Bo Ouyang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Bo Ouyang has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Qunfeng Liao
Oakland University
2 shared publications Edward P. Swanson
Texas A&M University - Mays Business School; Mays Business School, Texas A&M University
1 shared publicationJap Efendi
University of Texas at Arlington
1 shared publicationNeil Bhattacharya
Singapore Management University - School of Accountancy; Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Accounting Department
1 shared publicationRebecca Files
University of Texas at Dallas
1 shared publication- Theodore E. Christensen
University of Georgia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The real effect of C-suite ethnic diversity: Evidence from corporate resource adjustment
In this study, we utilize team diversity theory in conventional top management team research to examine whether and how C-suite ethnic diversity is related to corporate resource adjustment. We hypothesize C-suite ethnic diversity improves the efficiency of resource adjustment by expanding information resources for resource adjustment decision making and enhancing monitoring of CEO opportunism. Our evidence by conducting research using 2,509 firms for 25,362 firm-year observations over 1993–2020 suggests that C-suite ethnic diversity improves the efficiency of corporate resource adjustment and firm value. Further analyses indicate that the value-enhancing effect is more pronounced in firms more likely to benefit from the enlarged information resources and in firms with more severe agency problems. Our results are robust to endogeneity control through the entropy-balance approach and an instrumental variable (IV) method. Our study documents an economic channel through which diversity impacts firm value and offers valuable policy implication.
- 8 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe real effect of C-suite ethnic diversity: Evidence from corporate resource adjustment
In this study, we utilize team diversity theory in conventional top management team research to examine whether and how C-suite ethnic diversity is related to corporate resource adjustment. We hypothesize C-suite ethnic diversity improves the efficiency of resource adjustment by expanding information resources for resource adjustment decision making and enhancing monitoring of CEO opportunism. Our evidence by conducting research using 2,509 firms for 25,362 firm-year observations over 1993–2020 suggests that C-suite ethnic diversity improves the efficiency of corporate resource adjustment and firm value. Further analyses indicate that the value-enhancing effect is more pronounced in firms more likely to benefit from the enlarged information resources and in firms with more severe agency problems. Our results are robust to endogeneity control through the entropy-balance approach and an instrumental variable (IV) method. Our study documents an economic channel through which diversity impacts firm value and offers valuable policy implication.
- Open Access
- 8 December 2015
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Can Short Sellers Constrain Opportunistic Non-GAAP Earnings Reporting?
Prior research suggests that short sellers can monitor and limit opportunism in the reporting of conventional GAAP earnings. However, firms have increasingly begun to disclose customized earnings metrics calculated by excluding certain income items (usually expenses) to create their own non-GAAP version of earnings (which generally portrays a more optimistic view of performance). We extend this research by exploring how short sellers can influence the frequency and quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Results from our difference-in-differences estimations indicate that short-selling pressure significantly mitigates aggressive non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Cross-sectional tests suggest that short sellers influence the quality of non-GAAP earnings through two channels: (a) the increased costs of misreporting and (b) direct monitoring. We perform a large set of robustness tests to rule out other possible explanations for our results. Given the SEC’s recent concern about non-GAAP reporting, our results have strong policy implications for the SEC’s current consideration of additional regulation of non-GAAP disclosure. Moreover, our evidence contributes both to the literature on earnings management and to ongoing policy debates on short sales constraints.
- 8 December 2015
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCan Short Sellers Constrain Opportunistic Non-GAAP Earnings Reporting?
Prior research suggests that short sellers can monitor and limit opportunism in the reporting of conventional GAAP earnings. However, firms have increasingly begun to disclose customized earnings metrics calculated by excluding certain income items (usually expenses) to create their own non-GAAP version of earnings (which generally portrays a more optimistic view of performance). We extend this research by exploring how short sellers can influence the frequency and quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Results from our difference-in-differences estimations indicate that short-selling pressure significantly mitigates aggressive non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Cross-sectional tests suggest that short sellers influence the quality of non-GAAP earnings through two channels: (a) the increased costs of misreporting and (b) direct monitoring. We perform a large set of robustness tests to rule out other possible explanations for our results. Given the SEC’s recent concern about non-GAAP reporting, our results have strong policy implications for the SEC’s current consideration of additional regulation of non-GAAP disclosure. Moreover, our evidence contributes both to the literature on earnings management and to ongoing policy debates on short sales constraints.
- Open Access
- 2 June 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Executive Turnover Following Option Backdating Allegations
We find the likelihood of turnover in the CEO and CFO positions is significantly higher in the aftermath of option backdating (in comparison to industry-matched and propensity-score-matched control firms). Turnover is particularly high for severe cases of backdating, namely, when a regulatory investigation occurs or the financial statements are restated, and turnover is lower when directors are also compensated with backdated options. We find the displaced managers are punished by the labor market in that they are less likely than control firm managers to be rehired at comparable positions -- even when backdating at their former employer was not severe. We also observe that backdating firms restructure CEO compensation to rely less on stock options, especially when they hire a new CEO. Finally, we learn that the higher turnover extends to the General Counsel.
- 2 June 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessExecutive Turnover Following Option Backdating Allegations
We find the likelihood of turnover in the CEO and CFO positions is significantly higher in the aftermath of option backdating (in comparison to industry-matched and propensity-score-matched control firms). Turnover is particularly high for severe cases of backdating, namely, when a regulatory investigation occurs or the financial statements are restated, and turnover is lower when directors are also compensated with backdated options. We find the displaced managers are punished by the labor market in that they are less likely than control firm managers to be rehired at comparable positions -- even when backdating at their former employer was not severe. We also observe that backdating firms restructure CEO compensation to rely less on stock options, especially when they hire a new CEO. Finally, we learn that the higher turnover extends to the General Counsel.