FDFrançois Derrien

François Derrien

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


François Derrien has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Setup Costs and the Financing of Young Firms

    by François Derrien, Jean-Stéphane Mésonnier, Guillaume Vuillemey

    Firm births are key drivers of employment growth, productivity gains, and “creative destruction.” We show that setup costs create sizable financial constraints for new firms. When firms face high setup costs, they can only be established by leveraging up and lengthening debt maturity. We empirically confirm these predictions in a large sample of young French firms. Leverage is higher and debt maturity is longer in industries with high setup costs. Last, we show that following an exogenous shock that reduces banks’ supply of long-term loans, there is relatively lower firm creation in manufacturing industries with high setup costs. This paper was accepted by Bo Becker, finance. Funding: This work was supported by Observatoire du financement des entreprises par le marché (OFEM) (NA) and Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant F-STAR ANR-17-CE26-0007-01]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03846 .


  • Open Access

    Climate Risk Engagements

    by François Derrien, Alexandre Garel, Arthur Romec, Feng Zhou

    We study climate risk engagements by one of the world’s largest institutional investors. These engagements account for a substantial share of ESG engagements and predominantly target firms with large carbon footprints and high exposure to transition risk. The recent ESG backlash has led to a reduction in climate risk engagements, particularly in industries where climate issues are less financially material. Climate risk engagements are associated with greater voting support for management. Following engagement, targeted firms are more likely to adopt science-based climate targets and to disclose climate-related information. They also experience a modest reduction in emissions intensity. Placebo tests using social engagements suggest that these outcomes are specifically due to climate risk engagements. Finally, when targeted firms fail to subsequently take climate actions, engagement is repeated and complemented by votes against directors.

  • Open Access

    Do Analysts' Preferences Affect Corporate Policies?

    by François Degeorge, François Derrien, Ambrus Kecskés, Sébastien Michenaud

    Equity research analysts tend to cover firms about which they have favorable views. We exploit this tendency to infer analysts' preferences for corporate policies from their coverage decisions. We then use exogenous analyst disappearances to examine the effect of these preferences on corporate policies. After an analyst disappears, firms change their policies in the direction opposite to the analyst's preferences. The influence of analyst preferences on policies is stronger for firms for which analyst coverage is likely to matter more: young firms, and firms with higher market valuations. Our results suggest that firms choose their corporate policies, in part, to be consistent with the preferences of their analysts.

  • Open Access

    Analyst Hype in Ipos: Explaining the Popularity of Bookbuilding

    by François Degeorge, François Derrien, Kent L. Womack

    The bookbuilding procedure for selling initial public offerings (IPO) to investors has captured significant market share from auction alternatives in recent years, despite the significantly lower costs related to the auction mechanism in terms of direct fees and initial underpricing. This article shows that in the French market, where the frequency of bookbuilding and auctions was approximately equal in the 1990s, the ostensible advantages to the issuer using bookbuilding were advertising-related benefits. Specifically, we find that book-built issues were more likely to be followed and positively recommended by the lead underwriters, as well as to receive "booster shots" after issuance if the shares had fallen. Even nonunderwriters' analysts appear to promote book-built issues more but only as a way of currying favor with the IPO underwriter for allocations of future deals. Yet we do not observe valuation or post-IPO return differentials that suggest these types of promotion have any value to the issuing firm. We conclude that underwriters using the bookbuilding procedure have convinced issuers of the questionable value of the advertising and promotion of their shares.