Abstract
A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (Int J Game Theory 20:129–147, 1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of point valued solutions that contain the Gilboa–Lehrer value. We characterize each family by means of reasonable properties, which are related to the ones used by Gilboa and Lehrer.
Keywords
Funding Information
  • Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (PID2020- 113110GB-I00, PID2021-124030NB-C32, PID2021-124030NB-C33, PID2022- 138956NB-100)
  • Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Ordenación Universitaria, Xunta de Galicia (ED431C-2020/03, ED431C-2021/24)
  • Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca (2021-SGR-00306)

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