Elizabeth A. Tomsich
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Elizabeth A. Tomsich has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aaron B. Shev
Department of Emergency Medicine, School of Medicine, UC Davis Medical Center, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications - Andrew Crawford
Department of Emergency Medicine, School of Medicine, UC Davis Medical Center, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications - Daniel J. Tancredi
Department of Pediatrics, School of Medicine, UC Davis, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications - Garen J. Wintemute
Department of Emergency Medicine, School of Medicine, UC Davis, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications - Julia P. Schleimer
Department of Emergency Medicine, School of Medicine, UC Davis Medical Center, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications - Mona A. Wright
Department of Emergency Medicine, School of Medicine, UC Davis Medical Center, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 43
Views on democracy and political violence in the United States in 2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: From 2022 to 2024, an annual, nationally representative, longitudinal survey in the United States (US) has found concerning prevalences of support for and willingness to engage in political violence. This study examines changes in those prevalences from mid-2024 to mid-2025. Methods: Survey participants were members of Ipsos Knowledge Panel, ≥ 18 years old as of recruitment in 2022. Wave 4 was conducted May 23–June 13, 2025. The primary analysis generated findings for the entire cohort; a secondary analysis categorized respondents by political party and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliations. Principal outcome measures comprised measures of justification for, willingness to engage in, and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Results for 2025 were presented as weighted prevalences, with comparisons based on adjusted prevalence differences. Change from 2024 to 2025 was estimated based on mean change scores. Results: The 2025 completion rate was 89.9% (8,248 respondents/9,179 invitees). For the cohort as a whole, there were only small increases from 2024 to 2025 in the prevalence of the belief that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (2024: 32.3%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 31.0%, 33.6%; 2025: 35.6%, 95% CI 34.1%, 37.0%) and to advance 16 of 20 individual objectives. There were few changes in willingness to commit political violence and none in expectation of firearm use. Despite some increases among Democrats, MAGA Republicans in 2025 were substantially more likely than strong Democrats to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (MAGA Republicans 52.2%, 95% CI 48.4%, 56.1%; strong Democrats 32.1%, 95% CI 28.6%, 35.6%) and to advance 10 of those objectives when objectives were considered individually. A small group of non-Republican MAGA supporters had higher prevalences than most other groups on many measures. Conclusions: Support for and willingness to commit political violence increased only modestly from 2024 to 2025 and, where differences existed, remained generally higher among MAGA movement affiliates and Republicans than among Democrats. These findings can help advance prevention efforts, which are urgently needed in this US election year.
- 27 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 43
Open AccessViews on democracy and political violence in the United States in 2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: From 2022 to 2024, an annual, nationally representative, longitudinal survey in the United States (US) has found concerning prevalences of support for and willingness to engage in political violence. This study examines changes in those prevalences from mid-2024 to mid-2025. Methods: Survey participants were members of Ipsos Knowledge Panel, ≥ 18 years old as of recruitment in 2022. Wave 4 was conducted May 23–June 13, 2025. The primary analysis generated findings for the entire cohort; a secondary analysis categorized respondents by political party and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliations. Principal outcome measures comprised measures of justification for, willingness to engage in, and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Results for 2025 were presented as weighted prevalences, with comparisons based on adjusted prevalence differences. Change from 2024 to 2025 was estimated based on mean change scores. Results: The 2025 completion rate was 89.9% (8,248 respondents/9,179 invitees). For the cohort as a whole, there were only small increases from 2024 to 2025 in the prevalence of the belief that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (2024: 32.3%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 31.0%, 33.6%; 2025: 35.6%, 95% CI 34.1%, 37.0%) and to advance 16 of 20 individual objectives. There were few changes in willingness to commit political violence and none in expectation of firearm use. Despite some increases among Democrats, MAGA Republicans in 2025 were substantially more likely than strong Democrats to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (MAGA Republicans 52.2%, 95% CI 48.4%, 56.1%; strong Democrats 32.1%, 95% CI 28.6%, 35.6%) and to advance 10 of those objectives when objectives were considered individually. A small group of non-Republican MAGA supporters had higher prevalences than most other groups on many measures. Conclusions: Support for and willingness to commit political violence increased only modestly from 2024 to 2025 and, where differences existed, remained generally higher among MAGA movement affiliates and Republicans than among Democrats. These findings can help advance prevention efforts, which are urgently needed in this US election year.
- Open Access
- 26 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 41
Support for authoritarianism and use of force by and against the federal government in the United States in mid-2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: During this period of heightened risk for political violence and authoritarian government in the United States (US), there is an urgent need for information on the public’s support for authoritarianism and government-initiated violence and its willingness to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Methods: Findings are from Wave 4, conducted May 23-June 13, 2025, of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Findings are presented for the cohort as a whole and for demographic and political affiliation subgroups. Outcomes are expressed as weighted prevalences and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate. Results: The survey completion rate was 89.9%. Of 8248 respondents, 15.0% (95% confidence interval (CI) 13.9%, 16.1%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy.” One in 10 (9.6%, 95% CI 8.8%, 10.6%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “the [federal] government should use the military to help enforce its policies in the United States,” and 4.4% (95% CI 3.7%, 5.2%) strongly or very strongly agreed with the use of “private armed militia groups” for that purpose. Between 5% and 7% of respondents strongly or very strongly agreed that the federal government should arrest its critics, and about 2% were very or completely willing to personally engage in violence in support of (or opposition to) “government policies or the President” and against individual opponents (or supporters) of the government. Younger respondents tended to be less supportive of democracy as a form of government, more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism, and more willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Compared with strong Democrats, “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) Republicans were more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism and the current federal government’s use of the military and private militia groups but were not more willing personally to engage in violence. Conclusions: In 2025, substantial minorities of US adults endorsed statements consistent with authoritarianism. Smaller minorities endorsed and were willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. These findings call for sustained, concerted action to avert widespread political violence and preserve democracy in the United States.
- 26 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 41
Open AccessSupport for authoritarianism and use of force by and against the federal government in the United States in mid-2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: During this period of heightened risk for political violence and authoritarian government in the United States (US), there is an urgent need for information on the public’s support for authoritarianism and government-initiated violence and its willingness to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Methods: Findings are from Wave 4, conducted May 23-June 13, 2025, of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Findings are presented for the cohort as a whole and for demographic and political affiliation subgroups. Outcomes are expressed as weighted prevalences and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate. Results: The survey completion rate was 89.9%. Of 8248 respondents, 15.0% (95% confidence interval (CI) 13.9%, 16.1%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy.” One in 10 (9.6%, 95% CI 8.8%, 10.6%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “the [federal] government should use the military to help enforce its policies in the United States,” and 4.4% (95% CI 3.7%, 5.2%) strongly or very strongly agreed with the use of “private armed militia groups” for that purpose. Between 5% and 7% of respondents strongly or very strongly agreed that the federal government should arrest its critics, and about 2% were very or completely willing to personally engage in violence in support of (or opposition to) “government policies or the President” and against individual opponents (or supporters) of the government. Younger respondents tended to be less supportive of democracy as a form of government, more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism, and more willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Compared with strong Democrats, “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) Republicans were more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism and the current federal government’s use of the military and private militia groups but were not more willing personally to engage in violence. Conclusions: In 2025, substantial minorities of US adults endorsed statements consistent with authoritarianism. Smaller minorities endorsed and were willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. These findings call for sustained, concerted action to avert widespread political violence and preserve democracy in the United States.
- Open Access
- 26 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 12 (1) , 80
Militancy in the military: military service and support for political violence and right-wing extremism
Background: Political violence constitutes an increasing threat to individual and population-level health in the United States, with military service identified as a potential risk factor. The current study examines the association between military service, combat experience, and support for and willingness to engage in political violence and approval of extremist organizations and movements. Methods: A nationally representative sample of 12,947 US adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel completed the 2022 Life in America Survey. Outcomes are presented as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences. The analytic sample comprised 2,255 respondents with military backgrounds; 1,105, including an augment of 415 respondents, reported combat experience. Results: Military respondents were less likely than others to perceive the use of political violence “to keep our borders open” as usually or always justified (adjusted prevalence difference (aPD) -3.1%, 95% confidence interval (CI) -5.6, -0.7, q = 0.049). By contrast, they demonstrated a greater willingness to “use force or violence on your own as an individual” (aPD 5.0%, 95% CI 2.5%, 7.5%, q = .001) and to “organize a group of people who share your beliefs to use force or violence” (aPD 2.8%, 95% CI 0.7%, 4.8%, q = .029) to advance a political objective. They were also more likely to report that it would be very or extremely likely that they would be armed with a gun (aPD 6.3%, 95% CI 3.5%, 9.2%, q = .001) or carry a gun openly (aPD 6.5%, 95% CI 3.1%, 10.0%, q = .001) in a situation where they thought force or violence was justified to advance an important political objective; however, there were no differences with respect to threatening or shooting someone with a gun. Additionally, military respondents were more likely to strongly or very strongly approve of the Oath Keepers (aPD 4.1%, 95% CI 0.7%, 7.6%, q = .037). There were no significant differences by combat experience. Conclusions: Given the modest number of differences among numerous comparisons, and the relatively small size of prevalence differences, it does not appear that military service and combat experience act as risk factors for support for and willingness to engage in political violence, or approval of extremist organizations and movements.
- 26 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 12 (1) , 80
Open AccessMilitancy in the military: military service and support for political violence and right-wing extremism
Background: Political violence constitutes an increasing threat to individual and population-level health in the United States, with military service identified as a potential risk factor. The current study examines the association between military service, combat experience, and support for and willingness to engage in political violence and approval of extremist organizations and movements. Methods: A nationally representative sample of 12,947 US adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel completed the 2022 Life in America Survey. Outcomes are presented as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences. The analytic sample comprised 2,255 respondents with military backgrounds; 1,105, including an augment of 415 respondents, reported combat experience. Results: Military respondents were less likely than others to perceive the use of political violence “to keep our borders open” as usually or always justified (adjusted prevalence difference (aPD) -3.1%, 95% confidence interval (CI) -5.6, -0.7, q = 0.049). By contrast, they demonstrated a greater willingness to “use force or violence on your own as an individual” (aPD 5.0%, 95% CI 2.5%, 7.5%, q = .001) and to “organize a group of people who share your beliefs to use force or violence” (aPD 2.8%, 95% CI 0.7%, 4.8%, q = .029) to advance a political objective. They were also more likely to report that it would be very or extremely likely that they would be armed with a gun (aPD 6.3%, 95% CI 3.5%, 9.2%, q = .001) or carry a gun openly (aPD 6.5%, 95% CI 3.1%, 10.0%, q = .001) in a situation where they thought force or violence was justified to advance an important political objective; however, there were no differences with respect to threatening or shooting someone with a gun. Additionally, military respondents were more likely to strongly or very strongly approve of the Oath Keepers (aPD 4.1%, 95% CI 0.7%, 7.6%, q = .037). There were no significant differences by combat experience. Conclusions: Given the modest number of differences among numerous comparisons, and the relatively small size of prevalence differences, it does not appear that military service and combat experience act as risk factors for support for and willingness to engage in political violence, or approval of extremist organizations and movements.