Zhuo Huang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Zhuo Huang has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Weijia Wang
School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, China
2 shared publications - Yu Yu
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
2 shared publications - Shuo Sun
Quan Cheng Laboratory, Jinan, China
1 shared publication - Tianfu Zhang
School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, China
1 shared publication - Xiaogang Zhou
China Telecom Quantum Information Technology Group Co., Ltd
1 shared publication Yan Zhuang
China Mobile Internet, Guangzhou, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 April 2026
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2026 (2) , 928-952
DPA-Style Attacks on HQC
HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic) was selected as the fifth algorithm in the NIST suite of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) standards. As the only code-based algorithm currently standardized by NIST, HQC offers a good balance between security assurance, performance, and implementation simplicity. Most existing power analyses against HQC are of the SPA style: they can recover secrets with a small number of traces, but can only tolerate limited noise. In this paper, we develop a chosen-ciphertext DPA-style attack methodology against HQC. We formalize a dedicated chosen-ciphertext setting in which the adversary selects (u, v) to target the intermediate value v ⊕ (uy) over F2[x]/(xn − 1). We further optimize the attack by reducing its computational complexity and generalizing it to target masked HQC implementations. The proposed approach is validated through both simulation and practical experiments. In noiseless simulations, full-key recovery is achieved with just 10 traces, and the required number of traces increases linearly with 1/SNR. In practical evaluations on an STM32F4 microcontroller, the secret key can be recovered with 50 traces without profiling and 20 traces with profiling. When first-order masking is applied, key recovery on the same hardware target remains feasible by exploiting second-order features, requiring approximately 3,000 traces without profiling. Our results establish a direct and analyzable connection between leakage on v ⊕ (uy) and end-to-end key recovery, emphasizing the necessity of higher-order masking countermeasures for HQC implementations.
- 23 April 2026
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2026 (2) , 928-952
Open AccessDPA-Style Attacks on HQC
HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic) was selected as the fifth algorithm in the NIST suite of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) standards. As the only code-based algorithm currently standardized by NIST, HQC offers a good balance between security assurance, performance, and implementation simplicity. Most existing power analyses against HQC are of the SPA style: they can recover secrets with a small number of traces, but can only tolerate limited noise. In this paper, we develop a chosen-ciphertext DPA-style attack methodology against HQC. We formalize a dedicated chosen-ciphertext setting in which the adversary selects (u, v) to target the intermediate value v ⊕ (uy) over F2[x]/(xn − 1). We further optimize the attack by reducing its computational complexity and generalizing it to target masked HQC implementations. The proposed approach is validated through both simulation and practical experiments. In noiseless simulations, full-key recovery is achieved with just 10 traces, and the required number of traces increases linearly with 1/SNR. In practical evaluations on an STM32F4 microcontroller, the secret key can be recovered with 50 traces without profiling and 20 traces with profiling. When first-order masking is applied, key recovery on the same hardware target remains feasible by exploiting second-order features, requiring approximately 3,000 traces without profiling. Our results establish a direct and analyzable connection between leakage on v ⊕ (uy) and end-to-end key recovery, emphasizing the necessity of higher-order masking countermeasures for HQC implementations.
- 6 October 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 11963-11974
Finding More Hints—Improved Power Analysis Attacks on Dilithium
CRYSTALS-Dilithium (referred to as Dilithium) is a standard in NIST’s post-quantum cryptography project. However, its design does not include protections against attacks exploiting intermediate data leakage. Since Ravi and Bruinderink introduced schemes to forge Dilithium signatures, numerous works have leveraged power analysis attack to exploit vulnerabilities in Dilithium implementations. In this paper, we revisit previous attacks and identify promising optimization strategies for hints-oriented attacks. In such attacks, an adversary first utilizes side-channel leakage to derive hint equations related to the secret key and then solves for the secret key using these equations. Our new strategy enables each signature to generate more valid hint equations, significantly reducing the number of required signatures for a successful attack. By incorporating machine learning techniques, specifically the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), we can efficiently detect hint equations with high accuracy. Furthermore, by combining a lattice-based algorithm with hybrid filtering methods, our scheme can further reduce the required number of hint equations. Additionally, our attack method is applicable to Dilithium security levels 2, 3, and 5. For Dilithium-2, the proposed attack successfully recovers the complete secret key even under low Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) conditions, requiring 395, 330, and 305 signatures at SNRs of 0.0167, 0.0210, and 0.0406, respectively.
- 6 October 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 11963-11974
Finding More Hints—Improved Power Analysis Attacks on Dilithium
CRYSTALS-Dilithium (referred to as Dilithium) is a standard in NIST’s post-quantum cryptography project. However, its design does not include protections against attacks exploiting intermediate data leakage. Since Ravi and Bruinderink introduced schemes to forge Dilithium signatures, numerous works have leveraged power analysis attack to exploit vulnerabilities in Dilithium implementations. In this paper, we revisit previous attacks and identify promising optimization strategies for hints-oriented attacks. In such attacks, an adversary first utilizes side-channel leakage to derive hint equations related to the secret key and then solves for the secret key using these equations. Our new strategy enables each signature to generate more valid hint equations, significantly reducing the number of required signatures for a successful attack. By incorporating machine learning techniques, specifically the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), we can efficiently detect hint equations with high accuracy. Furthermore, by combining a lattice-based algorithm with hybrid filtering methods, our scheme can further reduce the required number of hint equations. Additionally, our attack method is applicable to Dilithium security levels 2, 3, and 5. For Dilithium-2, the proposed attack successfully recovers the complete secret key even under low Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) conditions, requiring 395, 330, and 305 signatures at SNRs of 0.0167, 0.0210, and 0.0406, respectively.