SHSilje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen

Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    What men don't see: How do minority judges shape majority decisions?

    by Silje Synnøve Hermansen

    How do minority judges influence majority decisions? “Panel effects” occur when judges on a panel change their votes in the presence of rank-and-file minority panelists. I argue that such effects are conditional on institutional design. Courts that delegate case preparation to a lead judge early in the proceedings confer agenda-setting authority on the person who organizes, interprets, and presents the case. Panel effects may therefore follow the identity of the lead judge. Judge gender may also matter beyond sex-discrimination litigation, wherever gendered treatment shapes the litigant’s initial experience. I test these claims using judge gender differences in employment disputes between EU institutions and their employees before the Court of Justice of the European Union (2000–2025). Female judges affect outcomes when serving as lead judges, while their mere presence does not. Panel effects thus depend on institutional rules governing case management; ignoring them risks overlooking substantial variation in judging.

  • The politics of the Court of Justice of the European Union: A review

    by Matthew Gabel, Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen, Jay Krehbiel

    This essay reviews recent research on how the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) influences the development and enforcement of European Union (EU) law. First, we focus on the supply of cases and how the procedural routes to the court affect the impact of its rulings. Second, we discuss how the collective and individual preferences of the judges shape how they dispose of those cases. To that end, we present a measurement strategy and original dataset of ideological preferences on the court. Third, we examine the productivity of the court and the prospects for reducing the current backlog of the court. Finally, we present novel empirical analyses that connect these three sections and identify questions for future research.


  • Open Access

    Shaping the Bench: The Effect of Ideology and Influence on Judicial Reappointments

    by Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen, Daniel Naurin

    Judicial appointments allow selectors to advance policy goals by appointing influential judges who share their ideological preferences. Under renewable terms, information from judicial records becomes crucial for identifying desirable candidates. While prior research has focused on judicial voting, we examine how expectations about judges’ influence on case law shape reappointments. Using original data on all potential reappointments to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), we show that governments select judges based on both ideology and potential impact. Secret voting -- intended to safeguard judicial independence -- fails to shield judges from ideological deselection. However, reappointment levels remain high because governments recognize the need to translate preferences into policies. Peer selection to influential court positions thus favors the reappointment of high-performing judges, while non-selective processes do not. Our findings challenge the belief that renewable terms weaken judicial independence, showing that selectors indirectly rely on peer evaluations for reappointments.

  • Open Access

    Leveling and Spotlighting: How the European Court of Justice Favors the Weak to Promote Its Legitimacy

    by Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen, Tommaso Pavone, Louisa Boulaziz

    As private actors turn to international courts (ICs), we argue that judges can adopt pro-individual rights agendas to promote their own legitimacy. By leveling the odds for disempowered individuals and spotlighting their rights claims, ICs rebut charges that they are playthings of the powerful and cultivate support networks in civil society. We assess our theory by scrutinizing the first IC with private access: the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Established as an economic court and alleged to conceal a pro-business bias, we leverage original data demonstrating that the ECJ publicizes itself as protector of individuals and matches words with deeds. The ECJ ‘levels’, favoring individuals’ rights claims over claims raised by businesses boasting better legal teams. The ECJ then ‘spotlights’ pro-individual rights rulings via press releases that lawyers amplify in law journals. These findings challenge claims that ICs build legitimacy by stealth and the ‘haves’ come out ahead in litigation.


  • Open Access

    Ideology and Agenda Setting on the Court of Justice of European Union: Evidence from Anti-Trust and State Aid Cases

    by Silje Synnøve Hermansen, Erik Voeten

    Can governments influence the ideological direction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through judicial appointments? How does the internal allocation of responsibilities affect CJEU decisions? These questions have been difficult to answer given that the CJEU publishes its judgments as a collective. We present a model in which a reporting judge proposes a draft judgment to a panel, which can then amend it before voting. The model implies that both the preferences of the median and the reporting judge shape rulings and that the reporting judge's influence grows when other judges face higher costs for drafting alternative opinions. We test these implications using annulment cases against EU Commission decisions relating to competition policy brought in the 1990-2021 period. As the median and the reporting judge are appointed by more economically left-wing governments, the Court increasingly rules in favor of government intervention in the economy.


  • Lingering bias: The effects of legislated gender quotas on representation quality in the European Parliament

    by Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen

    How does biased political recruitment—and the legislation of gender quotas—affect the quality of representation? The article theorizes that biased selection implies a higher hurdle for women than for men. As a consequence, fewer—but more talented and ambitious—female legislators enter office. When quotas are legislated, the bias lingers but takes new forms. Uncertain about their initial choice, parties compensate by drawing on incumbent women’s legislative record to update their beliefs. Quota women are thus more accountable. Drawing on a “before-after” design with a control group, this study investigates legislators’ effort, performance, ambition, and reselection to the European Parliament (1999–2014). It demonstrates that non-quota women handled more high-impact legislation and aimed at longer careers than other legislators. When quotas were imposed, the share of women did not increase. However, quota women had a higher pay off from performing well in office and reacted by increasing their effort.


  • Open Access

    Leveling and Spotlighting: How the European Court of Justice Favors the Weak to Promote its Legitimacy

    by Silje Hermansen, Tommaso Pavone, Louisa Boulaziz

    As private actors turn to international courts (ICs), we argue that judges can seize individual rights litigation to promote themselves as protectors of the weak. By leveling the odds for less resourceful individuals and spotlighting their rights claims, ICs can cultivate support networks in civil society. We verify this legitimation strategy by scrutinizing the first IC with private access: the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Often cast as a stealthy pro-business court, we show that ECJ judges instead publicized themselves as individual rights promoters: do they match words with deeds? Leveraging an original dataset, we find that the ECJ “levels,” favoring individuals’ rights claims compared to claims by businesses boasting larger, more experienced legal teams. The ECJ also “spotlights” support for individuals through press releases that lawyers amplify in law journals. Our findings challenge the view that ICs build legitimacy by stealth and the “haves” come out ahead in litigation.

  • Open Access

    The European Court of Justice, an Able and Unwilling Lawmaker: Evidence from 920 Free Movement and Persons Judgements

    by Urška Šadl, Silje Hermansen

    Does the European Court of Justice respond to political division authoritatively or cautiously? The existing literature suggests the former but this article, surveying 920 free movement of persons judgments, suggests the latter: the Court issues fewer legally weighty decisions about the substance and the scope of the application of rights, principles, and the limits of European competence (audacious judgments) in times of uneven political support while also disproportionately increasing chamber size. The findings cast the Court as a selectively audacious lawmaker, primarily concerned with procedural legitimacy. They nuance the established narrative of the Court as able and willing to make law in times of political stalemate and legislative paralysis. More broadly, the article suggests that courts do not make policy in lieu of legislators when and because they can but avoid policymaking if and until they can.

  • Open Access

    Blurred lines between electoral and parliamentary representation: The use of constituency staff among Members of the European Parliament

    by Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen, Andreja Pegan

    Parliamentarians receive public funding to employ local staff in the constituency. Local staff help members of parliament to execute their representative duties, but can also become an electoral asset. Drawing on theories of personal vote-seeking we study local staff as an example of constituency service. Modelling within-individual changes in local staff size among 1174 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we find that the number of local staff increases before both European and national elections, and more so in candidate-centred than party-centred systems. Despite a single European Parliament (EP) staff system, EU citizens are represented differently depending on where they elect their members and the electoral system that applies. Attempts to mend the EU’s democratic deficit by strengthening MEPs’ contacts with citizens through local staff potentially means that European public money is used to fund EP incumbents’ electoral campaigns. We discuss the implications of our findings for the democratic functioning of the European multi-level system.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    The CJEU Database Platform: Decisions and Decision-Makers

    by Stein Arne Brekke, Joshua C. Fjelstul, Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen, Daniel Naurin

    This article presents the CJEU Database Platform, which provides scholars with an extensive collection of easily accessible, research-ready data on the the universe of cases, decisions, and judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The CJEU Database Platform provides a foundation for the broader CJEU Database currently being developed by The IUROPA Project, a multidisciplinary group of scholars researching judicial politics in the European Union (EU). In this article, we illustrate how the CJEU Database Platform opens the door to new areas of theoretical and empirical research on judicial politics in the EU.