Дарья Максимовна Азарова
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Дарья Максимовна Азарова has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Natalia S. Pavlova
Lomonosov Moscow State University
1 shared publication - Sergei I. Fedorov
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration; Lomonosov Moscow State University
1 shared publication Д. М. Азарова
Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации; МГУ им. М. В. Ломоносова
1 shared publicationС. И. Федоров
Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации; МГУ им. М. В. Ломоносова
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Economic Policy in Economic Policy
- Vol. 21 (5) , 6-31
Through the Looking-Glass of Prices: The Effects of Price Transparency Achieved Through Transition to a Unified Price Indicator
Price is a universal tool for transmitting information among a great many consumers and producers performing economic calculations. Market prices provide signals that aggregate numerical information about the individual plans of a multitude of strangers acting on tacit and dispersed knowledge. Attempts to replace such spontaneously emerging social self-organization with centralized planning are untenable, as Austrian economists proved during the early twentieth century economic calculation debate. Nevertheless, enthusiasm for regulatory control over pricing is being revived by optimism about modern IT. This article defends the theses that using different sources of price information for a single market is advisable and that the effects of price transparency on competition are ambivalent. Such transparency is misleading because it does not incorporate all the knowledge relevant and necessary for making business decisions. A regulator has illusory control over pricing only by ignoring the heterogeneity of demand for price information while in fact increasing transaction costs for market participants. This article’s methodology is based on Austrian Economics, New Institutional Economics, and Industrial Organization theory. A product differentiation model has been adapted to demonstrate the effects of heterogeneity in demand for price information. Due to differences in the “contractual shell” of a product and a number of other factors, the demand for price information regarding trade in that product is shown to be heterogeneous in terms of the purposes of using this information and the requirements for its content. Forced transition to a single source of price information would decrease consumers’ benefit.
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Economic Policy in Economic Policy
- Vol. 21 (5) , 6-31
Open AccessThrough the Looking-Glass of Prices: The Effects of Price Transparency Achieved Through Transition to a Unified Price Indicator
Price is a universal tool for transmitting information among a great many consumers and producers performing economic calculations. Market prices provide signals that aggregate numerical information about the individual plans of a multitude of strangers acting on tacit and dispersed knowledge. Attempts to replace such spontaneously emerging social self-organization with centralized planning are untenable, as Austrian economists proved during the early twentieth century economic calculation debate. Nevertheless, enthusiasm for regulatory control over pricing is being revived by optimism about modern IT. This article defends the theses that using different sources of price information for a single market is advisable and that the effects of price transparency on competition are ambivalent. Such transparency is misleading because it does not incorporate all the knowledge relevant and necessary for making business decisions. A regulator has illusory control over pricing only by ignoring the heterogeneity of demand for price information while in fact increasing transaction costs for market participants. This article’s methodology is based on Austrian Economics, New Institutional Economics, and Industrial Organization theory. A product differentiation model has been adapted to demonstrate the effects of heterogeneity in demand for price information. Due to differences in the “contractual shell” of a product and a number of other factors, the demand for price information regarding trade in that product is shown to be heterogeneous in terms of the purposes of using this information and the requirements for its content. Forced transition to a single source of price information would decrease consumers’ benefit.
- Open Access
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Moscow University for Industry and Finance - Synergy in Journal of Modern Competition
- Vol. 20 (1) , 53-72
Regulating Trade in the Era of Marketplaces: The Effects of the 2016 Amendments to the Law on Trade on Suppliers
In 2016, Federal Law no. 273-FZ entered into force, introducing a number of significant amendments to the so-called Law on Trade (no. 381-FZ), adopted in 2009 and the central law regulating trade activities in the Russian Federation. This article assesses the impact of the 2016 amendments on the situation of suppliers to retail chains. Its relevance and novelty stem from the significant regulatory asymmetry currently observed between online platforms and traditional retail chains amid the rapid growth of marketplaces. The paper formulates hypotheses regarding the impact of Federal Law no. 273 on suppliers' commercial expenses, based on a detailed review of legislation, analytics, and empirical research. The findings demonstrate the lack of a sustainable long-term effect of the 2016 amendments, the presence of a short-term decline in commercial expenses for food suppliers in 2017, and a widening gap between large and small suppliers. While some of the restrictions are offset by changes in contract structures, they may hinder competition between chains and marketplaces. The conclusions emphasize that the current provisions of the Law on Trade do not guarantee the equalization of bargaining power and require revision, taking into account digitalization and the development of marketplaces. The theoretical significance of this work lies in clarifying the mechanisms by which industry regulation influences the distribution of commercial costs and bargaining power in vertical relations, while its practical significance lies in providing a basis for amending trade legislation and developing more symmetrical competition rules for offline retail chains and marketplaces.
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Moscow University for Industry and Finance - Synergy in Journal of Modern Competition
- Vol. 20 (1) , 53-72
Open AccessRegulating Trade in the Era of Marketplaces: The Effects of the 2016 Amendments to the Law on Trade on Suppliers
In 2016, Federal Law no. 273-FZ entered into force, introducing a number of significant amendments to the so-called Law on Trade (no. 381-FZ), adopted in 2009 and the central law regulating trade activities in the Russian Federation. This article assesses the impact of the 2016 amendments on the situation of suppliers to retail chains. Its relevance and novelty stem from the significant regulatory asymmetry currently observed between online platforms and traditional retail chains amid the rapid growth of marketplaces. The paper formulates hypotheses regarding the impact of Federal Law no. 273 on suppliers' commercial expenses, based on a detailed review of legislation, analytics, and empirical research. The findings demonstrate the lack of a sustainable long-term effect of the 2016 amendments, the presence of a short-term decline in commercial expenses for food suppliers in 2017, and a widening gap between large and small suppliers. While some of the restrictions are offset by changes in contract structures, they may hinder competition between chains and marketplaces. The conclusions emphasize that the current provisions of the Law on Trade do not guarantee the equalization of bargaining power and require revision, taking into account digitalization and the development of marketplaces. The theoretical significance of this work lies in clarifying the mechanisms by which industry regulation influences the distribution of commercial costs and bargaining power in vertical relations, while its practical significance lies in providing a basis for amending trade legislation and developing more symmetrical competition rules for offline retail chains and marketplaces.