The Tragedy of the Horizon: A Contracting Account
Authors:
- Christos CabolisCCChristos Cabolis
- Karl SchmeddersKSKarl Schmedders
Preprint
- 6 June 2026
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The “tragedy of the horizon” captures the gap between long-horizon climate damagesand the shorter horizons of corporate decision-making. We provide a contracting accountof this idea using a deliberately standard CARA-normal moral-hazard model.Under full commitment, the optimal linear contract can condition on long-horizon outcomes;horizon mismatch alone does not generate underinvestment. The tragedy ariseswhen shareholders cannot credibly commit today to compensate a CEO based on outcomesverified after the contracting horizon. Restricting compensation to an interimsignal yields a strict effort wedge relative to the full-commitment benchmark. The keycomparative static is that the wedge is largest when the long-horizon outcome wouldhave been most informative if contractible; that is, a more informative noncontractiblelong-horizon outcome does not close the gap. We also quantify the shareholder value ofextending the contracting horizon. The implication is that climate-linked CEO pay canaddress the tragedy of the horizon only when the relevant metrics are both informativeand contractible.Keywords
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