TLTao Li

Tao Li

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Tao Li has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Silent Portfolios, Softened Votes: Public Pensions' Response to Anti-ESG Policies

    by Joel F. Houston, Tao Li, Chuyi Sun

    Using newly assembled holdings and proxy-voting data from July 2017 through June 2025, we examine how public pension funds respond to state anti-ESG policies and demonstrate how these responses depend on fund governance. We find no significant change in the ESG ratings of pension fund portfolios, but substantial declines in support for environmental and social shareholder proposals following policy adoption. Support for these proposals falls by 36.1 and 24.9 percentage points, respectively. The declines are greatest among funds that reclaim voting authority from external managers while considerably smaller among those that continue to delegate voting. We also find that funds with greater political representation on their boards exhibit smaller declines in support. Interestingly, these funds were less likely to support environmental and social proposals before the anti-ESG policies were adopted, suggesting that their voting practices were already more closely aligned with state political preferences.

  • Open Access

    Power Tussle: Hedge Fund Activists and Short Sellers

    by Tao Li, Pedro Saffi, Daheng Yang

    We study interactions between activist hedge funds and large short sellers using European data on activist campaigns and mandatory disclosures of large short positions. Large short sellers are associated with a 21% higher likelihood of activist targeting, higher campaign success, and profitability. Using the EU’s 2012 harmonization of short-position disclosure rules as an exogenous shock, we find causal evidence that the regulatory change affected activist targeting. Our evidence is consistent with an information channel: only hedge fund short sellers predict targeting, and the effects are amplified by information aggregation and disclosure novelty. Evidence on bargaining and cost channels is weaker.

  • Open Access

    Institutional Ownership Overstates Voting Power: The Allocation of Voting Authority

    by Alon Brav, Tao Li

    Institutional ownership is commonly used to assess corporate governance influence, yet voting rights are often allocated through adviser-client relationships. We study how reported ownership translates into realized voting by reporting institutions and construct voting utilization, the fraction of reported ownership voted by the institution. Even among institutions that vote, the average institution votes 77 percent of its reported shares, and utilization varies substantially across institutions and firms. Advisers' stated allocation of voting authority strongly predicts which institutions vote. The largest institutional blockholders’ reported holdings overstate their realized voting control, implying that voting power is more diffuse than ownership suggests.

  • Decentralized Autonomous Organization Governance

    by Jungsuk Han, Jongsub Lee, Tao Li

    Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are entities without central leadership and operate based on a set of decision-making rules encoded into smart contracts using blockchain technology. In this study, we develop a theoretical model of DAO governance featuring strategic token trading under token-based voting to investigate potential conflicts of interest between a large participant (a “whale”) and many small participants. Our results show that ownership concentration has a negative effect on platform growth, but platform size, token illiquidity, and long-term incentives can mitigate this negative effect. We confirm these predictions using novel voting data on major DAOs from 2020 and 2024. This paper has been accepted by Lin William Cong for the Virtual Special Issue on Digital Finance. Funding: J. Han and J. Lee received financial support from the Institute of Management Research at Seoul National University. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07033 .


  • Open Access

    Carbon Offsets: Decarbonization or Transition-Washing?

    by Sehoon Kim, Tao Li, Yanbin Wu

    Using rich hand-collected data, we examine how firms use carbon offset credits issued by third-party developers to claim emission reductions. Guided by a conceptual framework, we show that following an exogenous ESG rating downgrade, firms facing greater internal abatement costs, including those with lower emissions, retire more carbon offsets rather than decarbonize in-house. Firms that lack climate-related governance mechanisms or face limited external scrutiny of climate claims strategically retire larger quantities of low-quality, inexpensive offsets. Our findings are consistent with offsets being used to outsource transition efforts as well as with the strategic use of offsets for "transition-washing" purposes.


  • Open Access

    DAO Governance

    by Jungsuk Han, Jongsub Lee, Tao Li

    Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are entities without central leadership and operate based on a set of decision-making rules encoded into smart contracts using blockchain technology. In this study, we develop a theoretical model of DAO governance featuring strategic token trading under token-based voting to investigate potential conflicts of interest between a large participant (a "whale") and many small participants. Our results show that ownership concentration has a negative effect on platform growth, but platform size, token illiquidity, and long-term incentives can mitigate its negative effect. We confirm these predictions using novel voting data on major DAOs between 2020 and 2024.


  • Open Access

    (Re)call of Duty: Mutual Fund Securities Lending and Proxy Voting

    by Tao Li, Qifei Zhu

    Taking advantage of a novel dataset on individual mutual funds' securities lending activities, we provide systematic evidence that mutual funds, especially ESG funds, recall loaned shares prior to voting record dates. Funds' responsiveness to recall for voting purposes varies with their stated lending policies, ownership stakes in portfolio firms, and investment horizons, indicating heterogeneity in their perceived value of voting rights. Recalled shares are more likely to be voted against management proposals, and in favor of shareholder proposals and dissident slates in proxy contests. Recall-sensitive funds attract higher inflows from institutional investors while foregoing modest lending revenue.

  • Open Access

    The Proxy Voting Choice Revolution

    by Alon Brav, Tao Li, Dorothy S. Lund, Zikui Pan

    A corporate governance revolution is underway. The conventional depiction of U.S. capital markets has focused on the presence of large institutional shareholders and their substantial influence over the economy. But in the past three years, in response to political and public pressure, the largest institutional asset managers have begun to diffuse their power by expanding “proxy voting choice” programs. Our article explores how these programs could shape institutional shareholder voting and the corresponding governance and performance of public companies for years to come. More specifically, we provide the first empirical analysis of a large asset manager’s voting choice program, providing a detailed account of the differences between policy offerings as well as their relative uptake by investors. Our empirical investigation also generates insights about the impact of proxy voting choice on the marketplace. It reveals that voting choice has promise, but also significant peril, for investors and the corporate governance ecosystem, particularly in light of a host of incentive issues facing its three key players—asset managers, investors, and proxy advisors. We highlight the thorny choice architecture problems that program designers must confront, ranging from setting the default rule to designing policy menus for rationally apathetic investors. In so doing, we offer concrete policy suggestions for asset managers and regulators, showing how careful calibration of these programs will help ensure that the advent of voting choice benefits investors and the economy, rather than harms them.

  • Open Access

    A Review of DAO Governance: Recent Literature and Emerging Trends

    by Jungsuk Han, Jongsub Lee, Tao Li

    Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) have emerged as a new organizational structure that leverages smart contracts and blockchain technology. Academics and practitioners have paid significant attention to DAOs, yet DAO decision-making processes and the broader implications remain under-studied. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. First, we compare the proposal-and voting-based governance mechanisms of DAOs with those of traditional corporate governance. Second, we introduce various novel voting models adopted by DAOs. Third, we discuss DAOs' drawbacks and highlight a unique agency problem arising from large token holders, termed "whales," within these organizations. The concentrated ownership such whales, whose interests may diverge from those of smaller token holders (i.e., users), obtain can result in governance vulnerabilities. After discussing recent instances of investor activism and contentious votes involving DAOs, we conclude by surveying the literature on the optimal DAO design.

  • Open Access

    Corporate Governance Meets Data and Technology

    by Wei Jiang, Tao Li

    Corporate governance encompasses a set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions that affect how a corporation is directed, administered, or controlled. Technology both enhances and disrupts the traditional board-centric corporate governance system, enhancing efficiency and transparency while introducing new challenges and risks. In this paper we examine three key themes comprehensively: the redefinition of information and information asymmetry through the generation of and access to big data; blockchain technology’s transformative potential for aggregating preferences and exercising shareholder voting rights while blurring the line between securities and tokens; and the impact of smart contracts and their underlying infrastructure on the expansion of contracts and the implementation of decentralized governance through decentralized autonomous organizations. These innovative technological solutions empower stakeholders to exercise governance rights effectively, but their complexity also gives rise to new barriers and inequalities. As technology evolves, collaboration among researchers, policymakers, and practitioners is imperative to ensure that corporate governance remains effective and responsive to the current dynamic business environment.