Ken-Ichi Shimomura
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ken-Ichi Shimomura has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Roberto Serrano
Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, USA
2 shared publications - Takehiko Yamato
Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics, School of Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan
2 shared publications - Elena Inarra
Basque Country University
1 shared publication - Junyi Shen
Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan
1 shared publication Kiyotaka Takahashi
Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology
1 shared publication- Theodore C. Bergstrom
University of California Santa Barbara
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 49-78
Revisiting Marshallian Versus Walrasian Stability in an Experimental Market
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 49-78
Revisiting Marshallian Versus Walrasian Stability in an Experimental Market
- Open Access
- 15 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 18 (1) , 16-37
The bargaining set and coalition formation
We study solution concepts for nontransferable utility games according to which the coalition structure and the payoff allocations are simultaneously determined. The steady bargaining set is a refinement of the Zhou bargaining set, which is included in the Mas‐Colell bargaining set. We prove the nonemptiness and partial efficiency of the steady bargaining set for at least one coalition structure under the restrictive non‐crossing condition. Without this condition, the Zhou bargaining set may be empty and the Mas‐Colell bargaining set is nonempty but may not be efficient.
- 15 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 18 (1) , 16-37
Open AccessThe bargaining set and coalition formation
We study solution concepts for nontransferable utility games according to which the coalition structure and the payoff allocations are simultaneously determined. The steady bargaining set is a refinement of the Zhou bargaining set, which is included in the Mas‐Colell bargaining set. We prove the nonemptiness and partial efficiency of the steady bargaining set for at least one coalition structure under the restrictive non‐crossing condition. Without this condition, the Zhou bargaining set may be empty and the Mas‐Colell bargaining set is nonempty but may not be efficient.
- Open Access
- 18 February 2020
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue économique
- Vol. 71 (2) , 225-266
The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
One of the many important contributions in David Schmeidler’s distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. JEL Codes: C71, C72.
- 18 February 2020
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue économique
- Vol. 71 (2) , 225-266
Open AccessThe Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
One of the many important contributions in David Schmeidler’s distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. JEL Codes: C71, C72.
- 27 September 2009
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (1)
Simple Economies with Multiple Equilibria
We study a general class of pure exchange economies that have multiple equilibria. This class generalizes an example presented by Shapley and Shubik. For such economies, we find easily verified conditions that determine whether there are multiple equilibria. We also provide simple methods for constructing economies in which arbitrary pre-specified sets of prices are equilibria. These economies have strong comparative statics properties, since prices at interior competitive equilibrium depend on the parameters of utility but not on the endowment quantities. We believe that this easily manipulated special case is a valuable addition to the class of simple general equilibrium economies that can be used as testing grounds in economic theory.
- 27 September 2009
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (1)
Simple Economies with Multiple Equilibria
We study a general class of pure exchange economies that have multiple equilibria. This class generalizes an example presented by Shapley and Shubik. For such economies, we find easily verified conditions that determine whether there are multiple equilibria. We also provide simple methods for constructing economies in which arbitrary pre-specified sets of prices are equilibria. These economies have strong comparative statics properties, since prices at interior competitive equilibrium depend on the parameters of utility but not on the endowment quantities. We believe that this easily manipulated special case is a valuable addition to the class of simple general equilibrium economies that can be used as testing grounds in economic theory.
- Open Access
- 31 December 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 52 (3) , 288-301
A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
- 31 December 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 52 (3) , 288-301
Open AccessA comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel