Abstract
We exploit non-accounting related lawsuits against audit client-firms as an exogenous shock that shifts auditors’ attention towards the sued client to test how auditors allocate resources and time to their other non-sued clients and its subsequent effect on audit quality. Consistent with prior research, we posit that this causes a negative spillover effect to the non-sued clients that share the same auditor as the sued client. We argue that the spillover effect is not equal for all the other non-sued clients which creates a within audit office variation. We identify clients as being more prone to be affected by the distraction event if the client is in a different city than the audit office city. Adopting this identification strategy, we show that client firms whose offices are situated in a different city as compared to the auditor’s offices, experience more restatements and less identified internal control weaknesses when the auditor is distracted as compared to the client firms that have their offices in the same city as the auditor’s offices and to the time that the auditor is not distracted. Results suggest that the audit quality of the clients is directly related to the level of distraction of an audit office and the distance of the client’s office from the audit office due to a resource allocation problem. Our results have important implications for auditors in managing their portfolio of clients during times of distraction and for companies in choosing the appropriate auditor.

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