Trusting versus monitoring: an experiment of endogenous institutional choices
- 3 May 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review
- Vol. 16 (2) , 329-355
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Max-Planck-Institute for Collective Goods (na)
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