Abstract
For those protective relays highly dependent on common centralized timing synchronization, the threat of loss of data synchronism, e.g., due to cyber-attack, cannot be ignored. In this case, measurements could be falsely timestamped, leading to undesired mal-operation of protection or evident performance deterioration if countermeasures are lacking. In this paper, several different timing attack scenarios and impacts to protective relays on the transmission line are analyzed. To cope with the timing attack scene, a remedial pilot main protection scheme based only on modulus information of measurements for a transmission line is proposed, independent of timing information. The proposed remedial scheme includes a modulus summation impedance relay, a mid-part relay and an instantaneous over-current relay. The effectiveness of the proposed scheme has been validated by theoretical analysis and simulation tests.
Funding Information
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (51577077, 51677108)
  • State Grid Project (SGTYHT/16-JS-198)

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