Linnéa Marie Rohde
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Linnéa Marie Rohde has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Federico Innocenti
University of Verona
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Selective Exposure Reduces Voluntary Contributions: Experimental Evidence from the German Internet Panel
Can strategic information acquisition harm the provision of a public good? We investigate this question in an incentivized online experiment with a large sample of the German population. The marginal returns of the public good are uncertain: it is either socially efficient to contribute or not. In the information treatment, participants can choose between two information sources with opposite biases. One source is more likely to report low marginal returns, whereas the other is more likely to report high marginal returns. We find that information avoidance is a minor phenomenon. Most participants select the source biased towards reporting low marginal returns, independent of their prior beliefs. As a result, the information treatment reduces contributions and increases free-riding. When contributing is socially efficient, the information treatment reduces social welfare. We find that social preferences guide information acquisition: socially-oriented participants are more likely to acquire information and select the source that is biased towards reporting low marginal returns. JEL Classification: C99, D12, D61, D83, H41
- 9 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessSelective Exposure Reduces Voluntary Contributions: Experimental Evidence from the German Internet Panel
Can strategic information acquisition harm the provision of a public good? We investigate this question in an incentivized online experiment with a large sample of the German population. The marginal returns of the public good are uncertain: it is either socially efficient to contribute or not. In the information treatment, participants can choose between two information sources with opposite biases. One source is more likely to report low marginal returns, whereas the other is more likely to report high marginal returns. We find that information avoidance is a minor phenomenon. Most participants select the source biased towards reporting low marginal returns, independent of their prior beliefs. As a result, the information treatment reduces contributions and increases free-riding. When contributing is socially efficient, the information treatment reduces social welfare. We find that social preferences guide information acquisition: socially-oriented participants are more likely to acquire information and select the source that is biased towards reporting low marginal returns. JEL Classification: C99, D12, D61, D83, H41