Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion
- 25 October 2006
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 10 (2) , 113-142
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- Efficient collusion in optimal auctionsJournal of Economic Theory, 2007
- Optimal state‐contingent regulation under limited liabilityThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2006
- Collusion as an Informed Principal ProblemSSRN Electronic Journal, 2005
- Competition Law for State-Owned EnterprisesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
- Mechanism Design with Collusion and CorrelationEconometrica, 2000
- Collusion Under Asymmetric InformationEconometrica, 1997
- Regulating a Dominant Firm: Unknown Demand and Industry StructureThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1995
- Regulation, competition, and asymmetric informationJournal of Economic Theory, 1990
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining ProblemEconometrica, 1979
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public GoodsEconometrica, 1977