Constraints on Rational Theory Choice
- 5 February 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 68 (3) , 639-661
Abstract
In a recent article, Samir Okasha presented an argument that suggests that there is no rational way to choose among scientific theories. This would seriously undermine the view that science is a rational enterprise. In this article, I show how a suitably nuanced view of what scientific rationality requires allows us to sidestep this argument. In doing so, I present a new argument in favour of voluntarism of the type favoured by van Fraassen. I then show how such a view of scientific rationality gives a precise interpretation of what Thomas Kuhn thought.Keywords
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