Xun Zhu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Xun Zhu has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Erte Xiao
Monash Univ, Dept Econ, Clayton, Vic, Australia
1 shared publication - Lingfang Li
School of Management Fudan University Shanghai China
1 shared publication - Simin He
School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China
1 shared publication - Xinlu Zou
School of Finance, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, China
1 shared publication Yuting Wu
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
A Promise Mechanism to Improve Online Reputation Systems: Evidence from an Experimental Study
Online reputation systems often suffer from insufficient and biased feedback, which weakens their ability to reduce information asymmetry and support trade. We design and test whether an ex ante promise mechanism can improve information generation in such systems. Before a transaction, buyers are given the opportunity to promise that they will provide feedback afterward. We examine two ways of embedding this mechanism into an online market: a market-promise solicitation mechanism, in which the platform prompts buyers to make the promise, and a seller-promise solicitation mechanism, in which sellers themselves request the promise. While theory predicts that both mechanisms may improve reporting rates and market efficiency, laboratory experiments show that only seller-promise solicitation significantly increases feedback provision and purchasing, thereby improving market efficiency. Our data suggest that the effectiveness of seller-promise solicitation aligns with the expectation-based motivations for keeping promises.
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessA Promise Mechanism to Improve Online Reputation Systems: Evidence from an Experimental Study
Online reputation systems often suffer from insufficient and biased feedback, which weakens their ability to reduce information asymmetry and support trade. We design and test whether an ex ante promise mechanism can improve information generation in such systems. Before a transaction, buyers are given the opportunity to promise that they will provide feedback afterward. We examine two ways of embedding this mechanism into an online market: a market-promise solicitation mechanism, in which the platform prompts buyers to make the promise, and a seller-promise solicitation mechanism, in which sellers themselves request the promise. While theory predicts that both mechanisms may improve reporting rates and market efficiency, laboratory experiments show that only seller-promise solicitation significantly increases feedback provision and purchasing, thereby improving market efficiency. Our data suggest that the effectiveness of seller-promise solicitation aligns with the expectation-based motivations for keeping promises.
- 3 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 82 (2) , 1-33
Responsibility sharing in a public bad experiment
- 3 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 82 (2) , 1-33
Responsibility sharing in a public bad experiment