JZJiayu (Kamessi) Zhao

Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Value of a Little Flexibility in Stable Matching

    by Daniel Freund, Sebastien Martin, Jiayu Zhao

    This paper investigates the value of introducing a little flexibility into the classical n × n student-optimal stable matching (SOSM) problem. We define flexibility as the ability to relax stability constraints, and we aim to characterize the value of flexibility-the reduction in total rank across all students when a single flexible match is permitted. We find that this minimal intervention-affecting just one match out of n-can nevertheless generate system-wide efficiency gains. We first establish tight upper and lower bounds: in the best case, a single flexible match yields an aggregate rank reduction of more than n(n-3), more than if every student moved from their second-to-worst to their second-to-best choice; in the worst case, flexibility yields no improvement. We then explore how preference structure affects the value of flexibility. With mild randomness in preferences, the value of flexibility already scales as Θ̃(n) in expectation, though only Θ(log n) students strictly benefit from flexibility. In fully random markets, we show that flexibility continues to generate Ω(n) improvement in rank in expectation, with Θ̃(n) students strictly better off. This suggests that allowing even a single flexible match can improve the average rank across all students by a constant. Our theoretical findings are supported by simulations using both random and empirical preference profiles; the latter are based on data from the dating platform OkCupid. Across these environments, we find that the gains from flexibility remain significant under various practical constraints, showing that even greater improvements are possible when the flexible pair is chosen optimally and when a small number of flexible matches (rather than just one) are permitted. Overall, our results demonstrate that a little flexibility goes a long way in stable matching.

  • Top Cited Papers

    On the Supply of Autonomous Vehicles in Platforms

    by Daniel Freund, Ilan Lobel, Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao

    Problem definition: The ongoing large-scale deployment of autonomous vehicle (AV) technology has the potential to fundamentally change the transportation landscape. Due to the high cost of AV hardware, the most likely path to widespread AV use is via platforms that can sustain high utilization, such as ride-hailing and delivery services. Our work studies the incentives of stakeholders in such deployments, possible misalignments, and contracting solutions to overcome them. Methodology/results: We consider four potential operational models to commercialize AVs, which we model as a supply chain game between a platform, an AV supplier, and human individual contractors (ICs), including (1) an open platform in which the AV supplier and ICs bring their own vehicles to the system, (2) an AV-supplier operated platform without ICs, (3) a platform that sources AVs through leasing contracts, and (4) an integrated supply chain. We find that except for the AV-only platform, all deployment models are subject to a risk of AV underutilization due to the need to maintain the ICs’ utilization sufficiently high to ensure ICs remain engaged. As AV underutilization propagates in a nonintegrated supply chain, an open platform can become arbitrarily worse than supply chain integration, and careful usage commitments are needed to overcome the efficiency loss. Managerial implications: This paper identifies a new kind of supply chain misalignment that is likely to emerge as AVs become deployed technology, which both platform operators and AV suppliers should be mindful of. Moreover, we demonstrate the value of usage commitment in the deployment of AVs through an open platform, which makes it more efficient than AV-only/AV leasing platforms. History: This paper was selected as part of the 1RR initiative between the M&SOM Journal and the MSOM Society. This particular paper was part of the 2024 MSOM Service Operations SIG Conference. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1175 .


  • Open Access

    On the Supply of Autonomous Vehicles in Platforms

    by Daniel Freund, Ilan Lobel, Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao

    The likely large-scale deployment of autonomous vehicle (AV) technology in the near future has the potential to fundamentally change the transportation landscape. Due to the high cost of AV hardware, the most likely path to widespread AV use is via platforms that can sustain high utilization, such as ride-hailing and delivery services. In this paper, we consider four potential operational models to commercialize AVs, which we model as a supply chain game between a platform, an AV supplier, and human drivers that join as individual contractors (ICs). Our operational models include (1) an open platform that outsources the high capital burden of AVs by allowing the AV supplier and human drivers to bring their own vehicles into the system, (2) an AV-only platform that is operated independently by the AV supplier, (3) a platform that sources AVs from the supplier through leasing contracts, and (4) an integrated supply chain in which the same entity operates the platform and supplies the AVs. We use (4) as a benchmark to measure the performances of the other models. We find that apart from operational model (2), all deployment models are subject to a risk of AV underutilization due to the need to maintain the ICs' utilization sufficiently high to ensure ICs remain engaged. In the non-integrated models, this risk can propagate backwards in the supply chain and thereby negatively affect its efficiency. In particular, as a result of AV underutilization, the supply chain profit of an open platform model can be arbitrarily smaller than the integrated benchmark. AV underutilization also arises in the presence of leasing contracts and leads to significant supply chain misalignment. The results demonstrate that the platform's optimal dispatch decision, via AV underutilization, may lead to market failures. In light of these market failures we explore potential contracting solutions through usage commitments. We find that when the platform can contractually commit to an AV utilization level under each demand realization in each scenario, the supply chain can be fully aligned. Moreover, even when demand is not fully contractible, well-designed dispatch commitments can still significantly increase the open platform efficiency. As a proof of concept, we show a guarantee of the following flavor for a simple prioritization contract: either the supply chain profit under the contract is at least half of that of an integrated supply chain or the supply chain can achieve half the profit of an integrated supply chain even without a contract. Despite the inability to fully align the supply chain, this contract demonstrates the value of supply chain contracts when compared to the potentially unbounded efficiency loss in the absence of a contract. In particular, with usage commitments, an open platform exhibits stronger theoretical guarantees and superior numerical performances compared to the other operational models considered in the paper, such as AV leasing or AV-only platforms.

  • Open Access

    Two-Sided Flexibility in Platforms

    by Daniel Freund, Sebastien Martin, Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao

    Flexibility is a cornerstone of operations management, crucial to hedge stochasticity in product demands, service requirements, and resource allocation. In two-sided platforms, flexibility is also two-sided and can be viewed as the compatibility of agents on one side with agents on the other side. Platform actions often influence the flexibility on either the demand or the supply side. But how should flexibility be jointly allocated across different sides? Whereas the literature has traditionally focused on only one side at a time, our work initiates the study of two-sided flexibility in matching platforms. We propose a parsimonious matching model in random graphs and identify the flexibility allocation that optimizes the expected size of a maximum matching. Our findings reveal that flexibility allocation is a first-order issue: for a given flexibility budget, the resulting matching size can vary greatly depending on how the budget is allocated. Moreover, even in the simple and symmetric settings we study, the quest for the optimal allocation is complicated. In particular, easy and costly mistakes can be made if the flexibility decisions on the demand and supply side are optimized independently (e.g., by two different teams in the company), rather than jointly. To guide the search for optimal flexibility allocation, we uncover two effects, flexibility cannibalization, and flexibility abundance, that govern when the optimal design places the flexibility budget only on one side or equally on both sides. In doing so we identify the study of two-sided flexibility as a significant aspect of platform efficiency.

  • Overbooking with Bounded Loss

    by Daniel Freund, Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao

    We study a classic problem in revenue management: quantity-based, single-resource revenue management with no-shows. In this problem, a firm observes a sequence of T customers requesting a service. Each arrival is drawn independently from a known distribution of k different types, and the firm needs to decide irrevocably whether to accept or reject requests in an online fashion. The firm has a capacity of resources B and wants to maximize its profit. Each accepted service request yields a type-dependent revenue and has a type-dependent probability of requiring a resource once all arrivals have occurred (or be a no-show). If the number of accepted arrivals that require a resource at the end of the horizon is greater than B, the firm needs to pay a fixed compensation for each service request that it cannot fulfill. With a clairvoyant that knows all arrivals ahead of time, as a benchmark, we provide an algorithm with a uniform additive loss bound, that is, its expected loss is independent of T. This improves upon prior works achieving [ ] guarantees. Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge generous support by the Sloan School of Management at MIT. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1293 .