Lingering bias: The effects of legislated gender quotas on representation quality in the European Parliament
- 29 December 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 26 (1) , 66-95
Abstract
How does biased political recruitment—and the legislation of gender quotas—affect the quality of representation? The article theorizes that biased selection implies a higher hurdle for women than for men. As a consequence, fewer—but more talented and ambitious—female legislators enter office. When quotas are legislated, the bias lingers but takes new forms. Uncertain about their initial choice, parties compensate by drawing on incumbent women’s legislative record to update their beliefs. Quota women are thus more accountable. Drawing on a “before-after” design with a control group, this study investigates legislators’ effort, performance, ambition, and reselection to the European Parliament (1999–2014). It demonstrates that non-quota women handled more high-impact legislation and aimed at longer careers than other legislators. When quotas were imposed, the share of women did not increase. However, quota women had a higher pay off from performing well in office and reacted by increasing their effort.Keywords
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