ProveriT: A Parameterized, Composable, and Verified Model of TEE Protection Profile
- 11 March 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 21 (6) , 5341-5358
Abstract
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) plays a crucial role in modern computer systems and the compromise of TEE can result in enormous losses. Although numerous TEE products have been proposed, most of them lack robust security guarantees. To address this concern, GlobalPlatform (GP) defines the TEE security standard, Protection Profile (PP), which has gained widespread adoption in the TEE development and Common Criteria (CC) evaluation. However, despite its importance, GPTEE PP has never been formally specified and verified. In this paper, we present ProveriT , a parameterized, composable, and formally verified model of GPTEE PP. Firstly, we propose the first formal specification of GPTEE PP in a parameterized manner, encompassing the definition of security problems, security objectives, and security functional requirements. Secondly, we provide a compositional framework, utilizing horizontal calculus and vertical calculus, to flexibly combine specific security functional requirements for TEE developers and reduce proof efforts for verification. ProveriT is extensible and reusable for the verification and CC evaluation of specific TEE products. Thirdly, we conduct a comprehensive formal verification of rationales in the model to ensure the correctness of GPTEE PP. During the verification, 8 issues are discovered and we provide suggestions to resolve them. Finally, we demonstrate the extensibility and effectiveness of ProveriT by applying it to the verification of a commercial TEE. All the specifications and verification are carried out in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (62132014)
- Zhejiang science and technology plan project (2022C01045)
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