Kyung Hwan Baik
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Kyung Hwan Baik has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dongryul Lee
Lee: Instructor, Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061. Phone +1‐540‐231‐5764, Fax +1‐540‐231‐5097
1 shared publication- Dongryul Lee
Department of Economics, Sungshin University, Seoul, South Korea
1 shared publication - Dongwoo Lee
China Center for Behavioral Economics and Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, China
1 shared publication - Jason F. Shogren
University of Wyoming
1 shared publication Jong Hwa Lee
Lee: Department of Economics, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, 110-745, South Korea. Phone +82-10-2762-1141, Fax +82-2-760-0946,
1 shared publication- Jong Hwa Lee
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Seoul, South Korea
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 18 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- p. 1-34
Duopoly firms’ decisions on disclosing their R&D investment information
- 18 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- p. 1-34
Duopoly firms’ decisions on disclosing their R&D investment information
- Open Access
Sabotage and Free Riding in Contests with a Group-Specific Public-Good/Bad Prize
We study contests in which two groups compete to win (or not to win) a group-specific public-good/bad prize. Each player in the groups can exert two types of effort: one to help her own group win the prize, and one to sabotage her own group's chances of winning it. The players in the groups choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently. We introduce a specific form of contest success function that determines each group's probability of winning the prize, taking into account players' sabotage activities. We show that two types of purestrategy Nash equilibrium occur, depending on parameter values: one without sabotage activities and one with sabotage activities. In the first type, only the highest-valuation player in each group expends positive effort, whereas, in the second type, only the lowest-valuation player in each group expends positive effort.
Open AccessSabotage and Free Riding in Contests with a Group-Specific Public-Good/Bad Prize
We study contests in which two groups compete to win (or not to win) a group-specific public-good/bad prize. Each player in the groups can exert two types of effort: one to help her own group win the prize, and one to sabotage her own group's chances of winning it. The players in the groups choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently. We introduce a specific form of contest success function that determines each group's probability of winning the prize, taking into account players' sabotage activities. We show that two types of purestrategy Nash equilibrium occur, depending on parameter values: one without sabotage activities and one with sabotage activities. In the first type, only the highest-valuation player in each group expends positive effort, whereas, in the second type, only the lowest-valuation player in each group expends positive effort.
- Open Access
- 28 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 59 (3) , 495-523
Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests
We study a three-player Tullock contest in an endogenous-timing framework, focusing on the players’ decisions on timing of effort exertion. In this model, there are two points in time at which the players may choose their effort levels. The players decide independently and announce simultaneously when they each will expend their effort, and then each player chooses her effort level at the point in time which she announced. We find that, given moderate asymmetries among the players, each of the players announces the first point in time, and thus they all choose their effort levels simultaneously at the first point in time. This finding is in sharp contrast to a well-known result obtained from two-player asymmetric contests with endogenous timing.
- 28 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 59 (3) , 495-523
Open AccessEndogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests
We study a three-player Tullock contest in an endogenous-timing framework, focusing on the players’ decisions on timing of effort exertion. In this model, there are two points in time at which the players may choose their effort levels. The players decide independently and announce simultaneously when they each will expend their effort, and then each player chooses her effort level at the point in time which she announced. We find that, given moderate asymmetries among the players, each of the players announces the first point in time, and thus they all choose their effort levels simultaneously at the first point in time. This finding is in sharp contrast to a well-known result obtained from two-player asymmetric contests with endogenous timing.
- 12 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 26 (1) , 23-42
Contests for catch shares
- 12 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 26 (1) , 23-42
Contests for catch shares
- 3 October 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 57 (1) , 145-165
Decisions of Duopoly Firms on Sharing Information on Their Delegation Contracts
- 3 October 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 57 (1) , 145-165
Decisions of Duopoly Firms on Sharing Information on Their Delegation Contracts
- 18 December 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 25 (2) , 400-419
Endogenous Group Formation in Contests: Unobservable Sharing Rules
- 18 December 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 25 (2) , 400-419
Endogenous Group Formation in Contests: Unobservable Sharing Rules
- 20 November 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 51 (4) , 2044-2055
ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN CONTESTS WITH DELEGATION
- 20 November 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 51 (4) , 2044-2055
ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN CONTESTS WITH DELEGATION
- 11 April 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 50 (2) , 348-363
DO RENT‐SEEKING GROUPS ANNOUNCE THEIR SHARING RULES?
We study collective rent seeking between two groups in which each group has the option of releasing or not its sharing‐rule information. First, we show that the case where both groups release their sharing‐rule information never occurs in equilibrium; when the players are unevenly matched, one group releases its sharing‐rule information and the other does not. Then, we select the Pareto‐superior equilibrium when the players are unevenly matched. We show that, in this selected equilibrium, the underdog releases its sharing‐rule information, and the favorite does not; thus, the underdog becomes the leader, and the favorite the follower (JEL D72).
- 11 April 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 50 (2) , 348-363
DO RENT‐SEEKING GROUPS ANNOUNCE THEIR SHARING RULES?
We study collective rent seeking between two groups in which each group has the option of releasing or not its sharing‐rule information. First, we show that the case where both groups release their sharing‐rule information never occurs in equilibrium; when the players are unevenly matched, one group releases its sharing‐rule information and the other does not. Then, we select the Pareto‐superior equilibrium when the players are unevenly matched. We show that, in this selected equilibrium, the underdog releases its sharing‐rule information, and the favorite does not; thus, the underdog becomes the leader, and the favorite the follower (JEL D72).
- 1 April 2007
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 73 (4) , 986-1002
Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation
- 1 April 2007
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 73 (4) , 986-1002
Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation
- 29 March 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 30 (1) , 103-117
Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
- 29 March 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 30 (1) , 103-117
Contests with group-specific public-good prizes