuits GDS-II files designed using an open-source 45nm standard cell library.