The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
- 15 August 2007
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 11 (2) , 165-174
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
- Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment2008
- Strategic Behavior in Contests2008
- Asymmetric contests with general technologiesEconomic Theory, 2005
- Preemptive behavior in sequential-move tournaments with heterogeneous agentsEconomics of Governance, 2005
- Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic ApproachThe Economic Journal, 2005
- A Model of Price Leadership Based on Consumer LoyaltyThe Journal of Industrial Economics, 1992
- Price LeadershipReview of Economic Studies, 1992
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibriaGames and Economic Behavior, 1990
- POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS*Economics & Politics, 1989
- Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contendersPublic Choice, 1987