LBLukas Bernhard

Lukas Bernhard

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Lukas Bernhard has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Empirical Security Analysis of Software-based Fault Isolation through Controlled Fault Injection

    by Nils Bars, Lukas Bernhard, Moritz Schloegel, Thorsten Holz

    We use browsers daily to access all sorts of information. Because browsers routinely process scripts, media, and executable code from unknown sources, they form a critical security boundary between users and adversaries. A common attack vector is JavaScript, which exposes a large attack surface due to the sheer complexity of modern JavaScript engines. To mitigate these threats, modern engines increasingly adopt software-based fault isolation (SFI). A prominent example is Google's V8 heap sandbox, which represents the most widely deployed SFI mechanism, protecting billions of users across all Chromium-based browsers and countless applications built on Node$.$js and Electron. The heap sandbox splits the address space into two parts: one part containing trusted, security-sensitive metadata, and a sandboxed heap containing memory accessible to untrusted code. On a technical level, the sandbox enforces isolation by removing raw pointers and using translation tables to resolve references to trusted objects. Consequently, an attacker cannot corrupt trusted data even with full control of the sandboxed data, unless there is a bug in how code handles data from the sandboxed heap. Despite their widespread use, such SFI mechanisms have seen little security testing. In this work, we propose a new testing technique that models the security boundary of modern SFI implementations. Following the SFI threat model, we assume a powerful attacker who fully controls the sandbox's memory. We implement this by instrumenting memory loads originating in the trusted domain and accessing untrusted, attacker-controlled sandbox memory. We then inject faults into the loaded data, aiming to trigger memory corruption in the trusted domain. In a comprehensive evaluation, we identify 19 security bugs in V8 that enable an attacker to bypass the sandbox.

  • Open Access

    EF/CF: High Performance Smart Contract Fuzzing for Exploit Generation

    by Michael Rodler, David Paaßen, Wenting Li, Lukas Bernhard, Thorsten Holz, Ghassan Karame, Lucas Davi

    Smart contracts are increasingly being used to manage large numbers of high-value cryptocurrency accounts. There is a strong demand for automated, efficient, and comprehensive methods to detect security vulnerabilities in a given contract. While the literature features a plethora of analysis methods for smart contracts, the existing proposals do not address the increasing complexity of contracts. Existing analysis tools suffer from false alarms and missed bugs in today's smart contracts that are increasingly defined by complexity and interdependencies. To scale accurate analysis to modern smart contracts, we introduce EF/CF, a high-performance fuzzer for Ethereum smart contracts. In contrast to previous work, EF/CF efficiently and accurately models complex smart contract interactions, such as reentrancy and cross-contract interactions, at a very high fuzzing throughput rate. To achieve this, EF/CF transpiles smart contract bytecode into native C++ code, thereby enabling the reuse of existing, optimized fuzzing toolchains. Furthermore, EF/CF increases fuzzing efficiency by employing a structure-aware mutation engine for smart contract transaction sequences and using a contract's ABI to generate valid transaction inputs. In a comprehensive evaluation, we show that EF/CF scales better -- without compromising accuracy -- to complex contracts compared to state-of-the-art approaches, including other fuzzers, symbolic/concolic execution, and hybrid approaches. Moreover, we show that EF/CF can automatically generate transaction sequences that exploit reentrancy bugs to steal Ether.