Sebastian Kappes
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Sebastian Kappes has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Johannes Zirngibl
Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany
2 shared publications - Oliver Gasser
IPinfo, Seattle, WA, USA
2 shared publications - Tiago Heinrich
Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany
2 shared publications - Anja Feldmann
Department of Radioimmunology, Institute of Radiopharmaceutical Cancer Research, Helmholtz-Zentrum Dresden-Rossendorf (HZDR), 01328 Dresden, Germany
1 shared publication - Arthur Berger
Gastroenterology and Endoscopy Unit, University hospital Bordeaux, Bordeaux, France
1 shared publication - Echo Chan
Akamai Technologies, Cambridge, MA, USA and Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1067-1081
TTL Jumps: Unexpected TTL Rewrites Impacting Inferences from Traceroutes
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1067-1081
Open AccessTTL Jumps: Unexpected TTL Rewrites Impacting Inferences from Traceroutes
- Open Access
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
- Vol. 4 (CoNEXT3) , 1-25
How Did You Find That Address? An In-Depth Investigation of Domain-Based IPv6 Scanners
IPv6's vast address space makes scanning particularly challenging. IPv6 scanners must first discover in-use IPv6 addresses they can target and scan. One way of doing this is by collecting IPv6 addresses from domain names : if a DNS name resolves to an IPv6 address, that address is more likely to be used by an actual live host. In this study, we investigate how IPv6 scanners rely on domain names for target reconnaissance. We set up a large IPv6 telescope to which we attract scanners by placing honey domain names on TLD zone files, CT logs, and the Tranco Top 1M. We introduce a technique to trace the packets that IPv6 scanners send to the telescope back to the initial DNS queries they sent to discover the IPv6 addresses, allowing us to better evaluate how large-scale IPv6 scanners collect and scan addresses. Over a period of six months, we collect 9.4M IPv6 scan packets from 25k addresses in 613 ASes. We find that domain-based IPv6 scanners differ in their address collection strategies, which also correlates with different scanner behavior: scanners that scan addresses hours after collecting them send mostly ICMP traffic, while scanners that resolve domains and scan addresses in one go are more focused on TCP/UDP-many of the latter are also not limited to IPv6 and will fall back to IPv4 if necessary. We uncover that scanners often combine (in particular, open) domain sources to find more targets, and that different domain sources attract different scanners. We also demonstrate that the IPv6 Hitlist is a strong mediating factor when attracting scanners through domain names, which we address by excluding our telescope's address space from the Hitlist. Furthermore, we use our fine-grained packet tracing to detect distributed scanning campaigns involving multiple ASes and to distinguish different scanners within large cloud ASes. Our findings show a diverse landscape of domain-based IPv6 scanning on the Internet: different scanners employ distinct scanning strategies and rely on unique domain sources, which greatly impacts how researchers should study them.
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
- Vol. 4 (CoNEXT3) , 1-25
Open AccessHow Did You Find That Address? An In-Depth Investigation of Domain-Based IPv6 Scanners
IPv6's vast address space makes scanning particularly challenging. IPv6 scanners must first discover in-use IPv6 addresses they can target and scan. One way of doing this is by collecting IPv6 addresses from domain names : if a DNS name resolves to an IPv6 address, that address is more likely to be used by an actual live host. In this study, we investigate how IPv6 scanners rely on domain names for target reconnaissance. We set up a large IPv6 telescope to which we attract scanners by placing honey domain names on TLD zone files, CT logs, and the Tranco Top 1M. We introduce a technique to trace the packets that IPv6 scanners send to the telescope back to the initial DNS queries they sent to discover the IPv6 addresses, allowing us to better evaluate how large-scale IPv6 scanners collect and scan addresses. Over a period of six months, we collect 9.4M IPv6 scan packets from 25k addresses in 613 ASes. We find that domain-based IPv6 scanners differ in their address collection strategies, which also correlates with different scanner behavior: scanners that scan addresses hours after collecting them send mostly ICMP traffic, while scanners that resolve domains and scan addresses in one go are more focused on TCP/UDP-many of the latter are also not limited to IPv6 and will fall back to IPv4 if necessary. We uncover that scanners often combine (in particular, open) domain sources to find more targets, and that different domain sources attract different scanners. We also demonstrate that the IPv6 Hitlist is a strong mediating factor when attracting scanners through domain names, which we address by excluding our telescope's address space from the Hitlist. Furthermore, we use our fine-grained packet tracing to detect distributed scanning campaigns involving multiple ASes and to distinguish different scanners within large cloud ASes. Our findings show a diverse landscape of domain-based IPv6 scanning on the Internet: different scanners employ distinct scanning strategies and rely on unique domain sources, which greatly impacts how researchers should study them.
- Open Access
- 11 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2165-2170
Lessons from an (Unsuccessful?) IPv6 Amplification Honeypot Deployment
While DRDoS attacks are well-understood in IPv4, it is not known to what extend attackers also make use of services on the IPv6 Internet to perform DRDoS attacks. In this work, we adapted an IPv4-only DRDoS honeypot to observe DRDoS attacks in IPv6. To attract scanners, we publicized our honeypots' addresses on the TUM IPv6 Hitlist. After one year of data collection, however, we observed little to no attackers exploiting IPv6 UDP services for DRDoS attacks. This paper presents our setup, findings, and the lessons learned from trying attract scanners to our DRDoS honeypot: we analyze the interactions we observed over time as well as the source addresses of scanners, and discuss how our choice of the IPv6 Hitlist as an address exposure method possibly impacted our findings. Although we managed to attract several scanners also observed by previous work, our results show that there are currently no attackers performing DRDoS attacks in IPv6, at least among these that rely on the IPv6 Hitlist to discover vulnerable hots.
- 11 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2165-2170
Open AccessLessons from an (Unsuccessful?) IPv6 Amplification Honeypot Deployment
While DRDoS attacks are well-understood in IPv4, it is not known to what extend attackers also make use of services on the IPv6 Internet to perform DRDoS attacks. In this work, we adapted an IPv4-only DRDoS honeypot to observe DRDoS attacks in IPv6. To attract scanners, we publicized our honeypots' addresses on the TUM IPv6 Hitlist. After one year of data collection, however, we observed little to no attackers exploiting IPv6 UDP services for DRDoS attacks. This paper presents our setup, findings, and the lessons learned from trying attract scanners to our DRDoS honeypot: we analyze the interactions we observed over time as well as the source addresses of scanners, and discuss how our choice of the IPv6 Hitlist as an address exposure method possibly impacted our findings. Although we managed to attract several scanners also observed by previous work, our results show that there are currently no attackers performing DRDoS attacks in IPv6, at least among these that rely on the IPv6 Hitlist to discover vulnerable hots.
- Open Access
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1058-1059
Poster: How Do You Know My Name? Investigating The Role of Domain Names for Target Reconnaissance among Web and IPv6 Scanners.
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1058-1059
Open AccessPoster: How Do You Know My Name? Investigating The Role of Domain Names for Target Reconnaissance among Web and IPv6 Scanners.
- Open Access
- 3 September 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
- Vol. 3 (CoNEXT3) , 1-24
Unveiling IPv6 Scanning Dynamics: A Longitudinal Study Using Large Scale Proactive and Passive IPv6 Telescopes
We introduce new tools and vantage points to develop and integrate proactive techniques to attract IPv6 scan traffic, thus enabling its analysis. By deploying the largest-ever IPv6 proactive telescope in a production ISP network, we collected over 600M packets of unsolicited traffic from 1.9k Autonomous Systems in 10 months. We characterized the sources of unsolicited traffic, evaluated the effectiveness of five major features across the network stack, and inferred scanners' sources of target addresses and their strategies.
- 3 September 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
- Vol. 3 (CoNEXT3) , 1-24
Open AccessUnveiling IPv6 Scanning Dynamics: A Longitudinal Study Using Large Scale Proactive and Passive IPv6 Telescopes
We introduce new tools and vantage points to develop and integrate proactive techniques to attract IPv6 scan traffic, thus enabling its analysis. By deploying the largest-ever IPv6 proactive telescope in a production ISP network, we collected over 600M packets of unsolicited traffic from 1.9k Autonomous Systems in 10 months. We characterized the sources of unsolicited traffic, evaluated the effectiveness of five major features across the network stack, and inferred scanners' sources of target addresses and their strategies.