Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements with the Optimal Intensity of Cooperation
Open Access
- 9 January 2025
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 88 (2) , 249-278
Abstract
This paper analyzes international environmental agreements in three-stage games consisting of a membership subgame, the signatories’ decision on the intensity of cooperation, and an emissions subgame. Signatories may act as Stackelberg leaders or play Nash. In the Stackelberg game, the highest intensity of cooperation between signatories is optimal. In the Nash game, a moderate or the highest intensity of cooperation is optimal if emissions are strategic substitutes. In this case the equilibrium emissions and the stable coalition of the Nash game with optimal cooperation intensity are identical to the equilibrium emissions and the stable coalition of the Stackelberg game with the highest cooperation intensity. Finally, we apply our results to coalition formation games of the literature. In the applied Nash games, optimizing with respect to the cooperation intensity may enlarge the stable coalition up to the grand coalition which implements the first best.Keywords
Funding Information
- FernUniversität in Hagen
This publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
- Pledge-and-review bargainingJournal of Economic Theory, 2022
- A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperationEuropean Economic Review, 2022
- The efficacy of international environmental agreements when adaptation matters: Nash-Cournot vs Stackelberg leadershipJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2021
- Stability of international environmental agreements under isoelastic utilityResource and Energy Economics, 2020
- Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation gameJournal of Public Economics, 2018
- Is trade liberalization conducive to the formation of climate coalitions?International Tax and Public Finance, 2014
- Self-enforcing environmental agreements and international tradeJournal of Public Economics, 2013
- The size of stable cartels: An analytical approachInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011
- Strategies for the international protection of the environmentJournal of Public Economics, 1993
- International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissionsEnvironmental and Resource Economics, 1992