Dynamic CEO Compensation
Authors:
- Alex EdmansAEAlex Edmans
- Xavier GabaixXGXavier Gabaix
- Tomasz SadzikTSTomasz Sadzik
- Yuliy SannikovYSYuliy Sannikov
- 12 September 2012
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 67 (5) , 1603-1647
Abstract
We study optimal compensation in a dynamic framework where the CEO consumes in multiple periods, can undo the contract by privately saving, and can temporarily inflate earnings. We obtain a simple closed‐form contract that yields clear predictions for how the level and performance sensitivity of pay vary over time and across firms. The contract can be implemented by escrowing the CEO's pay into a “Dynamic Incentive Account” that comprises cash and the firm's equity. The account features state‐dependent rebalancing to ensure its equity proportion is always sufficient to induce effort, and time‐dependent vesting to deter short‐termism.Keywords
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