Alessandro Giordani
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Alessandro Giordani has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ilaria Canavotto
Philosophy Department, University of Maryland, College Park, USA
3 shared publications - Luca Mari
Università Cattaneo - LIUC, Italy
3 shared publications - Claudio Calosi
Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage, Ca’ Foscari University, Venice, Italy
2 shared publications - Andrea Gaggioli
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
1 shared publication - Andrew Tedder
School of Chemistry and Biosciences, University of Bradford
1 shared publication - Damiano Costa
Institute of Philosophy, Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano, Switzerland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Artificial Intelligence Contribution Index (ACI): A Lightweight Framework for Declaring LLM Contributions to Human-Authored Documents
Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming how documents and other intellectual artifacts are conceived, structured, and expressed. However, norms about human-AI collaboration, and therefore in particular for declaring AI involvement in human-authored work, remain inconsistent: some institutions discourage any use, while others require only generic disclosure statements that fail to specify the nature and extent of AI contribution. This article proposes the Artificial Intelligence Contribution Index (ACI), a lightweight framework for transparent disclosure of AI assistance in authorship. ACI distinguishes between two independent dimensions of contribution – content and form – and assigns each a four-level scale, from no AI involvement to substantial AI-driven production. Conceptually, the framework is grounded in the rhetorical stages of inventio, dispositio, and elocutio, which together provide a structured account of how meaning is generated, organized, and articulated. On this basis, ACI captures whether AI contributed primarily to idea generation and conceptual organization, linguistic and stylistic expression, or both. The framework is designed to support explicit attribution rather than post-hoc detection, thereby emphasizing authorial responsibility over surveillance-based approaches. By offering a simple, modular, and interoperable attribution schema, ACI aims to strengthen transparency, accountability, and trust in human-AI co-creation across scholarly, educational and professional domains. Keywords Generative artificial intelligence; authorship; disclosure; transparency; accountability; human–AI collaboration.
- 24 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessArtificial Intelligence Contribution Index (ACI): A Lightweight Framework for Declaring LLM Contributions to Human-Authored Documents
Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming how documents and other intellectual artifacts are conceived, structured, and expressed. However, norms about human-AI collaboration, and therefore in particular for declaring AI involvement in human-authored work, remain inconsistent: some institutions discourage any use, while others require only generic disclosure statements that fail to specify the nature and extent of AI contribution. This article proposes the Artificial Intelligence Contribution Index (ACI), a lightweight framework for transparent disclosure of AI assistance in authorship. ACI distinguishes between two independent dimensions of contribution – content and form – and assigns each a four-level scale, from no AI involvement to substantial AI-driven production. Conceptually, the framework is grounded in the rhetorical stages of inventio, dispositio, and elocutio, which together provide a structured account of how meaning is generated, organized, and articulated. On this basis, ACI captures whether AI contributed primarily to idea generation and conceptual organization, linguistic and stylistic expression, or both. The framework is designed to support explicit attribution rather than post-hoc detection, thereby emphasizing authorial responsibility over surveillance-based approaches. By offering a simple, modular, and interoperable attribution schema, ACI aims to strengthen transparency, accountability, and trust in human-AI co-creation across scholarly, educational and professional domains. Keywords Generative artificial intelligence; authorship; disclosure; transparency; accountability; human–AI collaboration.
- Open Access
- 6 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 55 (1) , 135-165
A Norm-based Truthmaker Semantics for Modal Logic
In the last few decades, truthmaker semantics has attracted the attention of scholars from various areas, arguably due to its philosophical underpinning and its flexibility in addressing a number of problems that are difficult to solve using alternative semantic frameworks. Attention is now focused on developing truthmaker semantics for modal logic; this paper contributes to that direction. The basic idea we introduce is that truthmakers of modal sentences are norms. This allows us to derive two interesting results: first, we introduce a new modal semantics for minimal monotonic logic; second, we provide a truthmaker semantics for every modal logic characterized by a class of Kripke frames. This is, as far as we can tell, the first general result about truthmaker semantics for normal modal logics.
- 6 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 55 (1) , 135-165
Open AccessA Norm-based Truthmaker Semantics for Modal Logic
In the last few decades, truthmaker semantics has attracted the attention of scholars from various areas, arguably due to its philosophical underpinning and its flexibility in addressing a number of problems that are difficult to solve using alternative semantic frameworks. Attention is now focused on developing truthmaker semantics for modal logic; this paper contributes to that direction. The basic idea we introduce is that truthmakers of modal sentences are norms. This allows us to derive two interesting results: first, we introduce a new modal semantics for minimal monotonic logic; second, we provide a truthmaker semantics for every modal logic characterized by a class of Kripke frames. This is, as far as we can tell, the first general result about truthmaker semantics for normal modal logics.
- Open Access
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Measurement
- Vol. 259
Measurement and simulation: A conceptual framework
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Measurement
- Vol. 259
Open AccessMeasurement and simulation: A conceptual framework
- 26 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 407-449
On the Notion of Aboutness in Logical Semantics
- 26 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 407-449
On the Notion of Aboutness in Logical Semantics
- Open Access
- 22 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Measurement
- Vol. 222
On the interpretation of the measurement equation
- 22 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Measurement
- Vol. 222
Open AccessOn the interpretation of the measurement equation
- Open Access
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 112 (1-2) , 295-323
Situation-Based Connexive Logic
The aim of this paper is to present a system of modal connexive logic based on a situation semantics. In general, modal connexive logics are extensions of standard modal logics that incorporate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses, that is the thesis that a sentence cannot imply its negation and the thesis that a sentence cannot imply a pair of contradictory sentences. A key problem in devising a connexive logic is to come up with a system that is both sufficiently strong to fulfill some specific connexive theses and sufficiently well-motivated from a semantical point of view. The approach proposed here tries to address this problem by defining an appropriate connexive relation in terms of more basic notions. The result is a well-motivated system of modal connexive logic that nicely fits in both with the traditional ideas concerning the connexive conditional and with the current developments in connexive logic.
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 112 (1-2) , 295-323
Open AccessSituation-Based Connexive Logic
The aim of this paper is to present a system of modal connexive logic based on a situation semantics. In general, modal connexive logics are extensions of standard modal logics that incorporate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses, that is the thesis that a sentence cannot imply its negation and the thesis that a sentence cannot imply a pair of contradictory sentences. A key problem in devising a connexive logic is to come up with a system that is both sufficiently strong to fulfill some specific connexive theses and sufficiently well-motivated from a semantical point of view. The approach proposed here tries to address this problem by defining an appropriate connexive relation in terms of more basic notions. The result is a well-motivated system of modal connexive logic that nicely fits in both with the traditional ideas concerning the connexive conditional and with the current developments in connexive logic.
- Open Access
- 11 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 180 (7) , 1995-2024
Atoms, combs, syllables and organisms
Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts, i.e., parts without proper parts. Typically, this thesis is characterized by an axiom stating that everything has atomic parts. The present paper argues that the success of this standard characterization depends on how the notions of sum and composition are defined. In particular, we put forward a novel definition of mereological sum that: (i) is not equivalent to existing definitions in the literature, if no strong decomposition principle is assumed; (ii) can be used to argue that the standard characterization of atomism fails, because having atomic parts is not sufficient to be a sum of atoms; and (iii) provides a purely mereological distinction between structured and unstructured wholes, contributing to the ongoing debate on this crucial topic.
- 11 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 180 (7) , 1995-2024
Open AccessAtoms, combs, syllables and organisms
Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts, i.e., parts without proper parts. Typically, this thesis is characterized by an axiom stating that everything has atomic parts. The present paper argues that the success of this standard characterization depends on how the notions of sum and composition are defined. In particular, we put forward a novel definition of mereological sum that: (i) is not equivalent to existing definitions in the literature, if no strong decomposition principle is assumed; (ii) can be used to argue that the standard characterization of atomism fails, because having atomic parts is not sufficient to be a sum of atoms; and (iii) provides a purely mereological distinction between structured and unstructured wholes, contributing to the ongoing debate on this crucial topic.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (3) , 1-18
Universalism and extensionalism revisited
We present a new notion of mereological sum that is inequivalent to extant ones in the literature and does not fall prey to reasonable complaints that can be raised against some such notions. In light of this notion, we then revisit the relation between mereological universalism and extensionalism. In particular we argue that Varzi’s claim to the point that universalism entails extensionalism is justified only insofar as one sticks to Varzi’s notion of sum. In effect, we distinguish different versions of extensionalism and argue that universalism—when cashed out in terms of our new notion of sum—entails some versions but not others. Most significantly it does not entail extensionality of proper parthood. In the light of the above we set forth a new mereological system, Universalist Quasi-Supplemented Mereology, that can be considered a worthy alternative to different mereological systems in the literature.
- 10 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (3) , 1-18
Open AccessUniversalism and extensionalism revisited
We present a new notion of mereological sum that is inequivalent to extant ones in the literature and does not fall prey to reasonable complaints that can be raised against some such notions. In light of this notion, we then revisit the relation between mereological universalism and extensionalism. In particular we argue that Varzi’s claim to the point that universalism entails extensionalism is justified only insofar as one sticks to Varzi’s notion of sum. In effect, we distinguish different versions of extensionalism and argue that universalism—when cashed out in terms of our new notion of sum—entails some versions but not others. Most significantly it does not entail extensionality of proper parthood. In the light of the above we set forth a new mereological system, Universalist Quasi-Supplemented Mereology, that can be considered a worthy alternative to different mereological systems in the literature.
- 4 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 110 (4) , 989-1033
Generalizing Deontic Action Logic
- 4 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 110 (4) , 989-1033
Generalizing Deontic Action Logic
- Open Access
- 13 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (2) , 1-18
In defense of Aristotelian universals
To be an Aristotelian about universals is to hold that universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers. An argument against Aristotelianism about universals has recently been put forward by Costa to the effect that a contradiction follows from assuming a certain formulation of Aristotelianism together with some highly plausible principles governing the notions employed in that formulation. In this paper, we provide different ways of articulating the Aristotelian position which, while being related with some of the main contributions in the current Aristotelian tradition, do not fall prey to the argument.
- 13 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (2) , 1-18
Open AccessIn defense of Aristotelian universals
To be an Aristotelian about universals is to hold that universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers. An argument against Aristotelianism about universals has recently been put forward by Costa to the effect that a contradiction follows from assuming a certain formulation of Aristotelianism together with some highly plausible principles governing the notions employed in that formulation. In this paper, we provide different ways of articulating the Aristotelian position which, while being related with some of the main contributions in the current Aristotelian tradition, do not fall prey to the argument.