Yan Jia
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yan Jia has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Peng Wang
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
5 shared publications - Gang Liu
National Key Laboratory of Security Communication
4 shared publications - Shuping Mao
Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute
3 shared publications - Lei Hu
Chinese Academy of Sciences
2 shared publications - Bing Liu
Department of Cryptography Science and Technology, Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute, Beijing 100070, China
1 shared publication - Danping Shi
State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Cybersecurity
- Vol. 9 (1) , 255
Improved cube attack on round-reduced Trivium-LE(F) using a large number of superpolys
Trivium-LE(F), an energy-efficient variant of Trivium with broader applicability in resource-constrained devices, reduces energy consumption by 15% and reaches the maximum algebraic degree of 80 in fewer rounds compared than Trivium. The cube attack, an important cryptanalytic technique, is one of the most powerful cryptanalytic methods for stream ciphers. This paper presents an improved cube attack on round-reduced Trivium-LE(F) using small cubes and a large number of superpolys. In the offline phase, we choose small cubes with dimensions within available computational resources and apply the graph-based MILP modeling method with pruning techniques proposed by Delaune et al. to achieve efficient recovery of a large number of superpolys. In the online phase, we apply the testing method proposed by Zhang et al. to recover the key bits involved in the system of equations, by exploiting the sparsity and asymmetry of the superpoly equations. For the 743-round Trivium-LE(F), using 1074 superpolys derived from a 54-dimensional mother cube, we successfully recovered at least 50 bits of the secret key, reducing the secret key recovery attack complexity from the brute-force search level of $$2^{80}$$ to $$2^{54}$$ . Compared to previous works, our attack uses smaller cubes, making cube-sum computation feasible under current computational resources. In addition, we recover enough superpolys to extract a large number of key bits, significantly reducing the complexity of the brute-force search stage.- 12 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Cybersecurity
- Vol. 9 (1) , 255
Open AccessImproved cube attack on round-reduced Trivium-LE(F) using a large number of superpolys
Trivium-LE(F), an energy-efficient variant of Trivium with broader applicability in resource-constrained devices, reduces energy consumption by 15% and reaches the maximum algebraic degree of 80 in fewer rounds compared than Trivium. The cube attack, an important cryptanalytic technique, is one of the most powerful cryptanalytic methods for stream ciphers. This paper presents an improved cube attack on round-reduced Trivium-LE(F) using small cubes and a large number of superpolys. In the offline phase, we choose small cubes with dimensions within available computational resources and apply the graph-based MILP modeling method with pruning techniques proposed by Delaune et al. to achieve efficient recovery of a large number of superpolys. In the online phase, we apply the testing method proposed by Zhang et al. to recover the key bits involved in the system of equations, by exploiting the sparsity and asymmetry of the superpoly equations. For the 743-round Trivium-LE(F), using 1074 superpolys derived from a 54-dimensional mother cube, we successfully recovered at least 50 bits of the secret key, reducing the secret key recovery attack complexity from the brute-force search level of $$2^{80}$$ to $$2^{54}$$ . Compared to previous works, our attack uses smaller cubes, making cube-sum computation feasible under current computational resources. In addition, we recover enough superpolys to extract a large number of key bits, significantly reducing the complexity of the brute-force search stage. - 7 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 64-84
Breaking and Fixing Spoed
- 19 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 220-240
On the Committing Security of Generic Compositions for Authenticated Encryption
- 19 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 220-240
On the Committing Security of Generic Compositions for Authenticated Encryption
- Open Access
Quantum Security of Nonce-Based Encryption
We investigate the quantum security of nonce-based encryption under the indistinguishability against quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-qCPA). While classical results establish that IV-based modes such as CBC, CFB, OFB, and CTR achieve IND-qCPA security, we demonstrate that simply replacing the random IV with a nonce undermines both classical and quantum security. To address this, we propose a general transformation from R-IND-qCPA security to N-IND-qCPA security and introduce enhanced variants, namely, CBC2, CFB2, OFB2, and CTR2, that are provably secure in the nonce-based quantum setting. We further show that nonce-based stream cipher encryption inherently satisfies N-IND-qCPA security. These results provide a systematic framework for upgrading IV-based constructions to secure nonce-based counterparts, thereby strengthening practical symmetric encryption against quantum adversaries.
Open AccessQuantum Security of Nonce-Based Encryption
We investigate the quantum security of nonce-based encryption under the indistinguishability against quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-qCPA). While classical results establish that IV-based modes such as CBC, CFB, OFB, and CTR achieve IND-qCPA security, we demonstrate that simply replacing the random IV with a nonce undermines both classical and quantum security. To address this, we propose a general transformation from R-IND-qCPA security to N-IND-qCPA security and introduce enhanced variants, namely, CBC2, CFB2, OFB2, and CTR2, that are provably secure in the nonce-based quantum setting. We further show that nonce-based stream cipher encryption inherently satisfies N-IND-qCPA security. These results provide a systematic framework for upgrading IV-based constructions to secure nonce-based counterparts, thereby strengthening practical symmetric encryption against quantum adversaries.
- Open Access
- 9 November 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 13 (22) , 3595
Breaking Enhanced CBC and Its Application
The Enhanced Cipher Block Chaining scheme (eCBC) is an authentication encryption scheme (AE) improved from the CBC encryption scheme. It is shown that eCBC scheme fails to achieve ciphertext integrity (INT-CTXT): the IV is unauthenticated and the tag is a linear XOR of ciphertext hashes, enabling trivial forgeries such as IV substitution, block cancellation, and permutation. Furthermore, the medical image application diagonal block encryption based on eCBC scheme is also insecure. Its deterministic design leaks structural information, breaking confidentiality (IND-CPA). At the same time, it also inherits the forgery weaknesses of eCBC scheme, breaking authenticity. The results highlight that neither eCBC scheme nor its application meet AE security goals. And it is recommended to use standardized AE schemes such as SIV, GCM, or Ascon instead of ad hoc designs.
- 9 November 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 13 (22) , 3595
Open AccessBreaking Enhanced CBC and Its Application
The Enhanced Cipher Block Chaining scheme (eCBC) is an authentication encryption scheme (AE) improved from the CBC encryption scheme. It is shown that eCBC scheme fails to achieve ciphertext integrity (INT-CTXT): the IV is unauthenticated and the tag is a linear XOR of ciphertext hashes, enabling trivial forgeries such as IV substitution, block cancellation, and permutation. Furthermore, the medical image application diagonal block encryption based on eCBC scheme is also insecure. Its deterministic design leaks structural information, breaking confidentiality (IND-CPA). At the same time, it also inherits the forgery weaknesses of eCBC scheme, breaking authenticity. The results highlight that neither eCBC scheme nor its application meet AE security goals. And it is recommended to use standardized AE schemes such as SIV, GCM, or Ascon instead of ad hoc designs.
- 3 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 237-256
Committing Security of AEAD Based on Stream Cipher