SKSebastian Kappes

Sebastian Kappes

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Sebastian Kappes has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    TTL Jumps: Unexpected TTL Rewrites Impacting Inferences from Traceroutes

    by Sebastian Kappes, Anja Feldmann, Tobias Fiebig, Johannes Zirngibl


  • Open Access

    How Did You Find That Address? An In-Depth Investigation of Domain-Based IPv6 Scanners

    by Sebastian Kappes, Lion Steger, Victor Le Pochat, Oliver Gasser, Johannes Zirngibl, Tiago Heinrich

    IPv6's vast address space makes scanning particularly challenging. IPv6 scanners must first discover in-use IPv6 addresses they can target and scan. One way of doing this is by collecting IPv6 addresses from domain names : if a DNS name resolves to an IPv6 address, that address is more likely to be used by an actual live host. In this study, we investigate how IPv6 scanners rely on domain names for target reconnaissance. We set up a large IPv6 telescope to which we attract scanners by placing honey domain names on TLD zone files, CT logs, and the Tranco Top 1M. We introduce a technique to trace the packets that IPv6 scanners send to the telescope back to the initial DNS queries they sent to discover the IPv6 addresses, allowing us to better evaluate how large-scale IPv6 scanners collect and scan addresses. Over a period of six months, we collect 9.4M IPv6 scan packets from 25k addresses in 613 ASes. We find that domain-based IPv6 scanners differ in their address collection strategies, which also correlates with different scanner behavior: scanners that scan addresses hours after collecting them send mostly ICMP traffic, while scanners that resolve domains and scan addresses in one go are more focused on TCP/UDP-many of the latter are also not limited to IPv6 and will fall back to IPv4 if necessary. We uncover that scanners often combine (in particular, open) domain sources to find more targets, and that different domain sources attract different scanners. We also demonstrate that the IPv6 Hitlist is a strong mediating factor when attracting scanners through domain names, which we address by excluding our telescope's address space from the Hitlist. Furthermore, we use our fine-grained packet tracing to detect distributed scanning campaigns involving multiple ASes and to distinguish different scanners within large cloud ASes. Our findings show a diverse landscape of domain-based IPv6 scanning on the Internet: different scanners employ distinct scanning strategies and rely on unique domain sources, which greatly impacts how researchers should study them.

  • Open Access

    Lessons from an (Unsuccessful?) IPv6 Amplification Honeypot Deployment

    by Tiago Heinrich, Sebastian Kappes, Rafael Rodrigues Obelheiro

    While DRDoS attacks are well-understood in IPv4, it is not known to what extend attackers also make use of services on the IPv6 Internet to perform DRDoS attacks. In this work, we adapted an IPv4-only DRDoS honeypot to observe DRDoS attacks in IPv6. To attract scanners, we publicized our honeypots' addresses on the TUM IPv6 Hitlist. After one year of data collection, however, we observed little to no attackers exploiting IPv6 UDP services for DRDoS attacks. This paper presents our setup, findings, and the lessons learned from trying attract scanners to our DRDoS honeypot: we analyze the interactions we observed over time as well as the source addresses of scanners, and discuss how our choice of the IPv6 Hitlist as an address exposure method possibly impacted our findings. Although we managed to attract several scanners also observed by previous work, our results show that there are currently no attackers performing DRDoS attacks in IPv6, at least among these that rely on the IPv6 Hitlist to discover vulnerable hots.


  • Open Access

    Unveiling IPv6 Scanning Dynamics: A Longitudinal Study Using Large Scale Proactive and Passive IPv6 Telescopes

    by Hammas Bin Tanveer, Echo Chan, Ricky K. P. Mok, Sebastian Kappes, Philipp Richter, Oliver Gasser, John Ronan, Arthur Berger, Kc Claffy

    We introduce new tools and vantage points to develop and integrate proactive techniques to attract IPv6 scan traffic, thus enabling its analysis. By deploying the largest-ever IPv6 proactive telescope in a production ISP network, we collected over 600M packets of unsolicited traffic from 1.9k Autonomous Systems in 10 months. We characterized the sources of unsolicited traffic, evaluated the effectiveness of five major features across the network stack, and inferred scanners' sources of target addresses and their strategies.