FZFanlang Zeng

Fanlang Zeng

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Fanlang Zeng has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Freesia: Verifying Correctness of TEE Communication with Concurrent Separation Logic

    by Fanlang Zeng, Rui Chang, Hongjian Liu

    The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), a security extension in modern processors, provides a secure runtime environment for sensitive code and data. Although TEEs are designed to protect applications and their private data, their large code bases often harbor vulnerabilities that could compromise data security. Even though some formal verification efforts have been directed toward the functionality and security of TEE standards and implementations, the verification of TEE correctness in concurrent scenarios remains insufficient. This paper introduces an enhancement for ensuring concurrency safety in TEEs, named Freesia, which is formally verified using concurrent separation logic. Through a thorough analysis of the GlobalPlatform TEE standards, Freesia addresses data race issues in the TEE communication interfaces and ensures consistency protection for shared memory between the client and the TEE. A prototype of Freesia is implemented in the open-source TEE platform, OP-TEE. Additionally, the concurrency correctness of Freesia is modeled and verified using the Iris concurrent separation logic framework. The effectiveness and efficiency of Freesia are further demonstrated through real-world case study and performance evaluations.

  • Open Access

    KBX: Verified Model Synchronization via Formal Bidirectional Transformation

    by Jianhong Zhao, Yongwang Zhao, Peisen Yao, Fanlang Zeng, Bohua Zhan, Kui Ren

    Complex safety-critical systems require multiple models for a comprehensive description, resulting in error-prone development and laborious verification. Bidirectional transformation (BX) is an approach to automatically synchronizing these models. However, existing BX frameworks lack formal verification to enforce these models’ consistency rigorously. This paper introduces KBX, a formal bidirectional transformation framework for verified model synchronization. First, we present a matching logic-based BX model, providing a logical foundation for constructing BX definitions within the \(\mathbb{K}\) framework. Second, we propose algorithms to synthesize formal BX definitions from unidirectional ones, which allows developers to focus on crafting the unidirectional definitions while disregarding the reverse direction and missing information recovery for synchronization. Afterward, we harness \(\mathbb{K}\) to generate a formal synchronizer from the synthesized definitions for consistency maintenance and verification. To evaluate the effectiveness of KBX, we conduct a comparative analysis against existing BX frameworks. Furthermore, we demonstrate the application of KBX in constructing a BX between UML and HCSP for real-world scenarios, showcasing an 72% reduction in BX development effort compared to manual specification writing in \(\mathbb{K}\) .


  • ProveriT: A Parameterized, Composable, and Verified Model of TEE Protection Profile

    by Jilin Hu, Fanlang Zeng, Yongwang Zhao, Zhuoruo Zhang, Leping Zhang, Jianhong Zhao, Rui Chang, Kui Ren

    The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) plays a crucial role in modern computer systems and the compromise of TEE can result in enormous losses. Although numerous TEE products have been proposed, most of them lack robust security guarantees. To address this concern, GlobalPlatform (GP) defines the TEE security standard, Protection Profile (PP), which has gained widespread adoption in the TEE development and Common Criteria (CC) evaluation. However, despite its importance, GPTEE PP has never been formally specified and verified. In this paper, we present ProveriT , a parameterized, composable, and formally verified model of GPTEE PP. Firstly, we propose the first formal specification of GPTEE PP in a parameterized manner, encompassing the definition of security problems, security objectives, and security functional requirements. Secondly, we provide a compositional framework, utilizing horizontal calculus and vertical calculus, to flexibly combine specific security functional requirements for TEE developers and reduce proof efforts for verification. ProveriT is extensible and reusable for the verification and CC evaluation of specific TEE products. Thirdly, we conduct a comprehensive formal verification of rationales in the model to ensure the correctness of GPTEE PP. During the verification, 8 issues are discovered and we provide suggestions to resolve them. Finally, we demonstrate the extensibility and effectiveness of ProveriT by applying it to the verification of a commercial TEE. All the specifications and verification are carried out in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover.