Andrej Angelovski
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Andrej Angelovski has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Daniela Di Cagno
LUISS Guido Carli, Rome
4 shared publicationsWerner Güth
4 shared publications- Carles Solà
CUNY Coll Staten Isl, Lucille & Jay Chazanoff Sch Business, 2800 Victory Blvd, Staten Isl, NY 10314 USA
2 shared publications Francesca Marazzi
2 shared publications- Francesca Marazzi
Department of Economics and Finance, Tor Vergata University of Rome, Rome, Italy
2 shared publications Jordi Brandts
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Coordinating Cooperation: Local and Global Norms in Public-Good Provision
We study how communication structures affect voluntary cooperation when individuals belong simultaneously to a local subgroup and a larger global group. In a repeated public-good experiment, participants are assigned to a large global group divided into three smaller subgroups. We vary communication across three conditions: no communication, subgroup communication, and subgroup communication plus communication among subgroup delegates. We also vary whether participants can contribute only to a global public good or can allocate contributions between a global and a local public good. When only the global public good is available, contributions increase with the scope of communication: subgroup communication raises contributions, and delegate communication raises them further by improving coordination across subgroups. When both public goods are available, participants without communication direct most contributions to the less efficient local public good. Subgroup communication increases total contributions, but primarily by strengthening coordination on the local public good. Delegate communication shifts contributions away from the local public good and toward the globally efficient public good. The analysis of the chat data shows that communication affects not only whether participants reach agreements, but also which contribution norm is implemented.
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCoordinating Cooperation: Local and Global Norms in Public-Good Provision
We study how communication structures affect voluntary cooperation when individuals belong simultaneously to a local subgroup and a larger global group. In a repeated public-good experiment, participants are assigned to a large global group divided into three smaller subgroups. We vary communication across three conditions: no communication, subgroup communication, and subgroup communication plus communication among subgroup delegates. We also vary whether participants can contribute only to a global public good or can allocate contributions between a global and a local public good. When only the global public good is available, contributions increase with the scope of communication: subgroup communication raises contributions, and delegate communication raises them further by improving coordination across subgroups. When both public goods are available, participants without communication direct most contributions to the less efficient local public good. Subgroup communication increases total contributions, but primarily by strengthening coordination on the local public good. Delegate communication shifts contributions away from the local public good and toward the globally efficient public good. The analysis of the chat data shows that communication affects not only whether participants reach agreements, but also which contribution norm is implemented.
- Open Access
- 28 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 101 (4) , 821-855
Bidding for better jobs: an experiment on gender differences in competitiveness without a real-effort task
There is evidence from experiments, using real-effort tasks and tournament incentives, documenting women performing worse than men under competition. We question whether this perhaps is due to the very particular way in which competition is typically studied in lab experiments. We alternatively model competitive behavior in firms by letting experimental participants compete in bidding for salaries (prizes) of different sizes in flat or steep organizational hierarchies. In our representation of job competition via a competitive bidding process, bids sum up, in a stylized way, various monetary aspects of how one competes for higher positions in organizations. Higher bidding for positions corresponds to behaving more competitively. We mostly find no statistically significant differences between women’s and men’s bidding. Women do win the top positions significantly more often, but there are no differences in earnings, the difference between salaries and bids. These results may function as a counterbalance to results finding women less willing to compete in head-to-head (real-effort) competition. One approach, real-effort versus pure choice, is not superior to the other. They likely yield complementary insights on the same issue, like we believe they do in this case.
- 28 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 101 (4) , 821-855
Open AccessBidding for better jobs: an experiment on gender differences in competitiveness without a real-effort task
There is evidence from experiments, using real-effort tasks and tournament incentives, documenting women performing worse than men under competition. We question whether this perhaps is due to the very particular way in which competition is typically studied in lab experiments. We alternatively model competitive behavior in firms by letting experimental participants compete in bidding for salaries (prizes) of different sizes in flat or steep organizational hierarchies. In our representation of job competition via a competitive bidding process, bids sum up, in a stylized way, various monetary aspects of how one competes for higher positions in organizations. Higher bidding for positions corresponds to behaving more competitively. We mostly find no statistically significant differences between women’s and men’s bidding. Women do win the top positions significantly more often, but there are no differences in earnings, the difference between salaries and bids. These results may function as a counterbalance to results finding women less willing to compete in head-to-head (real-effort) competition. One approach, real-effort versus pure choice, is not superior to the other. They likely yield complementary insights on the same issue, like we believe they do in this case.
- Open Access
- 10 April 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 28 (3) , 513-535
Trust and trustworthiness in the villain’s dilemma: collaborative dishonesty with conflicting incentives?
Wrong-doers may try to collaborate to achieve greater gains than would be possible alone. Yet potential collaborators face two issues: they need to accurately identify other cheaters and trust that their collaborators do not betray them when the opportunity arises. These concerns may be in tension, since the people who are genuine cheaters could also be the likeliest to be untrustworthy. We formalise this interaction in the ‘villain’s dilemma’ and use it in a laboratory experiment to study three questions: what kind of information helps people to overcome the villain’s dilemma? Does the villain’s dilemma promote or hamper cheating relative to individual settings? Who participates in the villain’s dilemma and who is a trustworthy collaborative cheater? We find that information has important consequences for behaviour in the villain’s dilemma. Public information about actions is important for supporting collaborative dishonesty, while more limited sources of information lead to back-stabbing and poor collaboration. We also find that the level of information, role of the decision maker, and round of the experiment affect whether dishonesty is higher or lower in the villain’s dilemma than in our individual honesty settings. Finally, individual factors are generally unrelated to collaborating but individual dishonesty predicts untrustworthiness as a collaborator.
- 10 April 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 28 (3) , 513-535
Open AccessTrust and trustworthiness in the villain’s dilemma: collaborative dishonesty with conflicting incentives?
Wrong-doers may try to collaborate to achieve greater gains than would be possible alone. Yet potential collaborators face two issues: they need to accurately identify other cheaters and trust that their collaborators do not betray them when the opportunity arises. These concerns may be in tension, since the people who are genuine cheaters could also be the likeliest to be untrustworthy. We formalise this interaction in the ‘villain’s dilemma’ and use it in a laboratory experiment to study three questions: what kind of information helps people to overcome the villain’s dilemma? Does the villain’s dilemma promote or hamper cheating relative to individual settings? Who participates in the villain’s dilemma and who is a trustworthy collaborative cheater? We find that information has important consequences for behaviour in the villain’s dilemma. Public information about actions is important for supporting collaborative dishonesty, while more limited sources of information lead to back-stabbing and poor collaboration. We also find that the level of information, role of the decision maker, and round of the experiment affect whether dishonesty is higher or lower in the villain’s dilemma than in our individual honesty settings. Finally, individual factors are generally unrelated to collaborating but individual dishonesty predicts untrustworthiness as a collaborator.
- Open Access
- 8 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 112
Deciding for others: Local public good contributions with intermediaries
- 8 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 112
Open AccessDeciding for others: Local public good contributions with intermediaries
- 1 April 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 184, 232-252
Equal and unequal profit sharing in highly interdependent work groups: A laboratory experiment
- 1 April 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 184, 232-252
Equal and unequal profit sharing in highly interdependent work groups: A laboratory experiment
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 98, 102425
When to stop — A cardinal secretary search experiment
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 98, 102425
When to stop — A cardinal secretary search experiment
- 18 July 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 88 (1) , 97-119
Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
- 18 July 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 88 (1) , 97-119
Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
- 3 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review
- Vol. 16 (2) , 329-355
Trusting versus monitoring: an experiment of endogenous institutional choices
- 3 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review
- Vol. 16 (2) , 329-355
Trusting versus monitoring: an experiment of endogenous institutional choices
- Open Access
- 30 April 2019
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 57 (4) , 2163-2183
RANK‐ORDER COMPETITION IN THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS
Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free‐riding in impure public goods. In our Rank‐Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Rank‐Order‐VCM) group members compete via observable contributions for a larger share of the public good; high contributors receive preferential access (a larger share), while low contributors receive restricted access (a lower share). In a laboratory experiment, Rank‐Order‐VCM elicits median contributions equal to the full endowment throughout the finitely played games with constant groups. In the control treatment, with randomly assigned ranks, the contributions are significantly lower and decline over time. We thus provide evidence of rank competition, in situations where discriminatory access to public goods is possible, being efficiency enhancing. (JELC91, H41)
- 30 April 2019
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 57 (4) , 2163-2183
Open AccessRANK‐ORDER COMPETITION IN THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS
Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free‐riding in impure public goods. In our Rank‐Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Rank‐Order‐VCM) group members compete via observable contributions for a larger share of the public good; high contributors receive preferential access (a larger share), while low contributors receive restricted access (a lower share). In a laboratory experiment, Rank‐Order‐VCM elicits median contributions equal to the full endowment throughout the finitely played games with constant groups. In the control treatment, with randomly assigned ranks, the contributions are significantly lower and decline over time. We thus provide evidence of rank competition, in situations where discriminatory access to public goods is possible, being efficiency enhancing. (JELC91, H41)
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 77, 40-49
Does heterogeneity spoil the basket? The role of productivity and feedback information on public good provision
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 77, 40-49
Does heterogeneity spoil the basket? The role of productivity and feedback information on public good provision