Moritz Schloegel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Moritz Schloegel has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Thorsten Holz
Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy Bochum Germany
2 shared publications - Lukas Bernhard
Independent Dortmund Germany
1 shared publication - Moritz Bley
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security Saarbrücken Germany
1 shared publication - Nils Bars
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security Saarbruecken Germany
1 shared publication - Simon Wörner
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security Saarbrücken Germany
1 shared publication - Tobias Scharnowski
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security Saarbrücken Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Protocol-Aware Firmware Rehosting for Effective Fuzzing of Embedded Network Stacks
One of the biggest attack surfaces of embedded systems is their network interfaces, which enable communication with other devices. Unlike their general-purpose counterparts, embedded systems are designed for specialized use cases, resulting in unique and diverse communication stacks. Unfortunately, current approaches for evaluating the security of these embedded network stacks require manual effort or access to hardware, and they generally focus only on small parts of the embedded system. A promising alternative is firmware rehosting, which enables fuzz testing of the entire firmware by generically emulating the physical hardware. However, existing rehosting methods often struggle to meaningfully explore network stacks due to their complex, multi-layered input formats. This limits their ability to uncover deeply nested software faults. To address this problem, we introduce a novel method to automatically detect and handle the use of network protocols in firmware called Pemu. By automatically deducing the available network protocols, Pemu can transparently generate valid network packets that encapsulate fuzzing data, allowing the fuzzing input to flow directly into deeper layers of the firmware logic. Our approach thus enables a deeper, more targeted, and layer-by-layer analysis of firmware components that were previously difficult or impossible to test. Our evaluation demonstrates that Pemu consistently improves the code coverage of three existing rehosting tools for embedded network stacks. Furthermore, our fuzzer rediscovered several known vulnerabilities and identified five previously unknown software faults, highlighting its effectiveness in uncovering deeply nested bugs in network-exposed code.
Open AccessProtocol-Aware Firmware Rehosting for Effective Fuzzing of Embedded Network Stacks
One of the biggest attack surfaces of embedded systems is their network interfaces, which enable communication with other devices. Unlike their general-purpose counterparts, embedded systems are designed for specialized use cases, resulting in unique and diverse communication stacks. Unfortunately, current approaches for evaluating the security of these embedded network stacks require manual effort or access to hardware, and they generally focus only on small parts of the embedded system. A promising alternative is firmware rehosting, which enables fuzz testing of the entire firmware by generically emulating the physical hardware. However, existing rehosting methods often struggle to meaningfully explore network stacks due to their complex, multi-layered input formats. This limits their ability to uncover deeply nested software faults. To address this problem, we introduce a novel method to automatically detect and handle the use of network protocols in firmware called Pemu. By automatically deducing the available network protocols, Pemu can transparently generate valid network packets that encapsulate fuzzing data, allowing the fuzzing input to flow directly into deeper layers of the firmware logic. Our approach thus enables a deeper, more targeted, and layer-by-layer analysis of firmware components that were previously difficult or impossible to test. Our evaluation demonstrates that Pemu consistently improves the code coverage of three existing rehosting tools for embedded network stacks. Furthermore, our fuzzer rediscovered several known vulnerabilities and identified five previously unknown software faults, highlighting its effectiveness in uncovering deeply nested bugs in network-exposed code.
- Open Access
Empirical Security Analysis of Software-based Fault Isolation through Controlled Fault Injection
We use browsers daily to access all sorts of information. Because browsers routinely process scripts, media, and executable code from unknown sources, they form a critical security boundary between users and adversaries. A common attack vector is JavaScript, which exposes a large attack surface due to the sheer complexity of modern JavaScript engines. To mitigate these threats, modern engines increasingly adopt software-based fault isolation (SFI). A prominent example is Google's V8 heap sandbox, which represents the most widely deployed SFI mechanism, protecting billions of users across all Chromium-based browsers and countless applications built on Node$.$js and Electron. The heap sandbox splits the address space into two parts: one part containing trusted, security-sensitive metadata, and a sandboxed heap containing memory accessible to untrusted code. On a technical level, the sandbox enforces isolation by removing raw pointers and using translation tables to resolve references to trusted objects. Consequently, an attacker cannot corrupt trusted data even with full control of the sandboxed data, unless there is a bug in how code handles data from the sandboxed heap. Despite their widespread use, such SFI mechanisms have seen little security testing. In this work, we propose a new testing technique that models the security boundary of modern SFI implementations. Following the SFI threat model, we assume a powerful attacker who fully controls the sandbox's memory. We implement this by instrumenting memory loads originating in the trusted domain and accessing untrusted, attacker-controlled sandbox memory. We then inject faults into the loaded data, aiming to trigger memory corruption in the trusted domain. In a comprehensive evaluation, we identify 19 security bugs in V8 that enable an attacker to bypass the sandbox.
Open AccessEmpirical Security Analysis of Software-based Fault Isolation through Controlled Fault Injection
We use browsers daily to access all sorts of information. Because browsers routinely process scripts, media, and executable code from unknown sources, they form a critical security boundary between users and adversaries. A common attack vector is JavaScript, which exposes a large attack surface due to the sheer complexity of modern JavaScript engines. To mitigate these threats, modern engines increasingly adopt software-based fault isolation (SFI). A prominent example is Google's V8 heap sandbox, which represents the most widely deployed SFI mechanism, protecting billions of users across all Chromium-based browsers and countless applications built on Node$.$js and Electron. The heap sandbox splits the address space into two parts: one part containing trusted, security-sensitive metadata, and a sandboxed heap containing memory accessible to untrusted code. On a technical level, the sandbox enforces isolation by removing raw pointers and using translation tables to resolve references to trusted objects. Consequently, an attacker cannot corrupt trusted data even with full control of the sandboxed data, unless there is a bug in how code handles data from the sandboxed heap. Despite their widespread use, such SFI mechanisms have seen little security testing. In this work, we propose a new testing technique that models the security boundary of modern SFI implementations. Following the SFI threat model, we assume a powerful attacker who fully controls the sandbox's memory. We implement this by instrumenting memory loads originating in the trusted domain and accessing untrusted, attacker-controlled sandbox memory. We then inject faults into the loaded data, aiming to trigger memory corruption in the trusted domain. In a comprehensive evaluation, we identify 19 security bugs in V8 that enable an attacker to bypass the sandbox.