Xinlu Zou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Xinlu Zou has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Simin He
School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China
1 shared publication - Xun Zhu
School of Digital Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Targeted Inspection in a Local Public Goods Experiment
This study compares two inspection mechanisms for promoting cooperation in a public goods game. The mechanisms differ in which players are selected for inspection. In a repeated two-stage game, players in each period first choose their network neighbors and then choose contributions to a local public good that benefits both themselves and their neighbors. The random inspection mechanism selects one player with equal probability, while the targeted inspection mechanism selects one of the players with the fewest neighbors. Theoretically, targeted inspection is more effective in promoting cooperation. Under both mechanisms, cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium when players sever links with less cooperative neighbors, leaving less cooperative players with fewer neighbors and therefore higher inspection probabilities under targeted inspection. However, experimental results show that targeted inspection leads to lower cooperation than random inspection. Participants under targeted inspection tend to maintain more links to reduce their likelihood of being inspected rather than severing links with less cooperative neighbors.
- 14 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTargeted Inspection in a Local Public Goods Experiment
This study compares two inspection mechanisms for promoting cooperation in a public goods game. The mechanisms differ in which players are selected for inspection. In a repeated two-stage game, players in each period first choose their network neighbors and then choose contributions to a local public good that benefits both themselves and their neighbors. The random inspection mechanism selects one player with equal probability, while the targeted inspection mechanism selects one of the players with the fewest neighbors. Theoretically, targeted inspection is more effective in promoting cooperation. Under both mechanisms, cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium when players sever links with less cooperative neighbors, leaving less cooperative players with fewer neighbors and therefore higher inspection probabilities under targeted inspection. However, experimental results show that targeted inspection leads to lower cooperation than random inspection. Participants under targeted inspection tend to maintain more links to reduce their likelihood of being inspected rather than severing links with less cooperative neighbors.
- 3 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 82 (2) , 1-33
Responsibility sharing in a public bad experiment
- 3 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 82 (2) , 1-33
Responsibility sharing in a public bad experiment