Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts?
Authors:
- Kevin TobiaKTKevin Tobia
- Wesley BuckwalterWBWesley Buckwalter
- Stephen StichSSStephen Stich
Top Cited Papers
- 1 October 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 26 (5) , 629-638
Abstract
Psychologists and experimental philosophers have reported findings showing that in some cases ordinary people's moral intuitions are affected by factors of dubious relevance to the truth of the intuition. Some defend the use of intuition as evidence in ethics by arguing that philosophers are the experts in this area, and philosophers’ moral intuitions are both different from those of ordinary people and more reliable. We conducted two experiments indicating that philosophers and non-philosophers do indeed sometimes have different moral intuitions, but challenging the notion that philosophers have better or more reliable intuitions.Keywords
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