ZYZihao Yang
Zihao Yang
*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Zihao Yang has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dan Meng
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Mengxin Zheng
University of Central Florida
1 shared publication - Mingzhe Zhang
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS
1 shared publication - Qian Lou
University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA
1 shared publication - Rui Hou
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Shengyu Fan
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Cybersecurity
- Vol. 8 (1) , 119
Corrosion Hammer: a self-activated bit-flip attack to the processing-in-memory accelerator
The Resistive Random-Access-Memory (ReRAM) crossbar-based Processing-In-Memory (PIM) accelerator shows great promise in accelerating neural networks (NNs). This technique boasts low energy consumption and exceptional performance in multiplication and accumulations (MAC) operations, making ReRAM-based PIM accelerators an ideal solution for intelligent computing in wearable and low-power mobile devices. However, security concerns related to PIM have not been adequately addressed. In this paper, we present a new attack framework called SolutionName for ReRAM-based PIM accelerators. SolutionName builds upon the Bit Flip Attack (BFA), a weight modification attack that manipulates the NN function by flipping specific bits in the deployed quantized NN model. Unlike previous BFA methods that require explicit memory fault injection techniques, such as Row Hammer, to modify sensitive bits in the victim NN, SolutionName implants the trojan during the hardware-software co-design phase and flips sensitive bits using read disturbance. Read disturbance is a common noise in ReRAM caused by normal read operations. This approach enables the trojan to be activated quietly during normal use, eliminating the need for explicit attacks. Furthermore, we explore the impact of inputs on the activation time of the trojan and propose a method to expedite activation using normal input. Our experimental results demonstrate that SolutionName achieves an extremely covert trojan implantation and activation method, with an adversarial attack success rate of 94.38%. Additionally, with a specially designed method, the trojan activation can be accelerated on average by 61.98 $$\times $$ , providing controllable activation.- 23 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Cybersecurity
- Vol. 8 (1) , 119
Open AccessCorrosion Hammer: a self-activated bit-flip attack to the processing-in-memory accelerator
The Resistive Random-Access-Memory (ReRAM) crossbar-based Processing-In-Memory (PIM) accelerator shows great promise in accelerating neural networks (NNs). This technique boasts low energy consumption and exceptional performance in multiplication and accumulations (MAC) operations, making ReRAM-based PIM accelerators an ideal solution for intelligent computing in wearable and low-power mobile devices. However, security concerns related to PIM have not been adequately addressed. In this paper, we present a new attack framework called SolutionName for ReRAM-based PIM accelerators. SolutionName builds upon the Bit Flip Attack (BFA), a weight modification attack that manipulates the NN function by flipping specific bits in the deployed quantized NN model. Unlike previous BFA methods that require explicit memory fault injection techniques, such as Row Hammer, to modify sensitive bits in the victim NN, SolutionName implants the trojan during the hardware-software co-design phase and flips sensitive bits using read disturbance. Read disturbance is a common noise in ReRAM caused by normal read operations. This approach enables the trojan to be activated quietly during normal use, eliminating the need for explicit attacks. Furthermore, we explore the impact of inputs on the activation time of the trojan and propose a method to expedite activation using normal input. Our experimental results demonstrate that SolutionName achieves an extremely covert trojan implantation and activation method, with an adversarial attack success rate of 94.38%. Additionally, with a specially designed method, the trojan activation can be accelerated on average by 61.98 $$\times $$ , providing controllable activation.