Stavriana Hadjigavriel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Stavriana Hadjigavriel has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- James C. Hansen
Weber State University Goddard School of Business and Economics
1 shared publication María Gutiérrez Urtiaga
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid-Departamento de Economía de la Empresa; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
1 shared publicationSusana Gago Rodríguez
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Effect of Distance on Distracted Auditors: Evidence from Non-Accounting related Lawsuits against Audit Clients
We exploit non-accounting related lawsuits against audit client-firms as an exogenous shock that shifts auditors’ attention towards the sued client to test how auditors allocate resources and time to their other non-sued clients and its subsequent effect on audit quality. Consistent with prior research, we posit that this causes a negative spillover effect to the non-sued clients that share the same auditor as the sued client. We argue that the spillover effect is not equal for all the other non-sued clients which creates a within audit office variation. We identify clients as being more prone to be affected by the distraction event if the client is in a different city than the audit office city. Adopting this identification strategy, we show that client firms whose offices are situated in a different city as compared to the auditor’s offices, experience more restatements and less identified internal control weaknesses when the auditor is distracted as compared to the client firms that have their offices in the same city as the auditor’s offices and to the time that the auditor is not distracted. Results suggest that the audit quality of the clients is directly related to the level of distraction of an audit office and the distance of the client’s office from the audit office due to a resource allocation problem. Our results have important implications for auditors in managing their portfolio of clients during times of distraction and for companies in choosing the appropriate auditor.
- 30 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Effect of Distance on Distracted Auditors: Evidence from Non-Accounting related Lawsuits against Audit Clients
We exploit non-accounting related lawsuits against audit client-firms as an exogenous shock that shifts auditors’ attention towards the sued client to test how auditors allocate resources and time to their other non-sued clients and its subsequent effect on audit quality. Consistent with prior research, we posit that this causes a negative spillover effect to the non-sued clients that share the same auditor as the sued client. We argue that the spillover effect is not equal for all the other non-sued clients which creates a within audit office variation. We identify clients as being more prone to be affected by the distraction event if the client is in a different city than the audit office city. Adopting this identification strategy, we show that client firms whose offices are situated in a different city as compared to the auditor’s offices, experience more restatements and less identified internal control weaknesses when the auditor is distracted as compared to the client firms that have their offices in the same city as the auditor’s offices and to the time that the auditor is not distracted. Results suggest that the audit quality of the clients is directly related to the level of distraction of an audit office and the distance of the client’s office from the audit office due to a resource allocation problem. Our results have important implications for auditors in managing their portfolio of clients during times of distraction and for companies in choosing the appropriate auditor.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Bribes and Audit Fees
We exploit the UK Bribery Act, 2010 to test whether the pricing of audit changes with the level of corruption in the firm’s business environment. Adopting a triple difference design, we show that affected firms operating in countries perceived as more corrupt pay higher audit fees after the law enforcement. However, for these firms, we do not observe neither changes in discretionary abnormal accruals nor that compliance procedures are the main drivers for the increase in audit fees. We therefore attribute the increase in audit fees after the law to the higher perceived costs of corruption for the auditor rather than to a change in audit quality. Additionally, compared to other auditors, Big 4 auditors charge higher audit fees to companies with higher-perceived corruption exposure. On the other hand, subject firms that operate in countries with low corruption indexes experience a drop in audit fees suggesting that the law was effective in reducing bribery, at least in firms with lower perceived exposure to corruption.
- 10 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBribes and Audit Fees
We exploit the UK Bribery Act, 2010 to test whether the pricing of audit changes with the level of corruption in the firm’s business environment. Adopting a triple difference design, we show that affected firms operating in countries perceived as more corrupt pay higher audit fees after the law enforcement. However, for these firms, we do not observe neither changes in discretionary abnormal accruals nor that compliance procedures are the main drivers for the increase in audit fees. We therefore attribute the increase in audit fees after the law to the higher perceived costs of corruption for the auditor rather than to a change in audit quality. Additionally, compared to other auditors, Big 4 auditors charge higher audit fees to companies with higher-perceived corruption exposure. On the other hand, subject firms that operate in countries with low corruption indexes experience a drop in audit fees suggesting that the law was effective in reducing bribery, at least in firms with lower perceived exposure to corruption.