Implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction
- 1 November 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 49 (4) , 1599-1630
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
Funding Information
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science London (2153029, 20330052, 20730226, 24530379)
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Partial tax coordination in a repeated game settingEuropean Journal of Political Economy, 2014
- The Theory of International Tax Competition and Coordination2013
- Minimum taxes and repeated tax competitionInternational Tax and Public Finance, 2011
- Are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting?Journal of Public Economics, 2008
- An index of capital tax competitionInternational Tax and Public Finance, 2008
- Discriminatory tariffs and international negotiationsJournal of International Economics, 2003
- A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax CompetitionJournal of Public Economic Theory, 2002
- Fortress Building in Global Tax CompetitionJournal of Urban Economics, 1999
- Strategic Capital Tax Competition: A Pecuniary Externality and a Corrective DeviceJournal of Urban Economics, 1994
- Asymmetric tax competitionJournal of Urban Economics, 1991