FIFederico Innocenti

Federico Innocenti

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Federico Innocenti has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    An Evolutionary Analysis of Narrative Selection

    by Federico Innocenti, Roberto Rozzi

    We compare the evolutionary selection of agents who employ different heuristics to select the narratives through which they interpret new information. Agents' survival depends on the accuracy of their beliefs. Agents who choose narratives to align with the population's average belief have higher survival rates than those who use alternative heuristics. Conforming reduces an agent's belief variance but inherits the bias of the average belief, so it pays when the latter is close to the state's probability. Evolutionary selection helps maintain this proximity by eliminating inaccurate agents. The other heuristics survive as well, with their shares depending on the degree of uncertainty: agents who tend to form mild beliefs survive more when uncertainty is high, whereas those who tend to form extreme beliefs survive more when uncertainty is low. Conformism is usually considered detrimental, as it discards private information. In our model, conformist agents read their private information in light of the public information, and the consensus they anchor to consists of the agents that survived evolutionary selection, so the cost of conformism is limited.

  • Open Access

    Information Design and Entry in Auctions 

    by Federico Innocenti, Nicola Doni, Domenico Menicucci

    This paper is about a two-bidder auction setting with endogenous and costly entry in which, before the bidders' entry decisions, the seller may release information about the object on sale. This information affects each bidder's belief about the own distribution of value for the object on sale, hence it affects the bidder's incentive to enter. The seller uses a second price auction and we consider the class of unrestricted information structures using the techniques of information design in which the seller sends private messages to the bidders. We characterize the optimal information structure, which optimally trades off providing rents to the bidders in favorable (to the bidders) states of the world against inducing entry of all bidders in other states of the world (in order to generate a positive auction revenue). We compare the optimal information structure with some specific information structures examined in the literature and then show that a restriction to public messages hurts the seller significantly. We also show that using a first price auction allows the seller to earn the same revenue as when a second price auction is used. We then allow the seller to use an entry fee and jointly optimize, under some restrictions, with respect to the entry fee and the information structure. In this case the seller does not need to induce entry of all bidders to earn a positive revenue, and indeed induces entry of a single bidder, who is required to pay a high entry fee, if the entry cost is not small. But if the seller can also use a reserve price, then it is optimal to (almost) fully subsidize the entry cost and use the reserve price to extract all the bidders' rents while inducing the socially optimal entry.

  • Open Access

    First Impressions Matter: The Lasting Impact of Slanted Media on Attitudes

    by Federico Innocenti, Giacomo Ferraro, Marco Minozzo

    We investigate how slanted articles influence attitudes. We conducted a field experiment in which university students were randomly assigned to different treatments, reading news articles with either a positive or negative slant on both familiar and novel topics over four weeks. We collected students' attitudes weekly and conducted a follow-up survey four weeks after the experiment ended. We find that: a) slanted information significantly shifts attitudes in the intended direction; b) the effect is more substantial for novel topics; c) the first impression about a novel topic shapes attitudes; d) the change in attitudes persists over time. Our findings highlight that media are more effective at shaping initial attitudes than at altering pre-existing ones. Thus, our results show the importance of providing timely information in the early stages of public discourse.

  • Open Access

    Who Provides It Matters: Source Characteristics and Trust in Online Information

    by Federico Innocenti, Giacomo Ferraro, Tsung-Hsien Li

    We study how observable characteristics of information sources shape individuals' evaluations of their content. In an online experiment, we vary source characteristics while holding content constant. We find that disclosing these characteristics leaves both the content's perceived accuracy and the willingness to share it largely unaffected but substantially shapes trust in the source. Highly educated sources are trusted more; disclosing low education, popularity, and Republican affiliation each reduces trust. Participants sort across sources based on observable characteristics even before seeing any content, suggesting that source cues serve as credibility signals that influence who is trusted and heard.

  • Open Access

    Vague by Design: Central Bank Communication with an Inattentive Public

    by Federico Innocenti, Tsung-Hsien Li

    What is the optimal communication policy for a central bank to inform an inattentive public? We develop a model of central bank communication within a Bayesian persuasion framework, incorporating information processing costs and heterogeneous attention budgets across individuals. The central bank seeks to stabilize the economy by managing inflation expectations in response to fundamental shocks. When the shock is larger than the policy response, it is optimal for the central bank to remain deliberately vague, leveraging inflation surprises to mitigate fluctuations in unemployment. When the shock is smaller than the policy response, the central bank communicates precisely, balancing accuracy against audience reach. We further examine how belief heterogeneity, the share of inattentive individuals, adaptive expectations, and skewed attention budget distributions influence the central bank's optimal communication. Our findings underscore its strategic role as an effective instrument for macroeconomic stabilization.

  • Open Access

    Competition in persuasion in the attention economy

    by Federico Innocenti

  • Open Access

    Taxing Digital Platforms: A Race to the Top?

    by Federico Innocenti, Alessandro Bucciol

    The digital advertising tax is an increasingly used policy measure, but its consequences must still be better understood. We develop a theoretical model where two countries compete to tax a digital platform that sets its quality and advertising to maximize profits. Although the tax may increase country-level tax revenues, we highlight an unexplored drawback of this policy. The unilateral ability of a country to tax advertising revenues generated in its territories may lead to inefficiently high equilibrium tax rates. A “race to the top”, as opposed to the “race to the bottom” typically observed in tax competition across countries, occurs whenever the quality of the digital platform is sufficiently responsive to an increase in the tax rate and is more decisive than advertising in determining prices and consumer welfare. Our findings emphasize the need for a global initiative on digital platform taxation rather than leaving the decision to individual countries.

  • Open Access

    Social surrogacy: Market design and implications for fertility

    by Federico Innocenti, Lucia Schiavon

  • Open Access

    An Evolutionary Analysis of Narrative Selection

    by Federico Innocenti, Roberto Rozzi

    We study the performance of different methods for processing information, incorporating narrative selection within an evolutionary model. All agents update their beliefs according to Bayes' Rule, but some strategically choose the narrative they use in updating according to heterogeneous criteria. We simulate the endogenous composition of the population, considering different laws of motion for the underlying state of the world. We find that conformists -- that is, agents that choose the narrative to conform to the average belief in the population -- have an evolutionary advantage over other agents across all specifications. The survival chances of the remaining types depend on the uncertainty regarding the state of the world. Agents who tend to develop mild beliefs perform better when the uncertainty is high, whereas agents who tend to develop extreme beliefs perform better when the uncertainty is low.