In defense of Aristotelian universals
Open Access
- 13 March 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (2) , 1-18
Abstract
To be an Aristotelian about universals is to hold that universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers. An argument against Aristotelianism about universals has recently been put forward by Costa to the effect that a contradiction follows from assuming a certain formulation of Aristotelianism together with some highly plausible principles governing the notions employed in that formulation. In this paper, we provide different ways of articulating the Aristotelian position which, while being related with some of the main contributions in the current Aristotelian tradition, do not fall prey to the argument.Keywords
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