Fixed Fee or Proportional Fee? Contracts in Platform Selling Under Asymmetric Information
- 3 April 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Electronic Commerce
- Vol. 26 (2) , 245-275
Abstract
In platform selling, platforms commonly charge third-party sellers a commission fee, which affects sellers’ decision making and platforms’ contract choice. This study explores this choice where a platform privately knows the market size and intends to signal to a seller. We aim to provide researchers and platform-selling practitioners insights into contract and information strategies. The result shows that the fixed-fee contract leads to either a costly or a costless signaling scenario. In costly scenarios, the high-demand platform must downward distort the fixed rent to distinguish itself from the low-demand platform. This distortion results in a different consensus on two players’ contract preference when the commission rate in the proportional-fee contract is exogenous. Under symmetric information, consensus is achieved only on the proportional-fee contract. However, in asymmetric information settings, this consensus may arise on fixed-fee contracts if market uncertainty is high. Furthermore, the comparison of information strategies reveals that players can reach an agreement on both the information-sharing strategy and the proportional-fee contract under certain conditions. When the platform endogenously determines the commission rate, this decision making can also signal demand type, and only the proportional-fee contract leads to a win–win outcome.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (72102163)
- Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation, Ministry of Education of China (20YJC630037)
This publication has 37 references indexed in Scilit:
- Strategic Analysis of the Agency Model for Digital GoodsProduction and Operations Management, 2017
- Agency Selling or Reselling? Channel Structures in Electronic RetailingManagement Science, 2016
- Marketplace or Reseller?Management Science, 2015
- The Strategic Role of Third‐Party Marketplaces in RetailingProduction and Operations Management, 2014
- Supplier Encroachment Under Asymmetric InformationManagement Science, 2014
- Competition and Coordination in Online MarketplacesProduction and Operations Management, 2012
- Firm Strategies in the “Mid Tail” of Platform-Based RetailingMarketing Science, 2011
- Competition in two-sided marketsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2006
- Salesforce Compensation Scheme and Consumer InferencesManagement Science, 2003
- Signaling Games and Stable EquilibriaThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987