Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games
- 1 November 2017
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 106, 16-37
Abstract
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Funding Information
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
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